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 Abstract 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the short and long–term overreaction 
phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market. In addition, the thesis investigates links between 
stock market regulatory policies (price limits and circuit breakers) and the profitability of 
contrarian strategies. Finally, the study examines the effect of regime switch – from strict price 
limits to circuit breakers – on the volatility spillover, delayed price discovery and trading 
interference hypotheses. 
Using data from the Egyptian stock exchange, I find that a panel data approach adds a new 
dimension to the existing models, offers interesting additional insights and reveals the 
importance of the role of unobservable firm-specific factors in addition to observable factors 
in the analysis of the overreaction phenomenon. Moreover, portfolios based on unobserved 
factors i.e. management quality, corporate governance and political connections of board 
members, significantly outperform traditional portfolios based on size. Results also show 
evidence of genuine long-term overreaction phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market as the 
contrarian profits of the arbitrage portfolio cannot be attributed to the small firm effect, 
formation period length, and stability of time varying factor or seasonality effect. Finally, 
switching from a strict price limit to a circuit breakers regime increases stock price volatility 
and disrupts the price discovery mechanism in the Egyptian stock market. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Motivation 
 
1.1 Introduction and background 
The research on Behavioural Finance (BF) is concerned with the psychological interpretations 
of investor behaviour in stock markets. BF focuses on the cognitive psychology that links 
financial economics with the human decision making process. The main research findings of 
the BF show that investors interpret information differently and irrationally, and this leads to 
uninformed decisions. Therefore investors sometimes behave in an unpredictable and biased 
manner. Behavioural Finance puts much weight on the behaviour of investors that leads to 
stock market anomalies, Subrahmanyam (2007).    
 
In other words, BF tries to introduce a better interpretation for the existing financial 
econometrics models by taking into account human emotions and cognitive errors. Research 
findings on BF find that human flaws are predictable and consistent; therefore analysing 
investor psychology might offer superior investment opportunities Stracca (2004).  
 
The overreaction phenomenon is one of the consequences of taking human emotions in 
consideration when analysing investors’ behaviour in stock markets. In addition, the 
overreaction phenomenon is considered the most recent market anomaly added to the long list 
of traditional market anomalies, i.e. day of the week, January effect and low P/E ratio. It is 
worth mentioning that many non-traditional financial anomalies have been added to the 
literature over time, e.g.the excessive volatility of stock prices (Shiller 1981), long-term price 
2 
 
reversal (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985), and short-term trends (momentum) Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993).  
 
Keynes (1936) is considered the first to observe the overreaction phenomenon. Keynes argues 
that daily variability of profits does influence markets and causes excessive reaction. The 
appropriate reaction to information can be defined in the light of Bayes’ rule (1980). However, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) (TK) introduced the representativeness heuristic theory (RHT) 
in which people tend to underweight more distant past information and overweight recent 
information. In addition, TK argue that they usually judge the probabilities of an event 
compared with a well known probability distribution of other events or previous experiences 
or beliefs.  
 
Arrow (1982) finds results consistent with the RHT and concludes that all securities and 
futures markets can be characterised by excessive reaction to the recent information. Dreman 
(1982) and Basu (1977) also find evidence of the P/E anomaly as they find that stocks with 
low P/E ratio outperform those of high P/E ratio and earn abnormal risk-adjusted returns. In 
addition, Dreman (1982) provided a behavioural interpretation of PE/ratio hypothesis; he 
argued that stocks with low P/E ratios are underpriced due to investor pessimism as the result 
of announcements of poor earnings or other bad news. 
 
Barberies, Schleifer and Vishny (1998) introduce the model of investment sentiment in which 
they provide an alternative interpretation to the under and overreaction phenomena. They 
differentiate between the size of the shocks or signals and their weights (importance). They 
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argue that underreaction occurs if investors focus too much on the importance (weight) of the 
signal while the overreaction occurs when investors focus too much on the size (strength) of 
the shocks. On the other hand, (Daniel, Hirschleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) introduced 
amodel of biased self-attribution in which they argue that individual investors are over 
confident and subject to self-attribution bias when public information is found in line with 
prior information. This leads to rapid overreaction to the predicted signals.  
 
George and Hwang (2007) argue that the systematic mistakes of irrational investors in 
responding to new information are the main determinant of the overreaction hypothesis. These 
mistakes may result from the biased self-attribution theory of Daniel et al. (1998) or investors’ 
beliefs about the expected price behaviour in response to good or bad news (George and 
Hwang, 2007). Therefore investors may interpret and react to the new information arriving in 
the market differently; this leads to two contradictory investment behaviours, namely, price 
continuation or price reversals.  
 
On the other hand, the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1976) assumes that stock prices 
reflect all information available instantly, and prices follow a random walk with no trend and 
therefore abnormal profits are impossible; however in reality, investors tend to overreact to 
new information, in particular to positive and negative shocks. This suggests that stock price 
trends are predictable and investors can achieve abnormal returns. 
 
The dilemma, therefore, is whether stock prices are predictable and valuation errors are 
systematic or not. If this is so we have therefore a potential conflict between the Market 
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Efficiency and the Behavioural Finance views. The former assumes that stock prices follow 
random walk and equilibrium will be restored in the longer run in the event of temporary 
fluctuations in stock prices. Therefore the true price is the present value of the future dividends 
stream associated with it. However, the latter assumes that prices are highly influenced by 
investors’ psychological makeup (optimistic or pessimistic). This pushes prices to unexpected 
levels in both directions. Therefore the true stock price is the expected price based on the 
psychological makeup of investors. 
  
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) were the first to empirically examine the overreaction hypothesis 
in the finance literature. They built on the reasoning of Dreman (1982) and discovered a new 
stock market anomaly based on the Tversky and Kahneman’s representativeness theory 
(1974).    
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue that price reversals can be predicted in the US using only 
past return data (3-5 years) in case of systematic price overshoot. Therefore stock returns are 
predictable and this implies violation of the weak-form market efficiency. They formulate two 
main testable hypotheses; the first hypothesis, “large stock price movements will be followed 
by price reversals in the opposite direction” (the directional effect of Brown and Harlow, 
1988) and the second hypothesis, “the larger the initial price movements the greater the 
subsequent reversals” (the magnitude effect). This means that stock returns exhibit negative 
serial correlation over the longer horizon and therefore investors may earn abnormal returns 
by exploiting this long-term mispricing. This suggests a clear violation of market efficiency. 
Fama (1976) formulated the efficient market condition as in equation 1 
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~( 1tit FuE  is the estimated residual portfolio returns given a 
complete set of information arriving in the market. The efficiency condition is therefore that 
the expected returns on Winners equals the expected returns on Losers and equal to zero; 
therefore investors cannot beat the market by constructing a portfolio based on the past return; 
arbitrage profits are zero. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) (DT) formulate this condition as in 
equation (2) 
 
                  0)|~()|~( 11   tLttWt FuEFuE                                                              (2) 
 
By contrast, the Overreaction hypothesis of DT is “Loser portfolios constructed using past 
information (stock returns) outperform those of Winners”. In particular, they expect residuals 
to satisfy the following relationship
1
: 
                0)|~(0)|~( 11   tLttWt FuEandFuE                                                   (3) 
 
                                                          
1
  Losers are defined as stocks with poor performance (negative stock returns) in the previous period earn positive 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns in the subsequent period in US. However Winners are defined as stocks that 
perform better (positive stock returns) in the previous period earn negative risk-adjusted abnormal returns in the 
subsequent period. (DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987). 
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In other words, abnormal returns to Winners are expected to be negative and those to Losers, 
positive. If the market is efficient, trading strategies based on Loser-Winner anomaly cannot 
achieve abnormal returns (after transaction costs) given the available set of information m
tF 1  
between market participants (Jensen 1978). Therefore, if the efficient market hypothesis holds, 
the difference between excess returns on Winners and Losers is zero as in equation 4. 
However, if the overreaction hypothesis holds, we would expect positive excess returns based 
on the Losers–Winners anomaly as in equation 5 (see Dissanaike, 1997).  
 
                         0,,  TWTL RR                                                           (4) 
                         0,,  TWTL RR                                                           (5) 
Where R is the cumulative average excess return during test period T. TLR ,  and  TWR ,  are the 
average returns on the loser and winner’s portfolios respectively. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find that past Losers outperform past Winners by 24.6% in the 
US, and therefore they recommend selling Winners short and buying Losers as a profitable 
strategy. They argue that the overreaction phenomenon causes past Losers to be underpriced 
and past Winners to be overpriced. In addition, they find evidence that the overreaction effect 
is asymmetric and most of the cumulative average abnormal residuals (16.6%) are realised in 
January. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) concluded that the market prices are predictable and 
deviate from their fundamental due to investors’ overreactive behaviour and this suggests a 
clear violation of the Weak Form market efficiency (stock prices reflect past information). 
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Fama (1998), on the other hand, argues that long-term overreaction phenomenon is quite 
sensitive to the methodology of modelling excess returns (i.e. Cumulative Abnormal Returs- 
CARs or Buy and Hold-BAH). In addition, the abnormal returns sometimes disappear when 
using particular models (CAPM, market model and market-adjusted return) or when using a 
particular statistical approach Fama (1998)
2
. This suggests that the existence of the long–term 
overreaction might be attributable to chance; this argument is consistent with the EMH Fama 
(1998).  
 
1.2 Research objectives and motivation  
Emerging stock markets –by contrast with developed markets –– are characterised by excess 
volatility and lower efficiency (Fama, 1998). Therefore investors and fund managers in 
particular have been trying to exploit market imperfection to achieve abnormal returns by 
creating trading rules or exploiting market anomalies. The overreaction phenomenon is 
regarded as one of the newly added anomalies to the existing list of stock market anomalies 
(De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). The existing body of the literature has extensively investigated 
the overreaction phenomenon and how to achieve abnormal returns in developed markets; 
however, few studies have been conducted on emerging markets.  
 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the short and long–term overreaction 
phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market. The Egyptian stock market is one of the leading 
                                                          
2
  Fama (1998) defend the efficient market hypothesis and claims that the long-term return anomalies are fragile. 
In addition, he claims that the computation errors of the cumulative average abnormal returns using different 
methodologies (CARs, Buy and Hold, Rebalancing methods) are the main cause of the overreaction and 
underreaction anomalies in stock markets. 
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emerging markets in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) based on the statistics 
of the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE, 2010).  In addition, the thesis links between the 
long- term overreaction phenomenon and the regulatory policies (price limits and circuit 
breakers). Finally, the study examines the effect of regime switch – from strict price limits to 
circuit breakers – on the volatility spillover, delayed price discovery and trading interference 
hypotheses
3
. 
 
The existing body of literature has investigated the overreaction phenomenon using traditional 
methodologies; either cross-sectional or time series analyses. However, none of the existing 
studies has combined the two dimensions using panel data models involving cross section-
time series analysis (CSTS). Ignoring time dimension may lay the estimation open to bias 
(Cressy and Farag, 2011). Moreover, none of the existing studies has investigated the 
overreaction phenomenon dynamics using a dynamic panel data model and system GMM in 
                                                          
3
  Price limits are regulatory tools in both equity and futures markets in which further trading is prevented for a 
period of time with the intention of cooling market traders’ emotions and reducing price volatility. Within circuit 
breakers regime, trading may be stopped - for a pre-specified duration – across the whole market or for a 
particular stock if stock prices or market index hit a pre-determined level (Kim and Yang (2008)). 
Volatility spillover hypothesis states that price limits cause stock price volatility to spread out over a few days 
subsequent to the event (limit hit) (Kim and Rhee (1997)). Delayed price discovery hypothesis states that the 
price discovery mechanism is delayed due to the suspension of trading for a period of time (Kim and Rhee 
(1997)). Therefore, it is argued, price limits prevent security prices from reaching their intrinsic values and 
equilibrium levels. According to the trading interference hypothesis, Fama (1989), Telser (1989), Lauterbach and 
Ben-Zion (1993) and Kim and Rhee (1997) claim that if trading is prevented by price limits, then shares become 
less liquid and this leads to intensive trading activity during the following trading days. Detailed discussions of 
the above mentioned hypothesis are provided in chapter 5. 
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particular. In addition, none of the existing literature has identified the main unobservable 
factors that may be used to construct the so-called Unobservable portfolios
4
. 
 
Finally, regulatory policies (price limits and circuit breakers) play an important role in cooling 
down stock market volatility in both developed (trading halts) and emerging markets. 
However, none of the existing body of the overreaction literature has investigated the link 
between regulatory policies and overreaction hypothesis. The above-mentioned gaps in the 
literature are the main motivation for this thesis. 
 
1.3 Research contributions 
One of the most important contributions of this thesis is the novel methodology. A panel data 
model is used for the first time in the finance literature to examine the overreaction hypothesis.   
There are many benefits of using panel data models (Hsiao 2004:p3). Firstly, panel data 
models take individual stock heterogeneity into consideration; ignoring individual 
heterogeneity may lay the estimation open to bias and inconsistent estimates (Baltagi, 2010). 
Secondly, panel data models are less vulnerable to collinearity among variables, are more 
informative, offer more degrees of freedom and less variation (Baltagi, 2010: p7). Thus panel 
data models are more efficient and provide reliable parameter estimation compared with either 
cross section or time series models ((Baltagi, 2010: p7). Thirdly, more complicated models 
can be estimated i.e. dynamic models. Fourthly and most importantly, panel data models are 
                                                          
4
 I use companies fixed effects as a new portfolio formation approach. Fixed effects are defined as the 
unobservable factors that cause the regression line to shift up or down across companies. Further discussion is 
provided in chapter 4. 
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better at identifying the so called unobservable effects (either fixed or random), which cannot 
be detected through both pure time series and cross section analyses 
 
The main contribution of chapter three is the use of the dynamic panel data model in 
investigating the overreaction phenomenon. Unobservable factors (fixed effects) are then used 
as a new methodology to construct portfolios by contrast the traditional size-based portfolios. 
Finally, the chapter attempts to identify unobservable factors. It concludes that management 
quality, corporate governance and political connections of the board of directors are the main 
observable correlates to the unobservables, thus adding new insights to the existing panel data 
models. It is worth mentioning that this chapter is the first in the literature to investigate the 
relationship between firms’ corporate governance compliance, the political connections of the 
board of directors and the overreaction phenomenon. 
 
Chapter four is the first to link the long-term overreaction phenomenon with the change in 
regulatory policies, namely the switch from strict price limits to circuit breakers. In addition, 
this study is the first to augment the Fama and French three-factor and the Carhart (1997) four-
factor models by including contrarian and unobservable factors based on the company 
heterogeneity. 
The main contribution of chapter five is that it is the first to investigate the effect of regime 
switch (from strict price limits to circuit breakers) on overreaction, volatility spillover, delayed 
price discovery and trading interference hypotheses.  
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Finally, this study is the first to investigate empirically the short and long–term overreaction 
phenomenon, the relationship between regulatory policies and the volatility spillover, delayed 
price discovery and the trading interference hypotheses in the Egyptian stock market, one of 
the leading markets in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). 
 
1.4 Background about the Egyptian economy 
1.4.1 Introduction 
The world economy witnessed in 2008 the worst global financial crisis since the great 
depression of the 1930s. This had substantial implications for the world financial system. 
Subsequent growth rates in leading developed economies were therefore expected to be zero 
or negative. The crises instantly spread out and were transmitted to the leading global 
economies with the result that investment and consumption have been frozen in the UK and 
Europe and economic growth has started to slow down in many countries since 2009, three 
years after the crisis erupted.  
President Obama signed in February 2009 the biggest bailout plan in the history as the US 
Congress passed the Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Under this Act the US administration 
provided US $787 billion package to stimulate the economy and create 3.5 million jobs. 
Similarly, the external competitiveness of the second biggest world economy, namely Japan, 
deteriorated as the Yen rose dramatically against the Euro and the US$.   
 
The impact of the global financial crisis has spread to the vast majority of emerging 
economies, particularly those having direct links with the leading economies. The liquidity 
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position of countries has been remarkably affected as foreign direct investments, external 
demand and the exports of emerging markets have been dramatically diminished.  
 
The effect of the global financial crisis on the Egyptian economy has been cushioned as the 
Egyptian economy, and particularly the Egyptian banks, are less integrated into the 
international financial system. Despite the remarkable growth in the value of the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the portfolio investment funds, they have been proportionately small 
compared with other emerging economies. However, the Egyptian economy has been exposed 
to indirect external shocks such as the decline in tourism, fluctuations in international natural 
gas prices, and a potential shift in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.     
  
1.4.2 Egypt’s main economic indicators 
The Egyptian economy for decades was highly centralised. However, the economic reform 
process was greatly accelerated during the era of the former President Hosni Mubarak (1981-
2011). International institutions increasingly supported the Egyptian government to take 
actions towards the liberalisation of trade and stock market; as a result the GDP growth rate 
reached 7.2% in 2007 and 4.2% in 2008 during the global financial crisis, while the vast 
majority of the leading economies languished with negative or zero growth.  
Because the Egyptian economy had made such effective steps towards economic reform and 
enhancement of the investment climate, the Economic Reform Forum of the World Bank in 
2008 chose Egypt among the seven best-performing countries in the world. The growth rate 
since then has fallen and in 2011 is estimated at a lower 1.5% - 3.5% due primarily to the 
political tension in the Middle East region following the Arab Spring and the Egyptian 
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revolution. However, in 2012, once the parliamentary and the presidential elections have been 
run, the economy is expected to recover once more and to grow at a modest 5% annual rate. 
 
The Egyptian economic reform programme started in 1994 when the Egyptian government 
announced a major privatisation programme covering large swathe of publicly owned 
companies. 411 companies were sold since 1994 for Egyptian pounds (LE) 57 billion. The 
remarkable success in the programme has positively affected the development of Egyptian 
capital markets as the vast majority of the companies were sold to the public and anchor 
investors (ownership greater than 50%) via IPOs through the stock market.  
 
Table 1.1 summarises the main results of the privatisation programme over the period 2000-
2011. We can see that in numerical and value terms privatisations peaked in the period 2005-
2007, and rose again in 2008-9 after a major dip during the financial crisis.  
Table 1.1: Privatisation Programme 2000/2001-2009/2010 
 
Total Sales 
Companies/Assets 
(100% state-owned) 
Other Public Sector 
Sales 
Joint Venture 
Sales 
Total Sales GDP 
%of 
Total 
Sales to 
GDP 
 No. Value  
in LE 
Millions 
No. 
 
Value 
in LE 
Millions 
No. 
 
Value in 
LE 
Millions 
No. 
 
Value in 
LE 
Millions 
Value 
in LE 
Billions 
 
2000/2001  11 252 -- -- 7 118 18 370 391 0.09 
2001/2002  7 73 -- -- 3 879 10 952 379 0.25 
2002/2003  6 49 -- -- 1 64 7 113 418 0.03 
2003/2004  9 428 -- -- 4 115 13 543 485 0.11 
2004/2005  16 824 -- -- 12 4,819 28 5,643 539 1.05 
2005/2006  47 1,843 1 5,122 18 7,647 66 14,612 618 2.37 
2006/2007  45 2,774 1 9,274 7 1,559 53 13,607 745 1.83 
2007/2008  20 745 0 0 16 3,238 36 3,983 896 0.44 
2008/2009  16 1,590 0 0 1 63 17 1,653 1,039 0.16 
Dec-09  -- -- -- -- 1 4 1 4 1,181 0.00 
Grand Total  338 24,440 2 14,396 70 18,516 411 57,366   
Source: The Egyptian Ministry of Investment 
14 
 
Table 1.2 presents selected economic and financial indicators for the Egyptian economy over 
the period 2005 – 2010. The figures presented in table 1.2 show that foreign direct investment 
(FDI) amounted to US$ 4.3 billion in 2010 compared to US$ 5.2 in 2009. The net FDI 
investments of the oil sector represent over 50% of the total FDI during the last two years. The 
private sector in the Egyptian economy is now regarded as the engine of economic growth.  
 
The private sector contributed around two-thirds of the total GDP over the period 2003/04-
2007/08. The official statistics of the fiscal year 2008/09 also show that the growth rate in the 
private sector is 3.31% compared to 1.35% growth rate in the public sector. Foreign reserves 
increased from US$ 34.2 billion in 2008/09 to US$ 36 billion in 2009/10, meanwhile the 
inflation rate decreased from 13.2% in Dec 2009 to 10.3% in December 2010. 
 
The inflation rate in Egypt has been remarkably high over the past few years; it reached 11% 
in 2010 and was expected to increase during 2011 to 15% due to the political tension. This 
caused a devaluation of the Egyptian pound against the US$ by 5% during the first quarter of 
2011. The value of the external Egyptian debt was US$ 34.5 billion in 2010 of which 23% 
represented short-term debt.  
 
The external debt balance represented 14.5% of the GDP in 2010. On the other hand, the 
foreign exchange currency exceeded this debt liability over the past few years. Finally, since 
2008 Egypt has been regarded as one of the world’s main exporters of natural gas 
(representing 50% of all merchandise exports). The trade deficit is moreover usually 
15 
 
compensated by the revenue from service sector, in particular by Suez Canal transit fees and 
revenue from tourism.        
                   
Table 1.2:  Selected Economic and Financial Indicators 
 
 Jun-05 Jun-06 Jun-07 Jun-08 Jun-09 Mar-09 Mar-10 
GDP at Market Prices (LE 
Billions)  
538.5 617.7 744.8 895.5 1,038.6 771.6 893.5 
GNP (LE Billions)  563.3 649.4 787.4 949.2 1,081.7 805.5 915.4 
Real GDP (% Growth Rate )  4.5 6.8 7.1 7.2 4.6 4.7 5.1 
Real Per Capita GDP (% Growth 
Rate) 
2.5 4.9 4.9 5.1 2.5 NA NA 
Average Per Capita Income  7,693.2 8,657.6 10,211.1 12,030.0 13,654.8 13,526.0 15,332.1 
Share of Private Sector in GDP 
(%)  
61.7 60.3 62.4 61.6 62.8 62.5 63.6 
Overall Fiscal Balance (% GDP)  (9.6) (8.2) (7.3) (6.8) (6.9) (5.4) (7.3) 
Net FDI in Egypt (%GDP)  4.4 5.7 8.5 8.1 4.3 0.7 0.8 
Public Domestic Debt (% GDP)        
Net Domestic Budget Sector Debt  72.5 72.0 64.2 53.5 54.1 53.3 55.7 
Net Domestic General 
Government Debt 
51.5 53.8 49.6 42.7 45.0 43.5 47.8 
Net Domestic Public Debt  52.3 53.9 48.8 43.2 45.8 44.4 48.6 
Inflation Rates        
CPI (% Growth Rate) 11.4 4.2 11.0 11.7 16.2 13.3 12.9 
WPI (% Growth Rate)  9.9 4.1 11.8 -- -- -- -- 
PP (% Growth Rate) -- 4.1 11.8 17.7 2.5 (7.0) 13.2 
Exchange Rates        
Official Exchange Rate (LE/ US$)  6.006 5.747 5.710 5.500 5.510 5.570 5.460 
Interest Rates        
Interest Rate on T-Bills (91 days)  10.1 8.8 8.7 7.0 11.3 10.2 10.1 
Broad Money (% Growth Rate)  13.6 13.5 18.3 15.7 8.4 6.9 9.8 
External Debt        
External Debt (% GDP)  31.1 27.6 22.8 20.1 17.0 16.7 14.8 
External Debt (% Exports of 
G&S)  
100.3 82.4 70.4 59.9 64.4 293.6 295.5 
Debt Service (% Current 
Receipts)  
7.9 7.3 5.9 3.9 5.3 4.8 4.8 
Debt Service (% Exports of G&S)  9.4 8.5 6.9 4.6 6.2 5.7 5.8 
Population (% Growth Rate )  1.97 1.93 2.23 2.06 2.18 NA NA 
Domestic Savings (LE Billions)  84.6 105.7 121.2 150.4 129.1 101.4 130.4 
National Savings (LE Billions)  109.4 137.4 163.8 204.1 172.2 135.3 152.3 
Source: Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Finance, and Central Bank of Egypt. 
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1.5 Overview about the Egyptian Exchange (EGX)5 
1.5.1 The history of the Egyptian Exchanges 
The Egyptian exchange is the oldest stock market in the MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) region. The Alexandria stock exchange was founded in 1883 followed by the Cairo 
stock exchange in 1903. It is worth mentioning that the Alexandria exchange is one of the 
oldest futures markets in the world, particularly in cotton forward contracts. The vast majority 
of trading volume in the Alexandria futures market was done with the Liverpool Cotton 
Exchange until 1950.  
 
The Egyptian economy had grown significantly and before 1950 the Cairo and Alexandria 
stock exchanges were regarded as one of the top five stock exchanges in the world. The 
number of listed companies had reached 228 with a total market capitalisation of 91m 
Egyptian pounds. By the early 1960s, however, the vast majority of private firms had been 
nationalised by the socialist government. Therefore the role of the Cairo and Alexandria stock 
exchanges was dramatically diminished; the number of listed firms declined to a nine after 
thirty years. 
 
By contrast, in the 1990s the former president Mubarak adopted a comprehensive economic 
reform strategy. The Cairo and Alexandria stock exchanges were re- activated with large scale 
flotations.  656 companies were listed by 1992. The two stock exchanges were linked with one 
automated trading system; this facilitated the implementation of the privatisation programme 
                                                          
5
 The main source of information in this section is the EGX annual reports (1996-2010) 
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starting from 1992, in which a number of IPOs of state-owned companies were executed 
through the Cairo and Alexandria stock exchanges.  
 
1.5.2 Main Stock Market Indices
6
  
The EGX 30 index is the main Egyptian stock market index and the most widely used as an 
market benchmark and barometer. EGX performance could be tracked through the S&P-IFC 
Global and Investable Indices from 1996 and 1997 respectively. 
 
The EGX30 was initially launched in 2003 as a free-floated market capitalization weighted 
index and was retroactively computed as of 1 January 1998 with a base value of 1000 points. 
The major international financial institutions provide information and analysis of the 
performance of the Egyptian exchange based on the EGX30. The EGX30 is, like most world 
indices, weighted by the market capitalisation of its constituent stocks. It avoids cross holdings 
and industry concentration and excludes bankrupt companies and any companies ‘consumed’ 
in merger and acquisition deals. To reflect market activity, the index is rebalanced and updated 
every six months.     
 
In 2006 the Egyptian exchange launched a new market index, namely the Dow Jones EGX 
Egypt Titans 20 Index (DJ20) jointly with the leading global index provider Dow Jones 
indexes. The DJ20 tracks the 20 blue chips of the Egyptian stock market in terms of free-float 
adjusted market capitalisation, sales and net income. 
 
                                                          
6
  EGX annual reports (1996-2010) 
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In March 2009 the EGX then introduced two new price index products, namely EGX70 and 
EGX100, to track the performance of the most active 70 and 100 companies excluding the 
constituents of the EGX30. More recently, in 2010, the EGX launched the EGX20 capped 
index (allowing only a 10% maximum weight to any of its constituent stocks) with the aim of 
capturing the performance of the most active 20 companies in terms of market capitalisation 
and liquidity.  
 
1.5.3 Stock market regulations 
1.5.3.1 Price Limits  
Since 1996 EGX trading regulations imposed strict price limits (SPL) for all the listed shares, 
amounting to absolute changes of more than 5% of the current stock price. The limit is 
activated for a particular stock only when stock return hits the upper or lower limit; then the 
trading on the share is suspended for the rest of the trading session. The SPL is only removed 
in case of any corporate action. The SPL was first launched by the regulator with the intention 
of cooling down the market and avoiding excess volatility. In 2002 the regulator commenced a 
new price ceiling system, namely circuit breakers (CB) in which the price limits were widened 
to +-20% for the most actively traded shares in the EGX. Within the new CB regime, trading 
would be halted for 30 minutes should the stock price change for a particular stock hit +-10%.    
 
During the 30 minute trading halt, brokers must inform their clients of the temporary 
suspension of the trading session. In addition brokers are allowed to cancel or adjust traders’ 
orders to adjust their portfolio positions. When the trading session is resumed and if the stock 
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return for a given share has hit the upper or lower limit (now +-20%), trading is suspended 
until the end of the trading session.  
 
1.5.3.2 Intra-day trading mechanism: 
The Intra-day trading mechanism was launched in 2004 by the regulator for the listed shares in 
the main and the OTC markets for the most actively traded companies on the market. 
 
1.5.3.3 Settlement: 
The settlement mechanism in the EGX is as follows: 
 T (trading day) + 0 for securities traded by the Intra-day trading system. 
 T (trading day) +1 for government bonds. 
 T (trading day) +2 for all other securities. 
 1.5.3.4 Tax system 
According to the capital market law No.95/1992 no taxes are imposed on both dividends and 
capital gain in addition to coupon payments for individuals. 
 
1.5.3.5 Foreign investments 
There are no regulatory restrictions on foreign investment or profit repatriation in the Egyptian 
stock market. 
1.5.3.6 Trading hours 
The trading hours of the market are shown in the table below. 
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Table 1.3: Trading hours at the EGX 
 
Main Market Trading hours 
Trading session 10:30am – 2:30pm 
Bonds Market (Primary Dealers) 10:30am – 2:30pm 
NILEX (SMEs Market) 11am-12pm 
Over-the-Counter Market 9:45am- 11:15am 
Source:www.egyptse.com 
 
1.5.3.7 Short selling 
To support stock market liquidity the EGX has permitted margin trading and set up regulations 
for short selling of the most actively trading stocks. 
 
1.5.4 The performance of the Egyptian stock market  
The Egyptian stock market was classified by the Economist in 2010 as one of the best six 
emerging markets (CIVETS)
7
 offering significant potential growth over the next decade. In 
addition, the World Federation of Exchanges’ (WFE) statistics in 2010 reported that the 
Egyptian exchange achieved average gain of 15% during 2010, ahead of many leading world 
emerging stock exchanges i.e. China, Brazil, and Czech Republic, and ahead of all Arab stock 
markets excepting those of Qatar (25%) and Casablanca (21%) . The Morgan Stanley 
International index MSCI and S&P IFCI reported that the annual growth rates for the EGX 
during 2010 were 9% and 13% in US$ respectively. By comparison, the average growth rate 
for emerging markets was 12% in US$.  
 
                                                          
7
 Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa 
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The Egyptian stock market achieved reasonable performance indicators during 2008-2010 
even though the negative impact of the global financial crisis affected the vast majority of the 
stock markets throughout the world. The main market indicators diminished only slightly in 
2010 as compared to 2009. The total value traded during 2010 was LE 321 billion compared 
to LE 448 billion in 2009, meanwhile the total trading volume was 33 billion securities in 
2010 compared to 37 billion securities in 2009. The market capitalisation of the main market 
was LE 488 billion (40% of the GDP) during 2010 compared to LE 500 billion in 2009. 
During 2010 the EGX achieved attractive P/E of 14.7 compared to 13 in 2009; however, based 
on the statistics of the S&P/IFC composite index for emerging markets the average P/E is 
13.5. On the other hand, the dividend yield increased from 6.5% in 2009 to 7.1% in 2010 and 
the emerging market average dividend yield was 1.8%.  
 
Trading volume, dominated by financial institutions, rose from 37% in 2009 to 52% in 2010, 
while individual investors share fell to 48% of trading volume in 2010 compared to 63% in 
2009. Foreign investments accounted for 22% of the total trading volume in 2010 and total 
foreign capital inflow fell from LE8.4 billion in 2010 compared to LE5 billion in 2009. 
Foreign investments in EGX were dominated by Europe (43%), the US (27%) and Arab 
investments (24%).  
 
The UK investors were the first in the Egyptian stock market and accounted for 37% of the 
total foreign investments in 2010. Finally, the OTC trading volume sharply declined from LE 
115 billion in 2009 to LE billion in 2010. Table 1.4 presents the main market indicators for the 
Egyptian stock exchange (EGX) over the period 2001-2010. 
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Table 1.4: Main Market Indicators for the Egyptian stock exchange (EGX) 2001-2010 
 
 
1.6 The structure of the thesis  
The thesis comprises six main chapters; chapter one consists of six main sections; in section 
one I discuss the theoretical and conceptual background of the topic. Section two presents the 
main objectives and motivation of the study. Section three focuses on the main contribution of 
the thesis. Sections four and five present background about the Egyptian economy and an 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total Volume (bn shares) 1.3 0.9 1.4 2.4 5.3 9.1 15.5 25.5 36.6 33 
Volume of Listed Securities 1.2                        0.7 1.2 1.8 4.2 7.8 11.4 21.9 28.6 28 
Volume of Unlisted Securities 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.3 3.7 3.6 8 5 
Total Value Traded (LE bn) 31.8 34.2 27.8 42.3 160.6 287.0 363 529.6 448.2 321 
Value Traded (Listed Sec) 24.7 25.8 23.0 36.1 150.9 271.1 321.5 475.9 333.5 273 
Value Traded (Unlisted Sec) 7.1 8.4 4.8 6.2 9.7 15.9 41.5 53.7 114.7 48 
Number of Transactions (m) 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.7 4.2 6.8 9 13.5 14.6 10 
Number of Transactions 
(Listed Securities) 
1.1 0.7 1.2 1.7 4.0 6.6 8.7 12.8 13.5 10 
Number of Transactions 
(Unlisted Securities) 
0.01 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.1 0.4 
Average Monthly Value 
Traded (LE billion) 
2.7 2.9 2.3 3.5 13.4 23.9 1488 1656 1822 1300 
Average Monthly Value 
Traded (Listed Securities) 
2.1 2.2 1.9 3.0 12.6 22.6 1318 1436 1356 1105 
Average Monthly Value 
Traded (Unlisted Securities) 
0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.3 170 220 466 194 
Turnover Ratio (%)  14.1 9.5 11.5 14.2 31.1 48.7 38.7 70.3 49.9 42.9 
Foreign Participation as a % 
of Total Value Traded 
13.3 17.3 12.7 20.5 16.4 16.6 19.2 20 12.7 16.5 
Arab Participation as a % of 
Total Value of Traded 
2.9 1.8 7.8 7.0 13.9 13.6 12.5 10 6.3 6.1 
Number of Trading Days 246 249 244 249 249 244 244 244 249 247 
Average Company Size (LE 
million)  
101 106 176 294 613 897 1766 1259 1633 2302 
Number of Traded Companies 251 261 260 233 241 227 237 222 229 211 
Market Capitalisation (LE bn) 112 122 172 234 456 534 768 474 500 488 
Market Capitalisation % GDP 30 29 35 43 74 80 86 45 41 40 
Source: The Egyptian Exchange , annual reports 2001-2010 
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overview of the Egyptian stock exchange respectively. Finally, section six presents the 
structure of the thesis. 
Chapter two introduces a comprehensive literature survey of the overreaction phenomenon. 
The chapter mainly is divided into seven main sections. Section 1 includes introduction and 
motivation. Section two presents summary of the short-term overreaction in developed and 
emerging markets. In section 3 I present the development of the long term overreaction in both 
developed and emerging markets. In section 4 I present the possible interpretation to the 
overreaction phenomenon, namely the variation of risk (beta), seasonality and size effects, 
bid-ask spread and the tax hypothesis. Section five analyses the overreaction to specific events 
such as the overreaction to corporate actions (merger, acquisition and earnings and dividends 
announcements), to rumours and to the international sport championships results. Section six 
refutes the main arguments of the opponents of the overreaction phenomenon. Finally, section 
seven summarises and concludes. 
 
Chapter three investigates the short–term overreaction using a novel methodology, namely, 
dynamic panel data model using system GMM. Chapter three consists of five main sections. 
Section one includes the main objectives and motivation of the chapter. Section two presents 
the theoretical background about the traditional models and the proposed new model to 
explain the short-term overreaction. Section three describes the dataset used in the analysis. 
Section 4 presents the econometric modeling and the empirical results. Finally, section five 
summarises and concludes. 
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Chapter four, on the other hand, investigates the long–term overreaction phenomenon for all 
listed shares in the Egyptian stock exchange. Chapter four consists of six main sections. I 
present in section one the main objectives and motivations of the chapter. Section two 
discusses the theoretical arguments and the alternative measures of the long–term 
performance. Section three presents the alternative sources of the contrarian and momentum 
abnormal returns. Section four describes the dataset used in the analysis. Section 5 describes 
the econometric modeling and the empirical results. Finally, section six summarises and 
concludes. 
 
Chapter five investigates the effects of regime switch on the overreaction phenomenon. 
Chapter five consists of six main sections. Section one includes the main motivation and 
objectives of the chapter in addition to the theoretical background about the evolution of the 
different types of regulatory policies. In section two I analyse the academic debate about the 
impact of the circuit breakers and price limits. Section three presents a comprehensive 
literature review of the different types of regulatory policies. Sections four describes the 
dataset used in the analysis. Section five presents the econometric modeling and the empirical 
results. Finally, section six summarises and concludes. 
 
Chapter six presents a summary of the main findings of the thesis. Chapter six consists of six 
main sections. Sections one and two present the research objectives and main results of the 
thesis respectively. Sections three and four analyse the main contributions and research 
limitations respectively, while section five analyses the policy implication. Finally, section six 
provides suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature on the overreaction phenomenon is separated into long–term and short-term 
behaviour. The existing literature has extensively explored the overreaction phenomenon in 
developed markets. However, few studies have investigated the overreaction effect in 
emerging markets, generally recognised to be less informationally efficient and therefore more 
likely to be subject to market anomalies. Recent strands of research have concluded that - to 
the contrary of the efficient market hypothesis - using past prices, stock returns are predictable 
both over short and long horizons. See for example Shiller (1981) and De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985).  
 
This constitutes a newly added market anomaly
8
 in which changes in investor information 
result in an initial reaction (buying or selling), a price trend (down or up) and finally a partial 
reversal of the trend as investors revise their estimate of the impact of this new information. 
This phenomenon is called the overreaction effect and implies that stock returns are negatively 
serially correlated. Therefore stocks that performed poorly (Loser portfolios) during a 
portfolio formation period (the period over which the model is estimated) may outperform the 
market during the test period (the period over which the model is tested).  
 
On the other hand, the good performers (Winner portfolios) on this theory are expected to 
underperform the average market return in the test period. Therefore, based on the market 
                                                          
8
 Others include the January and Monday effects in addition to small firm effect and low PE ratio. 
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shocks and whether they represent good or bad news, stock returns may be predictable and a 
‘contrarian’ strategy may earn abnormal return by selling Winners short and buying Losers. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) thus devised a zero investment portfolio in which cash from short 
sales of Winners is used to finance investment in Losers. The overreaction hypothesis provides 
clear evidence of invalidity of Weak Form market efficiency (Fama, 1976) as investors can 
predict stock returns using past stock prices (Conrad, et al. (1997) and Baytas and Cakici 
(1999)).  
 
The main objective of this chapter is to conduct a comprehensive literature survey of the 
overreaction phenomenon. The chapter mainly is divided into seven main sections. Section 
one includes introduction and motivation. Section two presents summary of the short-term 
overreaction in developed and emerging markets. In section three I present the development of 
the long term overreaction in both developed and emerging markets.  
 
In section four I present the possible interpretation to the overreaction phenomenon, namely 
the variation of risk (beta), seasonality and size effects, bid-ask spread and the tax hypothesis. 
Section five analyses the overreaction to specific events such as the overreaction to corporate 
actions (merger, acquisition and earnings and dividends announcements), rumours and the 
international sport championships results. Section six refutes the main arguments of the 
opponents of the overreaction phenomenon. Finally, section seven summarises and concludes. 
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2.2  Short –term overreaction 
In this section, I present the literature on the short-term overreaction hypothesis in both 
developed and emerging markets.  
2.2.1 Developed Markets 
Zarowin, (1989) investigates the short–term overreaction phenomenon and whether or not size 
and seasonality effects can explain this phenomenon. Monthly returns data are collected over 
the period 1927-1985 for the listed shares in the NYSE. Zarowin formed equally size 
portfolios based on past returns performance and calculated the risk-adjusted abnormal 
performance of the two extreme portfolios, namely Winners and Losers following De Bondt 
and Thaler (1987). Results support the short-term overreaction in the NYSE as Losers 
significantly outperformed Winners by 2%-2.5% per month regardless their size. In addition, 
Zarowin argues that short-term overreaction is considered a clear violation of the efficient 
market hypothesis and regarded as a new market anomaly.  
 
Atkins and Dyl (1990) investigate the short–term overreaction in the US. They define the 
event as stock prices that experienced a large price change (based on the Wall Street Journal) 
in a single trading day. In addition, they examine the proposed relationship between the short-
term reversals and the bid-ask spread. Daily return data are collected for all listed shares in the 
NYSE over the period 1975-1984. Using the mean-adjusted, market and risk-adjusted returns 
to calculate the abnormal returns, they find strong evidence of short –term overreaction in case 
of bad news and weak evidence in case of good news. When they control for the bid-ask 
spread, they found that price reversals are minimised and traders could not profit from the 
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overreaction anomaly. This implies market efficiency. They conclude that the bid-ask spread 
is not the main source of the overreaction phenomenon in the NYSE. 
 
Bremer and Sweeney (1991) examine the short-term price reversal phenomenon in the US. 
They define the event as stocks that experienced at least -10% price drops in a single trading 
day. Daily stock return data are collected for all listed shares in the Fortune 500 over the 
period 1962-1986. Using the mean adjusted returns, results show evidence of price reversal in 
the US; positive cumulative excess returns (2.2%) tend to be following the large negative price 
drop over two days following the event. The price reversal phenomenon is unrelated to 
weekend and turn-of-the-year effects.  
 
Liang and Mullineaux (1994) investigate the short-term overreaction in NYSE and ASE over 
the period 1963-1988. They define the event based on the residuals of the market model, and 
then the three largest positive and negative events have been selected for each firm/year. Daily 
return data are collected over 401 days pre (200) and post (200) event. Using the event study 
methodology following Brown and Warner (1985), they find significant price reversal post 
negative and positive events. They also find that stock prices tend to decrease pre positive 
events (shocks) and increase pre negative shocks. Their results support the short-term 
overreaction hypothesis. 
 
Park (1995) argues that the predicted stock returns following large one-day price dramatic 
changes are biased due to both sample selection bias and bid-ask spread. Therefore Park 
(1995) investigates the effect of the bid-ask spread on the estimated stock returns following 
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one-day large price changes and the potential market microstructure explanation to this 
phenomenon. 
 
Daily price data of all listed shares of NASDAQ/NMS are collected over the period 1984-
1987. They calculate the stock returns based on the average bid-ask prices compared with the 
traditional returns based on closing prices and define the event if the absolute value of the 
market-adjusted abnormal returns exceeded 10% change in a particular day. Using the 
compounded cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), they find that bid-ask spread did not fully 
explain price reversals following the large one day price drop. In addition, they find evidence 
of the short–term market overreaction; however, the contrarian profits are not large enough to 
be exploited due to transaction costs. 
 
Cooper (1999) investigates the short-term overreaction phenomenon and the impact of 
alternative filter rules on contrarian profits of large capitalisation in the NYSE and AMEX. 
Weekly return and trading volumes data are collected for the 300 large firms in the NYES and 
AMEX - to minimise the bid-ask spread bias - over the period 1962-1993. Cooper uses the 
filter rule methodology by specifying Losers and Winners based on minimum amount of 
lagged weekly returns and trading volume growth. Cooper finds evidence of the overreaction 
phenomenon in the NYSE. In addition, he finds that the lower the trading activity the higher 
the price reversals. Results show that the filter rule strategies outperformed the buy and hold 
counterparts.   
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Nam et al. (2001) find evidence of mean reversion in NYSE using the asymmetric non-linear 
transition generalized autoregressive conditional model ANSTGARCH. They also find that 
the reversal from negative to positive returns is quicker than the reversal from positive to 
negative returns; in addition their findings support the overreaction hypothesis. 
 
Schnusenberg and Madura (2001) examine the short–term overreaction and underreaction of 
six main market indices in the US to avoid the potential bid-ask spread bias. They define the 
event based on the best (Winners) and worst (Losers) index historical performance. Daily 
price data are collected for major six stock indices in the US equity market since inception and 
until 1997, namely; DJIA, NYSE, NASDAQ, S&P500, Russel 3000, and Wilshire 5000. They 
use the mean–adjusted return and ARIMA models to estimate the expected returns.  
 
They find evidence of market underreaction in the following day subsequent to the event for 
the six market indices. In addition, they find significant short-term overreaction for the Losers 
and underreactions for the Winners over the 60 days following the event, these results are 
consistent with Fama (1998). They find that the less constituents (i.e. NASDAQ) in the index 
the greater degree of underreaction for the Winners.   
 
Larson and Madura (2003) investigate the relationship between overreaction/underreaction 
and the information disseminated to the market in the short-term based on the classification of 
the Wall Street Journal (informed/uninformed event). They define the event as stocks that 
experience at least +-10% daily price change over a three-day event window. Daily returns 
data are collected for the listed shares in the NYSE over the period 1988-1995. They estimate 
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the market model using the methodology of Brown et al. (1988) with the estimation window is 
(-260,-41), the examination window (-3, +20) and the event window (+81-+300). They find 
evidence of the overreaction phenomenon in cases of uninformed events. Their results support 
the overconfidence and self-attribution bias by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998).   
 
Ma et al. (2005) investigate the short-term overreaction in the US. They define the event as 
stocks that experienced the largest price change reported in the Wall Street Journal. Daily 
price data of a sample of (852) Winners and Losers listed in NYSE and NASDAQ are 
collected over the period 1996-1997. They find little evidence of price overreaction in the 
NYSE for both Winners and Losers; however, they find significant price reversal and evidence 
of the overreaction phenomenon in the NASDAQ market. They conclude that investors may 
interpret the new information differently in the NYSE and NASDAQ. 
 
Michayluk and Neuhauser (2006) investigate the overreaction hypothesis in the NYSE in 
response to the Asian financial crises in 1997. Daily price data are collected for 6276 stocks 
over 60 days following the crash. They find significant evidence of market overreaction to the 
Asian financial crises over one week following the Asian market crash. In addition, they find 
that both size and CAPM-beta did not explain the initial price decline following the crash. 
Finally they present evidence of short-term return predictability during the Asian stock market 
crash.   
Lo and Coggins (2006) investigate the daily and hourly overreaction phenomenon in the 
Australian stock market and whether or not trading volume and stock liquidity explain price 
reversals. Daily and hourly price data are collected for the top 200 companies listed in the 
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Australian stock exchange ASX from 2000 to 2002. Following the methodology of Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990), they find strong evidence of short–term contrarian profits; however these 
strategies are no longer profitable after controlling for transaction costs. They find a positive 
relationship between price reversals and order imbalance and that the overreaction 
phenomenon can be explained by temporary liquidity imbalance.   
 
Spyrou et al. (2007) examine the short term overreaction and underreaction to market shocks 
in the UK. Daily closing price data are collected for four stock market indices, namely, the 
FT30, FTSE100, FTSE250 and FTSE Small Cap over the period 1988 to 2004. They define 
the event (positive or negative shocks) when return on the market index is above or below two 
standard deviations over (-60,-11) day estimation window. They find no evidence of 
overreaction to market shocks for big firms, as no significant abnormal returns are found on 
the following days subsequent to the shock. On the other hand, they find evidence of market 
underreaction for small and medium size firms. Price reversals occur during 12-20 days 
following the event. They find no effect of the seasonality, bid-ask spread, and time varying 
risk in their results.   
 
Recently, Lobe and Rieks (2011) investigated the out of sample estimation of the short-term 
overreaction hypothesis in the German stock market. They define the event as stocks 
experienced price change at least 10% as a proxy of positive and negative shocks.  Daily data 
are collected for four main German stock market indices since inception, namely, DAX30, 
MDAX, SDAX, technology. Using the market and size–adjusted abnormal returns over a five-
day post-event, they find significant evidence of short-term overreaction in the German stock 
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market and this overreaction is not due to size or bid-ask spread. In addition, they find 
asymmetric price reaction to positive and negative shocks. When they controlled for the 
transaction costs, the contrarian profits were negligible. Their results support the efficient 
market hypothesis in the German stock market.  
 
2.2.2 Emerging Markets 
Few studies have investigated the short-term overreaction phenomenon in emerging stock 
markets. Bowman and Iverson (1998) investigate the short-term overreaction hypothesis in the 
New Zealand stock exchange. Weekly return data for all listed shares are collected over the 
period 1967-1986. They define the event as stock that experienced at least 10% weekly price 
change. They find strong evidence of the overreaction phenomenon in the New Zealand stock 
market as abnormal returns for Losers one week post-event (2.4%) outperform Winners (-
1.5%). The overreaction phenomenon was not due to bid ask bounce, non-synchronous trading 
or size effect.   
 
Otchere and Chan (2003) investigate the short–term overreaction in the Hong Kong stock 
exchange (HKSE). They argue that the Hong Kong stock market is unique for international 
investors as neither capital gains nor dividends are taxed. Daily data are collected over two 
periods around the Asian financial crises pre (1996-1997) and post crisis (1997-1998). They 
use three different methods to calculate the abnormal returns, namely, mean-adjusted, market 
model and the CAPM. They find little but significant evidence of price overreaction in the 
HKSE pre the Asian financial crises. They also find that price reversals are more pronounced 
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for Winner than for Losers. In addition, when they controlled for transaction costs, there was 
no evidence of contrarian profits. The overreaction phenomenon is diminished during the 
crises period and cannot be explained by either bid-ask spread or the day of the week effect.  
 
Farag and Cressy (2010) investigate the short-term overreaction and the disposition effect in 
the Egyptian stock exchange (EGX) over the period 2005-2008. Daily data are collected for 20 
companies listed in the EGX and experience one-day dramatic change in stock return (defined 
as a change greater in absolute value than 10% of the current intraday price). They argue that 
the existing body of the literature ignores the time dimension in the analysis and this may lay 
the estimation open to bias due to company heterogeneity. Using a panel data model, they find 
that the fixed effect model best suits the EGX data and the unobservable factors play an 
important role in explaining the overreaction phenomenon. Their results support the 
disposition effect as past Losers outperform past Winners. Table 2.2 presents a summary of 
the literature on the short-term overreaction. 
 
2.3 Long–term overreaction 
The existing body of research on the long-term overreaction is impressive, although we shall 
find that the interpretation of this phenomenon is controversial (Gunaratne and Yonesawa 
(1997), Shiller (1981), De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Conrad, et al. (1997). In this section, I 
present the literature on the long-term overreaction hypothesis in both developed and 
emerging markets. 
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2.3.1 Developed markets 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) are considered the first to elaborate the overreaction hypothesis 
which, as we have seen, claims that, contrary to the EMH, stock prices are predictable. They 
argue that the overreaction phenomenon should attract the attention of finance researchers as it 
represents a behavioural principle that can be applied in many other contexts. Motivated by 
work in cognitive psychology on intuitive prediction, monthly returns data are collected from 
NYSE. They form a three-year non-overlapping portfolio ranking based on the top and bottom 
50 cumulative excess returns in the formation period 1926-1982.  
 
 De Bondt and Thaler calculate the cumulative average abnormal residuals and find that Loser 
portfolios – on average – outperform the market by 19.6% during the three-year formation 
period. However, the Winners achieve 5% less than the market. This suggests that the 
cumulative average abnormal residual of the arbitrage portfolio (Losers-Winners) equals 
24.6%. This implies that the overreaction effect is asymmetric as it is much larger for the 
Losers. In addition they find evidence of the seasonality effect as most of the abnormal returns 
occur in January, consistent with the turn-of-the-year effect anomaly. Finally, they find results 
consistent with Graham's arguments that the overreaction hypothesis becomes very clear 
within the first 24-36 months of the test period. 
 
Howe (1986) investigates the long–term overreaction in the NYSE. Weekly data are collected 
over the period 1963-1981. The event is defined as stocks that experienced arbitrary large (+-
50%) weekly return and the estimation and events windows are defined as 52 weeks pre and 
post large price change. Using the OLS and Scholes-Williams (S-W) technique to measure the 
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systematic risk in case of good (+50%) and bad news (-50%), results reveal that Losers have 
greater systematic risk than those of Winners. Howe (1986) finds evidence to support the 
overreaction hypothesis; Winners perform poorly during the event window (30% less than the 
market). However, Losers achieve positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns of 
14% during the first five weeks of the event window. Finally, Howe (1986) concludes that the 
overreaction phenomenon in the NYSE cannot be attributed to January effect.  
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1987) in a follow-up paper, re-investigate the overreaction hypothesis 
with more focus on size and seasonality effects. In addition, they examine the relationship 
between time-varying risk premia and market efficiency and whether the variation in CAPM-
beta can explain the Loser-Winner anomaly. Using the same dataset and methodology of De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), they find that Losers’ January returns are negatively related to the 
returns of the formation period. In addition, the excess returns of January of the Winners are 
negatively related to December excess returns due to the tax–loss hypothesis. They also find 
that the variation in CAPM-beta cannot explain the Winner–Loser anomaly. Finally, they 
claim that the Winner–Loser anomaly is not attributed to the size effect (small firms have 
greater growth opportunity and more volatile compared to big firms effect). On the other hand,  
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1990) conclude that professional financial analysts overreact (the 
tendency to make extreme forecasts) in the same pattern as naive undergraduates. Therefore 
they argue that the behavioural interpretation should be taken into consideration when 
explaining stock market anomalies. Moreover, Amir and Ganzach (1998) conclude that there 
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is a direct relationship between the forecast horizon and the prediction bias, as they find 
greater overreaction and underreaction to analysts’ forecasts in the long term.  
 
Brown and Harlow (1988) examine the overreaction hypothesis as well as the intensity effect 
in the NYSE over the period 1946-1983. They define the intensity effect as “the shorter the 
duration the initial price change the greater price reversal”. Their results are consistent with 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) who find evidence of the overreaction and intensity effects in the 
NYSE of America particularly for the Losers. Alonso and Rubio (1990) investigate the 
overreaction phenomenon in the Spanish stock market. Monthly return data are collected for 
all the listed shares over the period 1965-1984. They use the market model to calculate the 
cumulative excess returns for the three-year non-overlapping portfolios as well as two size 
portfolios, namely ‘big’ and ‘small’, following the methodology of De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985). Their results support the existence of the overreaction phenomenon in the Spanish 
stock market, as Losers outperform Winners by 24.5% over the 12 months following the 
formation period. 
 
Chopra et al. (1992) investigate long-term performance using an innovative methodology to 
re-evaluate the overreaction phenomenon for all listed shares in the NYSE over the period 
1936-1986. They use the the estimated market compensation per unit of beta risk instead of 
CAPM–beta, with adjustments for size and time variation in beta. They adopt the Buy-and 
Hold returns measure to rank portfolios during a five-year ranking period; in addition, the 
formation period is defined as a set of overlapping five-year intervals.  
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Their results support the overreaction phenomenon in the NYSE as Losers are found to 
outperform Winners by 9.5% per year; in addition the overreaction phenomenon cannot be 
attributed to size effect. However, the overreaction is found to be much stronger for small 
firms. Chopra et al. (1992) argue that past returns, beta and size are highly correlated; 
therefore ignoring any of them will lay the estimation open to the omitted variable bias. They 
also find strong evidence of the January effect.  
 
Brailsford (1992) examines the mean reversion return behaviour and the Winner-Loser 
anomaly in the Australian stock market over the period 1958 to 1987. Following the 
methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
calculated over three-year non-overlapping portfolios using the zero-one market model. 
Brailsford (1992) finds no evidence of a Winner-Loser anomaly in the Australian stock 
market: the difference in CARs for the Loser-Winner arbitrage portfolios is found 
insignificant. 
Chen and Sauer (1997) investigate the stability of the overreaction hypothesis in the NYSE in 
the light of the results of Chopra et al. (1992). Monthly return data are collected over the 
period 1926-1992. Using the methodology of Chopra et al. (1992), they find that returns on the 
contrarian strategies are not stable over time, and that the overreaction hypothesis operates 
during the pre-World War II period. In addition, they find that extreme portfolios are less 
likely to remain extreme portfolios in subsequent periods as the standard deviation as a 
function of time in the rank period is U-shaped. Finally, they find a highly significant 
relationship between market risk premium and arbitrage portfolio returns. 
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Clare and Thomas (1995) investigate the long-run overreaction hypothesis in the UK. Monthly 
data are collected from the London Business School Share Price Database (LSPD) for 1000 
companies over the period 1955-1990. Following the methodology of De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985), they find that past Losers outperform Winners by 1.7% per year. They argue that this 
limited overreaction effect is attributed to size effect. Similarly, Dissanaike (1997) investigates 
the overreaction hypothesis in the UK.  
 
Monthly returns data are collected for 925 large companies from the LSE over the period 
1975-1991. Using the buy and hold portfolios and rebalancing methods
9
, he finds evidence of 
the overreaction hypothesis in the UK large firms. In addition, they find that Losers tend to be 
riskier than Winners and this causes Losers’ superior returns. The variation in CAPM beta 
does not seem to explain the Loser-Winner anomaly in the UK. Campbell and Limmack 
(1997) provide additional support for the existence of the long-term overreaction phenomenon 
in the UK. 
 
Dissanaike (2002) extends his previous work in this paper to investigate whether the size 
effect may explain the stock price reversal in the FT500. Using the same dataset and the 
methodology of Dissanaike (1997), his results show that there is no evidence that the Winner-
Losers anomaly is explained by size. This result is consistent with the overreaction literature 
in the UK (see Levis 1989a). Dissanaike (2002) argues that, during the past few years, there is 
a positive relationship between firm size and stock return, (Dimson and Marsh, 1998). Finally, 
                                                          
9
 The Buy and Hold and the Rebalancing methods are explained in more detailed in chapter 4. 
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Dissanaike claimed that the sample of FT500 is biased towards big size firms and his results 
are not in favour the efficient market hypotheses. 
 
Gunaratne and Yonesawa (1997) examine the mean reversion and overreaction phenomena in 
the Japanese stock market. Monthly return data are collected from the Japanese stock market 
over the period 1955-1990. Using the market-adjusted model, they form 20 non- overlapping 
four-year portfolios; they find evidence of overreaction phenomenon in the Japanese stock 
market as past Losers outperform Winners by 11% per annum. In addition, the variation of 
CAPM-beta partially explains the mean reversion phenomenon between rank and test periods. 
The overreaction hypothesis cannot be attributed to the seasonality effect anomalies. 
 
Odean (1998) examines the disposition effect of Shefrin and Stattman (1985) – the tendency 
of selling Winners short and buying Losers – in the NYSE. To examine the disposition effect, 
Odean analyses 10000 accounts and the trading records of a large brokerage house over the 
period 1987-1993. Results show that on average investors realise their gains faster than their 
losses and the vast majority of them are involved in tax motivated selling pressure in 
December. In addition, investors show their preferences to hold Losers and to sell Winners. 
 
Richards (1997) investigates the overreaction phenomenon for the country level using monthly 
data of 16 national market indices over the period 1969–1995. Using the methodology of De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), results show evidence of price reversals in smaller markets, and this 
might be explained by the small country effect. Richards argues that the cross border equity 
flow is not sufficient to remove the mispricing in equity prices.  
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Baytas and Cakici (1999) investigate the performance of the arbitrage portfolios based on size 
and past performance in seven stock markets, namely the US, UK, Canada, Japan, Germany, 
France and Italy. In addition, they examine whether firm size can explain the holding period 
returns of Losers and Winners. Five-year annual return data are collected over the period 
1982-1991. Following Conrad and Kaul’s (1993) methodology, they find evidence of 
overreaction phenomenon in all countries except the US. Their results are consistent with the 
literature on price overreaction and particularly Conrad and Kaul’s (1993). They also find that 
long term investment strategies based on size outperform those of based on long-term past 
performance. Finally, they find that long-term price reversals might be explained by firm size. 
 
Mun et al. (2000) use non-parametric methodology to investigate the overreaction hypothesis 
in the US and Canada. They find significant risk–adjusted residual returns in the short and 
intermediate horizon in the US sample; however they find evidence of contrarian profits in the 
intermediate term in the Canadian stock market. In addition, the variation of CAPM-beta does 
not explain the contrarian profits in both markets. 
 
Balvers et al. (2000) find significant evidence of mean reversion phenomenon in market 
indices across 16 developed countries. They suggest a new trading strategy, the “parametric 
contrarian strategy”, based on exploiting the mean reversion (share prices revert to their 
fundamental values over time) to better predict stock returns. This follows the work of 
Richards (1997). They conclude that the parametric contrarian strategy outperforms the 
traditional Buy and Hold method.  
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Gaunt (2000) investigates long-term overreaction phenomenon and the role of size in the 
Australian market. Monthly returns and market capitalisation data are collected over the 
period 1974-1997. Following the methodologies of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and 
Brailsford (1992), Gaunt constructs three-year non-overlapping portfolios using the zero-one 
market model to rank the portfolios into Losers and Winners. Using both cumulative 
rebalancing methods and buy and hold excess returns, Gaunt finds evidence of price reversal 
in both Winners and Losers. In addition, the Loser-Winner anomaly disappeared when the buy 
and hold method is used. Gaunt (2000) finds evidence of the small firm effect as Losers tend 
to be smaller and less liquid than Winners; therefore, the profitability of the Loser-Winner 
arbitrage portfolio is not exploitable in the Australian Market.  
 
Benou and Richie (2003) investigate the long-term overreaction phenomenon for large firms 
that experienced dramatic monthly price drop (at least 20%) in the US over the period 1990-
2000. Monthly return data are collected over one, two and three–year test periods. Following 
Fama (1998), they estimated the cumulative abnormal returns CARs and found positive and 
significant abnormal returns one year following the event. In addition, they found highly 
significant price reversals for technology stocks. However, results show evidence of 
underreaction for service stocks. Their results support the overreaction hypothesis in the US. 
They argue that buying large firms that experienced a large price drop is a profitable 
investment strategy. Similarly, Hirschey (2003) finds evidence of the overreaction hypothesis 
in both S&P500 and NASDAQ firms. 
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Chiao et al. (2005) examine the role of size and book-to-market ratios in explaining the 
overreaction hypothesis in the Japanese stock market. Monthly price data are collected for the 
listed shares in the Tokyo stock exchange (TSE) over the period 1975-1999. They construct 
size-BM portfolios based and prior returns and find strong evidence of persistent overreaction 
phenomenon in the Japanese market. In addition, they find that size and book-to-market ratios 
are correlated with the price reversals.  
 
Mazouz and Li (2007) investigate the overreaction hypothesis and whether or not size and 
time varying risk factors may explain this phenomenon in the UK. Monthly price data of the 
constituent of the FTSE all shares market index are collected over the period 1972-2002. 
Using both cumulative abnormal returns and buy and hold methods, and following the 
methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), they find strong evidence of price overreaction 
in the London stock exchange. In addition, they find that Losers outperform Winners by 
16.4% and 18.3% using CARS and BAH methods respectively. They find no evidence of the 
January effect on the contrarian profits; however, size effect cannot fully explain the 
overreaction phenomenon.  
 
Dissanaike and Lim (2010) investigate whether contrarian strategies based on advanced 
accounting valuation measures such as residual earnings and Ohlson models outperform the 
traditional measures such as book-to-market, earnings–to–price and cash flow-to-price ratios. 
Price and accounting data are collected from LSE for all the listed shares (excluding 
investment and unit trusts) over the period 1987-2001. They find that both the residual 
earnings and the Ohlson models outperform the traditional strategies based on B/M and E/P. 
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In addition, they find that traditional cash flow-to-price ratios outperform the advanced 
accounting measures. They recommend that investors’ size and the technical knowledge of 
more advanced models are the main determinant of the optimal portfolio formation.  
 
2.3.2. Emerging markets 
Da Costa (1994) investigates the overreaction hypothesis in the Brazilian stock market. 
Monthly data are collected from the Sao Paulo stock exchange (BOVESPA) over the period 
1970-1989. Da Costa constructs eight non-overlapping portfolios (the test and formation 
period are two years) following the methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Results 
support the overreaction hypothesis in the Brazilian stock market. In addition, the variation in 
CAPM-beta cannot explain Winner-Loser anomaly.   
 
Fung (1999) investigates the overreaction hypothesis in the Hong Kong stock market. Monthly 
return data of the constituents (33 companies) of the HSI market index are collected over the 
period 1980-1993. Fung adopts the buy and hold method following Conrad and Kaul (1993) to 
reduce the bid-ask spread bias. Results supported the overreaction phenomenon in the Hong 
Kong stock market as Losers outperform Winners by 10% one year after portfolio formation. 
 
Ahmad and Hussain (2001) investigate the long-term overreaction and seasonality in returns in 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock exchange (KLSE). Daily price data are collected for 166 listed shares 
in KLSE over the period 1986-1996. They use the daily market-adjusted excess returns to rank 
and construct three-year non-overlapping portfolios. Using the traditional arithmetic 
(cumulative) excess return and the buy and hold methods, they find evidence of price 
45 
 
overreaction in the KLSE as both Losers and Winners experienced significant reversals over 
the three-year test period. In addition, results show that the overreaction phenomenon is not 
dominated by size effect. They find evidence of the seasonality effect (Chinese New Year) in 
the KLSE.   
 
Chin et al. (2002) find evidence of overreaction in the New Zealand stock exchange. They also 
find that all contrarian strategies based on the accounting valuation ratios earned superior 
cumulative abnormal returns over the period 1988-1995. Wang et al. (2004) investigate the 
overreaction phenomenon in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market over the period 1994-
2000. Weekly return data are collected for 244 A shares 57 B shares (A-share market is 
opened for local Chinese investors while B- share market is for foreign investors). They use 
the market-adjusted model to calculate the abnormal returns and to construct Winner and 
Losers portfolios. They find that “A” shares have the tendency to overreact more than “B” 
shares. 
 
Saleh (2007) finds evidence of the overreaction hypothesis in the Amman stock exchange on 
the long-term (i.e. 48 month test periods). However, during the short- run, he finds evidence of 
momentum as Losers tend to be Losers during 3, 12, 16 and 36 month test periods. In addition, 
no evidence of size or January effect is found to explain the overreaction phenomenon. Table 
2.1 presents a summary of the literature on the long-term overreaction. 
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2.4 Possible explanations to the overreaction hypothesis 
In this section I discuss possible underlying explanations for what has been attributed to the 
overreaction of investors to new information. These include uncontrolled-for variations in 
beta, seasonality effects, size effect, bid-ask spread and tax loss hypothesis.  
2.4.1 Variation in beta 
Chan (1988) introduces an alternative interpretation to the traditional psychological one for the 
overreaction phenomenon. He argues that the risk of the Winners and Losers is not constant 
over time. Therefore the estimation of the abnormal returns is likely to be sensitive to CAPM-
beta and the variation in risk between estimation and test periods. Using the same data and the 
methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Chan finds that Losers tend to be bigger in size 
at the beginning of the rank period and betas for the Losers are smaller and safer than those of 
Winners within the rank period. Chan also finds large shift in the value of betas from 
formation to test periods. Loser stocks changed from being safer – as compared with Winners 
– at the beginning of the formation period to riskier within the test period. He concludes that 
the overreaction phenomenon and the Loser - Winner anomaly can be attributable to the 
variation in risk; controlling for the variation in CAPM-betas, the contrarian strategy achieves 
only a small abnormal return. 
 
2.4.2 Seasonality effect 
The seasonality effect is defined as repetitive stock price movements around trend 
line.Davidson and Dutia (1989) investigate the overreaction hypothesis for all the listed shares 
in the NYSE and AMEX over the period 1963-1985 to determine if a seasonality effect is the 
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underlying explanation of effects attributable to overreaction. They calculate the predicted and 
cumulative predicted errors based on the market model. They construct two portfolios, 
namely, highest and lowest cumulative predictive errors. Their results contradict the 
overreaction hypothesis as Winners (Losers) continued to be Winners (Losers) as abnormal 
returns earned in year (t-1) are positively related to the abnormal returns earned in year (t). 
They also find evidence of a January anomaly as 25% of the Winners occur in January, 
whereas Losers are no longer Losers in January.   
 
 
2.4.3 Size effect 
Zarowin (1990) replicates the methodology of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and reexamines 
the overreaction hypothesis in the NYSE over the period 1926-1982. Contrary to De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985), Winners and Losers are defined as the highest and lowest quintiles of the 
cumulative excess returns over the formation period. Zarowin (1990) finds that the variation in 
size is the main cause of the superior performance of Loser portfolios over those of Winners. 
Zarowin (1990) also finds that the excess abnormal returns disappeared – except for those on 
January - when controlling for size and this supports the role of tax loss selling hypothesis in 
explaining the January effect. He also finds evidence of short–term overreaction over one 
month and this anomaly cannot be explained by size effect.  
 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) investigate the proposed association between the overreaction 
phenomenon and the profitability of contrarian strategies. Using weekly autocorrelation data 
of the equal and value-weighted indices over the period 1962-1987, they find evidence of 
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positive auto-correlation in the stock market index. However, individual stock returns are 
found to be negatively serially correlated. They argue that this suggests that overreaction is not 
necessarily the only interpretation of the contrarian profits as less than 50% of the contrarian’s 
expected profits may be attributed to the overreaction phenomenon. 
 
2.4.4 Bid-ask spread 
The bid-ask spread originating in the work of Roll (1983) may potentially explain the 
overreaction phenomenon. The bid-ask spread consists of the difference between the buying 
and selling price of a stock. The idea behind it is that at the end of the day (when prices are 
measured) one may randomly end on a buy or a sell order. Since these two prices differ by the 
bid-ask spread a negative autocorrelation of stock prices is obtained. Atkins and Dyl (1990) 
find that the shift between bid and ask prices may cause a temporal patterns in stock returns 
and this shift may explain the overreaction hypothesis.  
 
Kaul and Nimalendran, (1990) investigate whether bid-ask spread or overreaction 
phenomenon determines the short-term properties of stock returns on the NASAQ. Two series 
of returns are collected, namely, stock returns both including and excluding the bid-ask spread 
over the period 1983-1987. Using the variance ratio (variance ratio is used to measure the 
relative magnitudes of daily stock returns errors as the result of overreaction or bid-ask spread, 
Kaul and Nimalendran, (1990)), they find that bid-ask spread is the main source of stock price 
reversals. Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) show that over 23% and 50% of stock return 
variances for big and small firms respectively can be explained by bid-ask errors. As a result 
they find little evidence of the overreaction phenomenon in NASDAQ firms.   
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Cox and Peterson (1994) investigate the role of the bid-ask spread and stock liquidity in 
explaining stock price reversals following a large one-day return drop (at least 10% following 
Bremer and Sweeney (1991)). Daily price data are collected for all listed shares in NYSE, 
AMEX, and NMS over the period 1963–1991. They calculate the stock abnormal returns as 
mean-adjusted, market model and the market-adjusted returns respectively. The estimation 
window is from 105 through six days pre-event and the post-event window is from 21 to 120 
days post-event. However, the event window is from 1-20 days post-event. They find strong 
evidence of price post-event reversals post-event, but the degree of reversal diminishes over 
time. In addition, they find evidence of small firm effect as small firms reverse more than 
large. Finally, they find that the price reversal phenomenon can be attributed to the bid-ask 
spread. Therefore their findings do not support the short-term overreaction.  
 
Akhigbe et al. (1998) investigate the short-term overreaction in the NYSE during 1992. The 
dataset consists of stocks that experienced a large percentage change over one day during 1992 
as published in the Wall Street Journal. The estimation window is from (-220, -20) days pre-
event and the event window is (-5, +4) days post-event. Using the market model to calculate 
the abnormal returns, they compare the expected abnormal return with the average percentage 
of bid-ask spread. Results show evidence of the overreaction hypothesis as Losers experienced 
greater reversals than the average percentage bid-ask spread during the next two days 
subsequent to the event. They conclude that the bid-ask spread (after controlling for the day of 
the week and the initial price change in event day) has significant explanatory power of the 
price reversal phenomenon during 1992.   
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Conrad, et al. (1997) investigate the main characteristics of the short-term overreaction in the 
US and whether or not the bid-ask spread is the main source of the profits for a contrarian 
strategies. They use weekly data from both NASDAQ from 1985-1989 and NYSE/AMEX 
from 1990-1991. Using the bid returns data, their results show that the measurement errors and 
the bid-ask spreads (negative serial co-variances) are the main source of the contrarian profits. 
Therefore there is no evidence of the overreaction hypothesis in both NASDAQ and 
NYSE/AMEX in the short-term. In addition, the inclusion of the transaction costs eliminates 
the contrarian profits. The authors highlight that the measurement errors may lead to 
misinterpretation to the weak-form market efficiency. 
 
2.4.5 Tax loss hypothesis 
The tax hypothesis attempts to explain the overreaction phenomenon by reference to the role 
of tax in determining investor behaviour. George and Hwang (2007) investigate whether or not 
long-term price reversal for the Winners can be explained by this hypothesis. They argue that 
investors are reluctant to sell high locked- in capital gain securities (Winners) to postpone tax 
payments. This suggests that high locked- in capital gain stocks are expected to have higher 
prices and lower expected returns compared to non-locked-in capital gain stocks
10
. 
 
 Monthly data are collected for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ over the period 1963-2001 in 
addition to Hong Kong monthly data from 1980-2000. They use three alternative measures of 
returns to test the overreaction hypothesis, namely, the traditional return, five-year high and 
                                                          
10
 Capital gain stocks are said to be locked in if investors are unable or unwilling to sell their shares due to high 
capital gain taxes.  
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five-year low measures, as well as two additional measures to test the lock-in hypothesis, 
namely, equal-weighted gain and loss and equal-weighted gain only measures. They find 
strong evidence of the tax hypothesis as Winners reversal diminished because the traditional 
reversal measures are subsumed in the locked-in measures. In addition, no price reversals are 
found for non January Loser portfolios. They also find no evidence of price reversals for both 
Winners and Losers in the Hong Kong stock exchange where no capital gain or dividends 
taxes are imposed. Their results are inconsistent with the overreaction hypothesis.  
 
Hoitash and Krishnan (2008) find evidence that high speculative intensity
11
 or herding 
behaviour may explain long-term investor overreaction in the US over the period 1985–2004. 
This may occur because of the expected serial autocorrelation caused by noise traders. Yalcin 
(2008) by contrast investigates the gradual information diffusion model of Hong and Stein 
(1999) which argues that as long as different traders hold different sets of information, 
investors only respond to the information they know and thus the expected stock prices might 
be biased. Yalcin (2008) finds that the contrarian profits diminish gradually by the increase of 
the rate of information dissemination in the NYSE from July 1980 to December 2004.   
 
2.5 Overreaction to specific events 
In this section I discuss studies that relate stock market overreaction to a number of different 
events including the so-called earnings phenomenon, the trading behaviour of insiders, 
                                                          
11
 defined as the adjusted autocorrelation in daily trading volumes based on the amount of information arrived in 
the market) 
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takeover rumours, and adjustments in foreign exchange markets and going concern audit 
opinion announcements. 
 
Zarowin, (1989) investigates the overreaction to the earnings phenomenon in the US. He 
creates a trading rule based on firms that experience good earnings (Winners) and bad 
earnings (Losers). All listed firms with seven consecutive years of earnings (six years pre the 
event and the current earning year) are included in a sample from NYSE over the period 1971-
1981. Zarowin forms two portfolios, namely, the worst performer and best performer based on 
the earning performance measure. He calculated average excess return over the 36 months 
subsequent to the extreme earnings year following De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Results show 
that the poorest earning portfolio outperforms the best earning portfolio by 16.6% over the test 
period due to the differences in firm size. Therefore the overreaction to earning hypothesis is 
not supported.  
 
Seyhun (1990) investigates the trading behaviour of insiders in NYSE, ASE and NASDAQ 
around the October 1987 stock market crash. Daily stock data are collected over the period 
from January 1975 to November 1988. Seyhun finds evidence of the overreaction hypothesis 
during the crash as insiders became heavy buyers after the crash so that extreme Losers 
became Winners over the three years subsequent to the crash.    
 
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) examine the overreaction/underreaction of financial analysts 
to earnings announcements. EPS and price forecasts quarterly data are collected for 178 firms 
over the period 1976-1986. They find evidence of analysts’ underreaction to earnings 
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announcements rather than overreaction. In addition, and contrary to the results of De Bondt 
and Thaler (1990), they conclude that extreme earnings forecasts by analysts cannot be 
explained by the overreaction hypothesis. 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) investigate the reaction of stock prices to common factors and 
firm-specific information in the US. Weekly data are collected from the ASE and the NYSE 
over the period 1963-1990. They find evidence of underreaction to the stock market common 
factors and significant evidence of market overreaction to firm-specific information. In 
addition, they find that the main source of the contrarian profits in the short horizon is the 
overreaction to firm specific information. They argue that price pressure of liquidity motivated 
traders is the main cause of price reversal.    
 
Michaely et al. (1995) examine the immediate and long-term reaction to two main dividend 
policies, namely, cash dividends initiation and omission. The sample includes all listed 
companies in both the NYSE and AMEX that initiated or omitted cash dividends over the 
period 1964-1988. Stocks abnormal returns are calculated based on the Buy and Hold strategy 
for three days pre and post-events. They find that the short-run price effect of dividends 
omission is negative; however the price impact on dividends initiation is positive. In addition, 
the market reaction for both dividends initiation and omission are equal. They also find highly 
significant long-term drift subsequent to dividend omissions. Their results are not consistent 
with De Bondt and Thaler (1985).     
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Zivney et al. (1996) investigate the market overreaction to takeover rumours in the US. They 
examine over 2000 takeover rumours articles published in the “Heard on the Street” (HOTS) 
and “Abreast of the Market” (AOTM) columns in the Wall Street Journal. The sample 
represents all listed shares subject to takeover in the NYSE and AMEX over the period 1985-
1988. Using the market-adjusted residual return following the methodology of Brown and 
Warner (1985), they find negative abnormal returns one year post takeover rumours. Therefore 
they conclude that the buy on rumours strategy is not profitable. However, the authors 
recommend that selling short subsequent to rumours (published on AOTM) 100 days after the 
rumour day, earns 20% cumulative annual abnormal returns.  
 
Larson and Madura (2001) investigate the short-term overreaction to adjustments in the 
foreign exchange market. They analyse the effect of extreme one-day exchange rate 
adjustments on a sample of developed and emerging markets. Daily data of 15 (five emerging 
and 10 industrial currencies) exchange rates are collected over the period 1988-1995. Using 
the event study methodology following Brown et al. (1988), results fail to support the efficient 
market hypothesis. Interestingly, they find evidence of investor underreaction in the industrial 
economies, and overreaction in the emerging economies.  
 
Chelley-Steeley (2001) uses the Kalman filter methodology to estimate price adjustments for 
the daily opening and closing prices of the Dow Jones market index. They find that 
overreaction at the opening prices involves both higher volatility and negative autocorrelation. 
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In addition, they find greater tendency of overreactive behaviour of the stock market index at 
the opening prices than those of closing prices.  
 
Kadiyala and Rau (2004) investigate the overreaction/underreaction towards four main 
corporate events in the US, namely, cash and equity financed acquisition, share buyback and 
equity offerings. They find that the announcements of corporate events after good news (i.e. 
positive earnings surprise) outperforms those events after bad news announcements (negative 
earnings surprise) apart from the information convoyed in the corporate event. They also find 
no evidence of market overreaction to the corporate events. 
 
Schaub (2006) finds evidence of overreaction to the going concern audit opinion 
announcements in the US. They analyse 79 announcements published in the Wall Street 
Journal over the period 1984-1996. Using the risk adjusted model to calculate the abnormal 
returns, they find significant negative abnormal returns (-15.31%) subsequent to the 
announcements followed by positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns (10.33%) 10 
days post the announcement day.   
 
Edmans et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between investor’s mode and stock returns.  
They find significant negative abnormal returns (-7% monthly) as the result of market reaction 
to losses by national football teams especially in the western European countries. In addition, 
they find weak evidence of market reaction to international cricket, rugby, and basketball 
international competitions. They argue that investors may earn abnormal returns by selling 
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short the futures on market indices before major sports events in the western European 
countries. On the other hand, Vergin (2001) finds evidence of price overreaction to the 
outstanding performance in the National Football League (NFL) games compared to the 
previous 2-5 games in the US between 1981 and 1995.  
 
2.6 Opponents of the contrarian strategy 
A large strand of the literature argues that the overreaction phenomenon can be attributed 
simply to the computation errors in abnormal returns. Another large body of the literature 
however believes that momentum is the most profitable trading strategy. In this section I 
present the alternative views of the opponents of the contrarian trading strategy. 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examine the relative strength strategies over 3-12 month 
periods. Daily stock returns data are collected around earnings announcement dates from 
NYES and AMEX over the period 1965-1989. They consider 16 different relative strength 
strategies (selecting stocks based on past 1-4 quarters returns and hold them for the same 
period). They find that the strategy based on buying past Winners (six months) and holding 
them for another six months earns 12.01% compounded excess returns on average. In addition, 
they find that Winner portfolios earn higher excess returns during seven months and 36 
months of the formation period. They conclude that the profitability of the relative strength 
strategies cannot be attributed to size or systematic risk. 
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Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) re-examined the alternative interpretations of momentum profits 
documented in their earlier paper in 1993. They provide evidence that the momentum profits 
during the 1990s is genuine and is not due to data mining or data snooping biases. In addition, 
they find evidence that the positive momentum profit in the test periods is sometimes 
associated with price reversals. Therefore they argue that the behavioural models such as the 
representative heuristic of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and self-attribution of Daniel et al. 
(1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) provide a partial interpretation of the momentum anomaly.  
 
2.6.1 Computation errors 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) claim that the long-term cumulative average abnormal return is 
upwardly biased. They argue that (CARs) accumulate monthly measurement errors (bid-ask 
spread and non-synchronous trading
12
) as well as the true abnormal return over a long period 
and this leads to spurious returns. Conrad and Kaul (1993) claim that the Buy and Hold 
method is the most relevant technique to measure the long-term performance
13
.Monthly data 
are collected from the NYSE over the period 1926-1988 and using the methodology of De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), they find no evidence of market overreaction as CARs are found to 
be upwardly biased. For instance the non-January cumulative abnormal returns are 12.2% 
under the CARs, however it is actually -1.7% under the BAH technique. They show that 
Losers outperform Winners only in January and this is not due to the overreaction 
phenomenon.    
 
                                                          
12
 Non- synchronous trading is defined as infrequent trading. 
13
 Chapter 4 includes detailed discussion of the alternative measures of the abnormal returns. 
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On the other hand, Loughran and Ritter (1996) show (using monthly data form NYSE over the 
period 1929-1988) that the results of Conrad and Kaul (1993) are driven by survivorship bias 
and long-term mean reversion. They find that the strong explanatory power of price in the 
pooled regression of Conrad and Kaul (1993) is due to the tendency for low (high) stock prices 
to be followed by high (low) returns. They claim that the discrepancies in results between De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Conrad and Kaul (1993) are due to the inclusion of AMEX firms 
in the sample. Loughran and Ritter (1996) argue that the results of De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) are not driven by the bias in CARs, but by the bid-ask spread bias. They further argue 
that bid-ask spreads affect monthly CARs of low–priced stocks. They conclude that the bid-
ask spread bias is found to be the main cause of the long-term overreaction when forming 
portfolios based on CARs.  
 
Dissanaike (1994) compares the alternative techniques of measuring long-term cumulative 
abnormal returns, namely, arithmetic method CARs, rebalancing method RB and buy and hold 
method BAH. Dissanaike argues that the rank period returns using the arithmetic method is 
biased and leads to inaccurate ranks for both Winners and Loser portfolios. Monthly returns 
data are collected for the FT500 over the period 1981-1991. The results show the sensitivity of 
the rank and test period returns to the different approaches of computing the cumulative 
abnormal returns and hence it may alter the conclusion of the overreaction hypothesis. 
Dissanaike finds that the rebalancing method RB is more accurate than the arithmetic method.   
 
Ball et al. (1995) investigate the measurement error in raw abnormal returns of contrarian 
portfolios. Monthly returns data are collected from NYSE and AMEX. Using the buy and hold 
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method to calculate the abnormal returns over non-overlapping five years, they find that the 
profitability of contrarian strategy is substantially driven by low-priced Losers in the 
portfolios. They find little evidence of the January anomaly, however negative abnormal 
returns are found in the June-end portfolios. Kim (2009) used the Morgan Stanley Capital 
Index (MSCI) data for 16 developed countries from 1969 to 2007 to examine the profitability 
of the contrarian strategies. Results provide evidence against the contrarian strategy as the 
mean reversion rate of stock prices is very slow across the sample. This suggests that the 
contrarian strategies might be profitable but only in the very long term.  
 
2.6.2 Contrarian or momentum 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) investigate 120 different trading strategies over the period 1923-1989 
in the NYSE. They find that less than 50% of the trading strategies earn significant abnormal 
returns. The contrarian strategies are found to be profitable in the long term during 1926-1947; 
however the authors find that the momentum strategies are profitable in the short term (3-12 
months). 
 
Rouwenhorst (1998) investigated the Winner–Loser anomaly in 12 European stock markets, 
namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Monthly return data are collected over 
the period 1978-1995. Portfolios are constructed following the methodology of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). They find evidence of momentum profits in the internationally diversified 
portfolios as past Winners outperform past Losers by 1.5% per month. In addition, the return 
continuations are detected for small and big firms in all the 12 countries, however small firms 
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exhibit more return continuation. Their results support the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). 
 
Schiereck et al. (1999) investigate the contrarian and momentum strategies in the German 
stock market. They find consistent results with behavioural finance literature as momentum 
strategies are found to be profitable in the short term, however contrarian strategies are found 
to be profitable in the long term.  
 
Kang et al. (2002) investigate the short-term overreaction and the intermediate–term 
momentum strategies and the main source of the contrarian/momentum profits in the Chinese 
stock market 1994-2000. Weekly stock price data are collected for 163 companies in 1994 and 
286 companies over the period 1995-2000. Using the methodologies of Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), they find evidence of the short-term overreaction 
and intermediate–term momentum profits. They also find that the overreaction profits are 
dominating in case of equal-weighted portfolio strategies, however momentum profits are 
prevailing when they use the value-weighted portfolio strategies. They conclude that the high 
proportion of individual investors and the unreliable information (rumors) are the main source 
of the contrarian profits. 
 
Demir et al. (2004) examine the short and intermediate momentum strategies in the Australian 
market. Daily volume weighted average price data are collected for all the approved stocks 
(462 stocks) over the period 1990-2001 and all shares (772 stocks) included in the All 
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Ordinaries Index of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) over the period 1996-2001. They 
construct momentum portfolios based on 30, 60, 90, 180 day estimation and test periods. 
Using the buy and hold excess returns method, they find that taking long positions on Winners 
for 30, 60, 90 and 180 days and selling short Losers yields significant abnormal returns  
ranging from 5.34% to 0.46% per month. In addition, they find that momentum profits are 
prevailing for both big and small companies. The momentum profits are significantly higher 
than those of the US and European markets. 
 
Xiang et al. (2002) find that cross-sectional returns are predictable by insider trading activities 
in US over the period 1985 to 1996. In addition, book-to-market and size cannot explain 
momentum profits. They conclude that the overreaction phenomenon can be seen as the main 
reason for the intermediate momentum profits. On the other hand, Hon and Tonks (2003) find 
evidence of momentum profits in the UK. However, they conclude that this momentum is not 
prevailing over the whole period 1955-1996; therefore it is not considered as a main feature of 
the UK stock market.   
 
Forner and Marhuenda (2003) extend the study of Alonso and Rubio (1990) and reexamine the 
overreaction hypothesis in the Spanish stock markets. They use different methodology and test 
periods (6, 12, 60 month windows in addition to the 36 month window previously analysed by 
Alonso and Rubio (1990)). Using the CAPM model they construct two portfolios, namely, 
Losers and Winners based on the extreme residual returns using CARs following De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) and BAH following Conrad and Kaul (1993). Monthly return data are 
collected over the period 1963-1997. 
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 They find that one-year and five-year momentum and contrarian strategies earn significant 
abnormal returns. Contrary to Alonso and Rubio (1990), no significant abnormal returns are 
detected within the 36 month test period. Their results support the existence of the momentum 
profits in the short term and the contrarian profits in the longer term, even after accounting for 
time varying risk. They argue that their results cannot be attributed to data snooping bias.  
 
George and Hwang (2004), using the methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), find that 
the profitability of momentum strategies can be explained by the previously published 52-
week high price data rather than the traditional past return rank period. They also find no 
evidence of long-term price reversal based on the 52-week high price rule over the period 
1963–2001. They conclude that there is no relationship between short-term momentum and 
long-term reversals; they are likely to be two separate phenomena. 
 
Antoniou et al. (2005) argue that studying the contrarian strategies in emerging markets is 
more profitable due to market inefficiency and the possibility of returns predictability. They 
examine the out-of-sample evidence of the overreaction profitability and the main sources of 
the contrarian profits in the Athens stock market. Weekly price data are collected for all listed 
shares and the ASE General Price Index over the period 1990-2000. The portfolio investment 
strategy is based on short sell previous Winners and take long position on the Losers following 
the methodology of Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995).  
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They find that negative serial correlations leads to statistically significant short-term 
contrarian profits in the ASE. They find that this profit is not fully attributed to market 
frictions or risk. The Fama French three-factor model explains the contrarian profit 
considerably better than the CAPM. Siganos (2007) finds evidence of the momentum profits 
in the UK over the period 1975-2001 and concludes that – contrary to the literature – investors 
can maximise their momentum profits by including small firms of both Losers and Winners in 
their portfolios.  
 
Gutierrez and Pirinsky (2007) define two different types of momentum strategies, namely, 
firm-specific abnormal returns and relative returns momentum. The former shows continuing 
long-term return performance consistent with the underreaction hypothesis. However, the 
latter shows a reversal in one year consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. In addition, 
they find that institutional investors tend to buy securities based on past high returns and avoid 
past poor securities.   
 
McInish et al. (2008) examine the profitability of both contrarian and momentum strategies in 
seven Pacific-Basin stock markets. Weekly returns data are collected from Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore over the period 1990-2000. Using the 
methodology of Lo and Mackinlay's (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), they find 
evidence of contrarian profits in five out of seven countries. Contrarian profits are reported in 
Japan while momentum profits are found in both Japan and Hong Kong. In addition, they find 
that Losers display momentum and Winners display reversals. Combining Winners and Losers 
in a trading strategy earns abnormal returns for one week.  
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Wu (2011) investigates the dynamic relationship between mean reversion and momentum 
strategies in the Chinese stock market using the methodology of Balvers and Wu (2006). Daily 
returns data are collected for the “A” shares listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
over the period 1990-2001. Wu finds no significant abnormal returns for the pure short-term 
(3-12months) momentum strategy of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). However he finds highly 
significant abnormal returns for the pure contrarian strategy for all holding periods. Wu also 
finds that the combined strategy (momentum + contrarian, 12 month formation and test 
periods) results in a significant excess return of 22.2%. His results support the overreaction 
hypothesis in the Chinese market. 
 
2.7 Summary  
 
The main objective of this chapter has been to conduct a comprehensive literature survey of 
the overreaction phenomenon and to address issues raised by its critics. I have presented the 
literature on both short and long-term overreaction and in both developed and emerging 
markets. Moreover, I have analysed the competing explanations for events attributed to 
overreaction, namely, the variation of risk (beta), seasonality and size effects, bid-ask spread 
and the tax hypothesis. In addition, I have analysed the overreaction to specific events, such as 
the overreaction to corporate actions (merger, acquisition and earnings and dividends 
announcements), to rumours and to international sport championship results. Finally, I have 
critically discussed the main arguments of the opponents of the overreaction phenomenon.  
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The main findings of this chapter are that both short and long-term overreaction phenomenon 
have been extensively investigated in developed markets in the 1980s and 1990s using both 
the cumulative average abnormal return (arithmetic and rebalancing method) and the buy and 
hold methods. However, a new strand of literature has recently begun to investigate the 
overreaction phenomenon in emerging markets. The literature survey illustrated the ongoing 
debate about the existence of the overreaction phenomenon itself and whether or not other 
factors (the change in risk (beta), firm size, seasonality, and bid-ask spread) are really the main 
source of contrarian profits.   
 
I showed that one deficiency of the existing body of the literature is that it has investigated the 
overreaction phenomenon using either cross section or time series data alone. None of the 
existing studies has combined these two dimensions by using a panel data model. Ignoring the 
time- or the cross-sectional dimensions may however lay the estimation open to questions of 
bias (Cressy and Farag (2011)). Moreover, existing studies have largely ignored the dynamics 
of the process of overreaction. To do this requires the use of a dynamic panel data model and 
of system GMM in particular.  
Finally, the existing body of the literature on overreaction has not investigated the link 
between regulatory policies and overreaction hypothesis. Regulatory policies (price limits and 
circuit breakers) adopted by policy makers to reduce volatility, may play an important role in 
explaining what we observe in these markets. This requires a particular kind of data that this 
study, unlike those in the literature, is able to provide. The above mentioned gaps in the 
literature are therefore main motivation for this thesis and we shall attempt to fill these gaps in 
the empirical chapters that follow. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of the literature on the Short-term overreaction 
Authors, date and title Market 
Estimation and 
Event windows 
Sample & 
study period 
Methodology Summary of empirical findings 
Atkins, A. & Dyl, E. (1990) 
Price Reversals, Bid-Ask 
Spreads, and Market 
Efficiency. 
NYSE 
US 
Estimation 
window (-70 , -
11 days) 
Event window 
(-10, +10 days) 
Daily return data 
for all listed shares 
over the period 
1975-1984. 
Three Losers and 
three Winners 
Mean-adjusted, 
Market-adjusted 
returns 
Risk-adjusted returns  
Strong evidence of short–term 
overreaction for bad news. 
Weak evidence of short –term 
overreaction in case of good news. 
Bid-ask spread is not the main 
source of the overreaction 
phenomenon. 
Consistent results with De Bondt 
and Thaler. 
Bremer, M. & Sweeney, R. 
(1991). The Reversal of 
Large Stock-Price 
Decreases. 
NYSE 
US 
Event window    
  (-20, +20 days) 
Daily stock returns 
for all listed shares 
in the Fortune 500 
over the period 
1962-1986. 
Mean adjusted 
returns 
Evidence of price reversal 
phenomenon in the US. 
Price reversal phenomenon is 
unrelated to both the weekend and 
turn-of-the-year effects. 
Cox, D. & Peterson, D. 
(1994) Stock Returns 
Following Large One-Day 
Declines: Evidence on 
Short-Term Reversals and 
Longer-Term Performance. 
NYSE, 
AMEX, 
and NMS 
US 
The estimation 
window is (-105 
to +6) days pre-
event and the 
post-event 
window is (+21 
to +120) days 
post-event. The 
event window is 
(+1 +20) days 
post-event. 
Daily price data for 
all listed shares in 
NYSE, AMEX, 
and NMS over the 
period 1963 – 
1991. 
Mean-adjusted 
returns. Market 
model.  
Market- adjusted 
returns. 
Strong evidence of price reversals 
post-event. 
The degree of reversals is 
diminished over time. 
Evidence of small firm effect as 
small firms was found to reverse 
more than large firms. 
The price reversal phenomenon 
can be attributed to the bid -ask 
spread. Therefore their findings do 
not support the short term 
overreaction.  
Liang, Y. & Mullineaux, D. 
(1994) Overreaction and 
Reverse Anticipation: Two 
Related Puzzles? 
NYSE & 
ASE 
US 
 
 
Event window   
   (-200 , +200 
days) 
Daily stock returns 
for all listed shares 
1963-1988 
Event type 
methodology of 
Brown and Warner 
(1985). 
Form four base 
Significant price reversal post 
negative and positive events.  
Stock prices tend to decrease pre 
positive events (shocks) and 
increase pre negative shocks. 
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portfolios and 16 
control portfolios. 
Support the overreaction 
hypothesis. 
Zivney, T., Bertin, W. & 
Torabzadeh, K. (1996) 
Overreaction to Takeover 
Speculation. 
NYSE 
&AMEX 
US 
Event window   
   (-20 ,+252 
days) 
All listed shares 
subject to takeover 
in the NYSE and 
AMEX 1985-1988. 
Market-adjusted 
residual return 
following the 
methodology of 
Brown and Warner 
(1985) 
Negative abnormal returns one 
year post takeover rumours.  
The buy on rumours strategy is not 
profitable.  
Selling short the subsequent 
rumours 100 days after the 
rumours day, earns 20% 
cumulative annual abnormal 
returns.  
Akhigbe, A., Gosnell, T. & 
Harikumar, T. (1998) 
Winners and Losers on 
NYSE: A Re-Examination 
Using Daily Closing Bid-
Ask Spreads. 
NYSE 
US 
Estimation  
window     (-220 
,+20 days 
Event window 
(-5,+4) 
Stocks that 
experienced large 
percentage change 
over one day 
during 1992 as 
published in Wall 
Street Journal 
The market model to 
calculate the 
abnormal returns. 
Compare the 
expected abnormal 
return with the 
average percentage 
of bid-ask spread. 
Results showed evidence of the 
overreaction hypothesis. 
Losers experienced greater 
reversals than the average 
percentage bid-ask spread during 
the next two days subsequent to 
the event.  
The bid- ask spread has significant 
explanatory power of the price 
reversal phenomenon.  
Bowman, R. & Iverson, D. 
(1998) Short-run 
overreaction in the New 
Zealand stock market. 
New 
Zealand 
Estimation  
window     (+21 
, +80 weeks 
Event window 
(-5,+10 weeks) 
Weekly return data 
for all listed shares 
were collected over 
the period 1967 -
1986 
Market model 
Risk adjusted model. 
Weekly CARs. 
Bowman and Iverson (1998) 
investigated the short-term 
overreaction hypothesis in the 
New Zealand stock exchange. 
They found strong evidence of the 
overreaction in the New Zealand 
stock market as abnormal returns 
for Losers one week post-event 
(2.4%) outperform Winners (-
1.5%). The overreaction 
phenomenon was not due to bid 
ask bounce, non-synchronous 
trading or size effect.   
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Cooper, M. (1999) Filter 
Rules Based on Price and 
Volume in Individual 
Security Overreaction. 
NYSE  
& 
AMEX 
US 
Alternative 
filter rules based 
on weekly 
returns and 
trading 
volumes. 
300 large firms to 
minimise the bid-
ask spread bias 
over the period 
1962-1993. 
Filter rule methods 
by specifying Losers 
and Winners based 
on minimum amount 
of lagged weekly 
returns and growth 
in trading volume  
Compare filter rules 
to Buy and hold 
abnormal returns. 
Supporting evidence of the 
overreaction phenomenon in the 
NYSE.  
The lower the trading activity the 
higher the price reversals.  
The filter rules strategies 
outperformed the buy and hold 
counterparts.   
Schnusenberg, O. & 
Madura, J. (2001) Does 
U.S. Stock Market Indexes 
Over– or Underreact? 
US 
DJIA, 
NYSE, 
Nasdaq, 
S&P500, 
Russel 
3000, and 
Wilshire 
5000 
Estimation 
window (-1,-60) 
and the event 
windows (+1, 
+2, +5, +10, 
+30, +60) 
 
Daily price data 
were collected for 
major six stock 
indices in the US 
equity market since 
inception and 
until1997 
They defined the 
event based on the 
best (Winners) and 
worst (Losers) index 
historical 
performance. 
They used the mean 
–adjusted return and 
ARIMA models to 
estimate the 
expected returns. 
Evidence of the market 
underreaction in the following day 
subsequent to the event for the six 
market indices.  
Significant short-term overreaction 
for the Losers and underreactions 
for the Winners over the 60 days 
following the event, the fewer 
constituents (i.e. Nasdaq) in the 
index the greater degree of 
underreaction for the Winners.   
Otchere, I. & Chan, J. 
(2003) Short-Term 
Overreaction in the Hong 
Kong Stock Market: Can a 
Contrarian Trading 
Strategy Beat the Market? 
HKSE 
Hong 
Kong 
Estimation 
window (-70,-
10) and the 
event windows 
(-7, +7).  
 
Daily data over two 
periods pre (1996-
1997) and post 
(1997-1998) Asian 
financial crises 
1996-1998. 
Three different 
methods to calculate 
the abnormal returns, 
mean-adjusted, 
market model and 
the CAPM. 
Buy–and-Hold 
abnormal returns. 
Little but significant evidence of 
price overreaction pre the Asian 
financial crises. 
 Price reversals were more 
pronounced for Winner.  
The overreaction phenomenon is 
diminished during the crises 
period and cannot be explained by 
either bid –ask spread or the day of 
the week effect.  
Larson, S. & Madura, J. 
(2003) What drives stock 
price behaviour following 
NYSE 
US 
Estimation, 
examination and 
windows are (-
Listed shares 1988-
1995 
They defined the 
event as at least +-
10% daily price 
They found significant evidence of 
the overreaction phenomenon in 
case of uninformed events. 
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extreme one-day returns. 260, -41), the 
examination 
window (-3, 
+20) and the 
event window 
(+81-+300)). 
change over three-
day event window. 
They estimated the 
market model using 
the methodology of 
Brown et al. (1988) 
No evidence of overreaction in 
case of informed events.  
 Their results supported the 
overconfidence and self- 
attribution bias by Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998).   
Demir, I., Muthuswamy, J. 
& Walter, T. (2004) 
Momentum returns in 
Australian equities: The 
influences of size, risk, 
liquidity and return 
computation. 
 ASX 
Australia 
30, 60, 90, 180 
day estimation 
and test periods 
Daily volume 
weighted average 
price data for all 
the approved 
stocks 1990-2001 
and all shares 
included in the in 
the All Ordinaries 
Index 1996-2001. 
They constructed 
momentum 
portfolios based on 
the buy and hold 
excess returns 
method. 
They found that taking long 
positions on Winners and selling 
short Losers yields significant 
abnormal returns range from 
5.34% to 0.46% per month. 
Momentum profits were prevailing 
for both big and small companies.  
Momentum profits are 
significantly higher than those of 
the US and European markets 
Ma, Y. Beach, L. & Hasan, 
T. (2005) 
The Stock Price 
Overreaction Effect: 
Evidence on Nasdaq Stocks 
 
Nasdaq 
NYSE 
US 
Estimation 
Window (-120, 
-21) and event 
windows (-5, 
+5, 
 (+1, +2) (+3, 
 +10) (+11, 
+20) 
 (+21, +50).  
Daily price data of 
a sample (852) of 
Winners and 
Losers listed in 
NYSE and 
NASDAQ over the 
period 1996-1997. 
 
The market model to 
calculate the 
abnormal returns, 
CARs. 
Little evidence of price 
overreaction in the NYSE for both 
Winners and Losers. 
Significant price reversal as 
evidence of the overreaction 
phenomenon in Nasdaq market. 
Investors may interpret and 
analyse the new information 
differently in the NYSE and 
NASDAQ. 
Antoniou, A. & Galariotis, 
E. (2005) Contrarian 
Profits and the 
Overreaction Hypothesis: 
the Case of the Athens 
Stock Exchange. 
ASE 
Athens 
Buy and Hold 
for 
1-4 quarters 
returns period. 
Weekly price data 
for all listed shares 
over the period 
1990-2000. 
The investment 
strategy based on 
short sell previous 
Winners and go long 
on the Losers 
following the 
methodology of Lo 
and MacKinlay 
Negative serial correlations leads 
to statistically significant short- 
term contrarian profits in the ASE. 
These profits are not fully 
attributed to market frictions or 
risk.  
Fama French three- factor model 
explained the contrarian proffers 
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(1990) and 
Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1995). 
well better than the CAPM.    
Schaub, M. (2006) Investor 
overreaction to going 
concern audit opinion 
announcements. 
US Estimation 
window  
(-299,-50) and  
the event 
windows  
(+1, +10) 
 
Analysed 79 
announcements 
published in the 
Wall Street Journal 
Daily price data 
over the period 
1984-1996 
Using the risk 
adjusted model to 
calculate the 
abnormal returns. 
Event study 
methodology. 
Significant negative abnormal 
returns (-15.31%) subsequent to all 
the 79 announcements followed by 
positive and significant cumulative 
abnormal returns (10.33%) 10 
days post the announcement day.   
Evidence of overreaction to the 
going concern audit report. 
Michayluk, D. & 
Neuhauser, K. (2006) 
Investor Overreaction 
During Market Declines: 
Evidence from the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis. 
NYSE, 
AMEX, 
Nasdaq 
US 
Event windows 
+1, +5, +30, 
+60 days 
Daily price data for 
6276 stocks over 
60 days around the 
crash  
Cumulative 
abnormal returns and 
return correlations. 
Significant evidence of market 
overreaction to the Asian financial 
crises over one week following the 
market crash.  
Both size effect and CAPM beta 
did not explain the initial return 
decline following the crash. 
Evidence of short-term return 
predictability during Asian stock 
market crash.   
Lo, K. & Coggins, R. 
(2006) Effects of order 
flow imbalance on short 
horizon contrarian 
strategies in the Australian 
equity market. 
ASX 
Australia 
Five lags of 
autocorrelation 
for hourly and 
daily returns on 
individual 
securities. 
Daily and hourly 
price for the top 
200 companies 
from 2000 to 2002. 
Following the 
methodology of Lo 
and MacKinlay 
(1990) 
Strong evidence of short –term 
contrarian profits. 
Contrarian strategies were no 
longer profitable after controlling 
or transaction costs.  
Positive relationship between price 
reversals and order imbalance.  
The overreaction phenomenon can 
be explained by temporary 
liquidity imbalance.   
Spyrou, S. Kassimatis, K. 
& Galariotis, E. (2007) 
Short-term overreaction, 
LSE 
UK 
Positive or 
negative shocks 
when the market 
Daily closing price 
FT30, FTSE100, 
FTSE250 and 
Calculate AR and 
CARs using a mean-
adjusted. 
No evidence of overreaction to 
market shocks for big firms. 
No significant abnormal returns 
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underreaction and efficient 
reaction: evidence from the 
London Stock Exchange. 
return is above 
or below two 
SD over -60,-11 
day estimation 
window 
FTSE Small Cap 
over the period 
1988 to 2004. 
 were found on the following days 
subsequent to the shock.  
Evidence of market underreaction 
for small and medium size firms. 
Price reversals occurred during 12-
20 days following the event. No 
effect of the seasonality bid-ask 
spread, and time varying risk on 
their results.   
McInish, T., Ding, D. & 
Pyun, C. (2008) Short 
horizon contrarian and 
momentum strategies in 
Asian markets: An 
integrated analysis. 
Japan, 
Taiwan, 
Korea, 
Hong 
Kong, 
Malaysia, 
Thailand, 
and 
Singapore 
Rank period 
one, two and 
four weeks. 
 
Weekly returns 
data were collected 
over the period 
1990-2000 
Using the 
methodology of Lo 
and MacKinlay's 
(1990) and 
Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1995). 
Weighted relative 
strength portfolios. 
long/short position in 
Positive/negative 
excess return stocks.  
Evidence of contrarian profits in 
five out of seven countries.  
Contrarian profits were reported in 
Japan while, momentum profies 
were found in both Japan and 
Hong Kong.  
Losers on display momentum and 
Winners display reversals.  
Combining Winners and Losers in 
a trading strategy earn abnormal 
return that last for one week. 
Farag, H & Cressy, R. 
(2010) 
Do unobservable factors 
explain the disposition 
effect in emerging stock 
markets? 
EGX30 
Egypt 
Estimation 
period (-6 to -
106) and event 
window (+1 to 
+120) 
Daily data are 
collected over the 
period 2005-2008 
Panel data methods 
and the event study 
following the 
methodology of Cox 
and Peterson (1994) 
Fixed effect model best suits the 
EGX data. 
The unobservable factors play an 
important role in explaining the 
overreaction phenomenon.  
Their results support the 
disposition effect as past Losers 
outperform past Winners. 
Lobe, S. & Rieks, J. (2011) 
Short-term market 
overreaction the Frankfurt 
stock exchange. 
DAX30, 
MDAX, 
SDAX, 
technology 
Germany 
1-5 day window 
post-event 
Daily data were 
collected for four 
main market 
indices since 
inception namely, 
DAX30, MDAX, 
Calculate AR using 
the market and size –
adjusted abnormal 
returns over five-day 
post-event,  
Significant evidence of short-term 
overreaction in the German stock 
market. 
 Price overreaction is not due to 
size or bid-ask-spread. 
They found asymmetric price 
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SDAX, technology reaction to positive and negative 
shocks. 
 When they controlled for the 
transaction costs, the contrarian 
profits were negligible. 
Their results supported the 
efficient market hypothesis in the 
German stock market.   
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Table 2.2: Summary of the literature on the Long-term overreaction 
Authors, date and title Market 
Rank and 
test periods 
Sample & 
study period 
Methodology Summary of empirical findings 
De Bondt, W. & Thaler, R. 
(1985) Does the Stock Market 
Overreact? 
NYSE  
US 
three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1926-1982 
Cumulative average 
abnormal residuals 
(CAAR) 
Results support the overreaction 
hypothesis as Losers outperforms 
Winners by 24.6%. 
Evidence of seasonality effects (turn of 
the year effect).  
Howe, J. (1986) Evidence on 
Stock Market Overreaction 
NYSE  
US 
52 weeks pre 
and post-
event (50% 
weekly price 
change. 
Listed shares 
1961-1983 
OLS and Scholes- 
Williams. 
Cumulative average 
abnormal returns 
(CAAR) 
Evidence of the overreaction hypothesis. 
Overreaction phenomenon cannot be 
attributed to January effect.  
De Bondt, W. & Thaler, R. 
(1987) Further Evidence on 
Investor Overreaction and 
Stock Market Seasonality. 
NYSE  
US 
Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1926-1982 
Cumulative average 
abnormal residuals 
(CAAR) 
The excess returns of January for the 
Winners are negatively related to 
December excess returns 
The variation in CAPM-beta cannot 
explain the Winner –Loser anomaly. 
The Winner –Loser anomaly is not 
attributed to the size effect.     
Chan, K. (1988) On the 
Contrarian Investment 
Strategy. 
NYSE  
US 
Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1926-1982 
Cumulative average 
abnormal residuals 
(CAAR) 
There is a large change of betas from the 
formation to the test period.  
The overreaction phenomenon and the 
Winner –Losers anomaly are due to the 
variation of risk.  
When controlling for the variation of 
CAPM-betas, the contrarian strategy 
achieved small abnormal return,  
Zarowin, P. (1989) Does the 
Stock Market Overreaction to 
Corporate Earnings 
Information? 
NYSE 
US 
 
Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
listed shares  
1971-1981 
Compare the excess 
returns of two 
extreme earnings 
portfolios 
Poorest earning portfolio outperform 
best earning portfolio by 16.6% over the 
test period.  
The abnormal return achieved due to 
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differences in size. 
The overreaction to earning hypothesis 
is not supported  
Davidson, W. & Dutia, D. 
(1989) A Note on the 
Behaviour of Security Returns: 
A Test of Stock Market 
Overreaction and Efficiency.  
NYSE 
and 
AMEX 
US 
One year non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
 listed shares 
1963-1985 
 
Calculated the 
cumulative 
predicted errors 
based on the market 
model for two 
extreme portfolios. 
contradicted to the overreaction 
hypothesis  
Winners (Losers) continued to be 
Winners (Losers)  
Evidence of January anomaly as 25% of 
the Winners occur in January, and 
Losers were no longer Losers in 
subsequent January.    
Alonso, A. & Rubio, G. (1990) 
Overreaction in the Spanish 
Equity Market. 
Spain Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
listed shares 
1967-1984 
 
Following the 
methodology of  De 
Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) 
Results supported the overreaction 
phenomenon in the Spanish stock 
market. 
Losers outperform Winners by 24.5% 12 
months after formation period. 
Zarowin, P. (1990) Size, 
Seasonality, and Stock Market 
Overreaction. 
NYSE  
US 
Three year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1926-1982 
Following the 
methodology of De 
Bondt and Thaler 
(1985). 
The variation in size is the main cause of 
the superior performance of Loser 
portfolios over those of Winners.  
The excess abnormal returns 
disappeared – except for those on 
January- when controlling for size. 
 Evidence of the January effect. 
Chopra, N., Lakonishok, J. & 
Ritter, J. (1992) Measuring 
abnormal performance: Do 
stocks overreact? 
NYSE 
 US 
Five-year 
ranking 
period. 
Five-year 
overlapping 
formation 
period. 
Listed shares 
1936-1986 
Calculated the 
abnormal returns 
with adjustments 
for size and time 
variation in beta. 
Used the Buy-and 
Hold returns to 
rank portfolios. 
Results supported the overreaction  
phenomenon Consistent results with De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
Losers were found to outperform 
Winners by 9.5% per year. 
The overreaction phenomenon cannot be 
attributed to size effect. 
Strong evidence of January effect.  
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Brailsford, T. (1992) A Test 
for the Winner-Loser Anomaly 
in the Australian Equity 
Market: 1958-87 
Australia Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1958-1987 
Cumulative average 
abnormal residuals  
using zero-one 
market model 
following De Bondt 
and Thaler 
No evidence of the Winner-Loser 
anomaly in the Australian stock market  
The difference in CARs for the Losers-
Winner portfolios is insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
Jegadeesh, N. & Titman, S. 
(1993)  
Returns to Buying Winners 
and Selling Losers: 
Implications for Stock Market 
Efficiency. 
NYES 
and 
AMEX 
Buy and 
Hold for 
1-4 quarters 
returns 
period. 
Listed shares 
1965-1989 
16 different relative 
strength strategies 
over 3-12 month 
horizons. 
Buying past Winners (6 months) and 
holding them for another 6 months earns 
12.01% compounded excess returns on 
average. 
the profitability of the relative strength 
strategies cannot be attributed to size or 
systematic risk 
Conrad, J. & Kaul, G. (1993) 
Long-Term Market 
Overreaction or Biases in 
Computed Returns? 
NYSE  
US 
Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1926-1982 
Cumulative average 
abnormal residuals 
(CAAR) and BAH. 
 Zero-one market 
model following 
De Bondt and 
Thaler 
 
No evidence of market overreaction. 
Long-term abnormal returns of the 
contrarian strategies are upwardly biased 
due to measurement errors. 
Buy and Hold method is the most 
relevant techniques to measure the long-
term performance 
January CARs were 12.2% under the 
CARs and - 1.7% under the BAH  
Da Costa, N. (1994) 
Overreaction in the Brazilian 
stock market.  
BOVESPA 
Brazil 
Two-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1970-1989 
Cumulative average 
abnormal residuals 
(CAAR) and BAH. 
 Zero-one market 
model following 
De Bondt and 
Thaler 
Results supported the overreaction 
hypothesis. 
 The variation in CAPM-beta could not 
explain Winner-Loser anomaly.   
The overreaction effect is asymmetric. 
Clare, A. & Thomas, S. (1995) 
The Overreaction Hypothesis 
FTA All 
Share 
Index 
Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
Listed shares 
1955-1990 
Cumulative average 
abnormal residuals 
(CAAR). 
 Past Losers outperform Winners by 
1.7% per year. 
 This limited overreaction effect is 
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and the UK Stock market. UK portfolios  Zero-one market 
model following 
De Bondt and 
Thaler. 
attributed to the size effect 
Overreaction hypothesis is not supported 
by using annual data.  
Ball, R., Kothan, S. & 
Shanken, J. (1995) Problems 
in measuring portfolio 
performance An application to 
contrarian investment 
strategies. 
NYSE 
and 
AMEX. 
US 
Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1925-1984 
For NYES 
 1962-1984 
For AMEX 
Buy- and Hold 
abnormal returns 
Jensen alpha 
 
The contrarian strategy profitability is 
much driven by low-priced Losers.  
Limited evidence of the January 
abnormal returns anomaly. 
Negative abnormal returns were found 
in the June-end portfolios.    
Loughran, T. & Ritter, J. 
(1996) Long-Term Market 
Overreaction: The Effect of 
Low-Priced Stocks. 
NYSE  
US 
Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1929-1988 
 
Cumulative average 
abnormal residuals 
(CAAR). 
Buy- and Hold 
The results of Conrad and Kaul (1993) 
were driven by the survivor bias.  
The discrepancies in results between De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Conrad 
and Kaul (1993) were due to the 
inclusion of AMEX firms.  
Bid –ask-spread bias was found to be the 
main cause of the long-term 
overreaction when forming portfolios 
based on CARs  
Losers outperform Winners more using 
buy and hold method compared to 
CARs. 
Chen, C. & Sauer, D. (1997) Is 
Stock Market Overreaction 
Persistent Over Time? 
NYSE 
 US 
Five-year 
ranking 
period. 
Five-year 
overlapping 
formation 
period. 
Listed shares 
1926-1992 
Calculated the 
abnormal returns 
with adjustments 
for size and time 
variation in beta.  
Following the 
methodology of 
Chopra et al. 
(1992). 
The returns on the contrarian strategies 
are not stable over time,  
The overreaction hypothesis is 
prevailing during the pre-war period. 
The extreme portfolios are less likely to 
remain extreme portfolios during the 
subsequent periods.  
Highly significant relationship between 
market risk premium and arbitrage 
portfolio returns.   
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Dissanaike, G. (1997) Do 
Stock Market Investors 
Overreact? 
FT500 
UK 
Two-year 
ranking 
period. 
Two-year 
non 
overlapping 
formation 
period. 
925 Large 
companies 
1975-1991 
Buy and hold and 
rebalancing 
methods. 
Past Losers portfolios outperform 
Winners.  
Losers tend to be riskier than Winners.  
The variation in CAPM beta does not 
seem to explain the Loser- Winner 
anomaly in the UK.  
Results supported the overreaction 
hypothesis in the UK 
Gunaratne, P. & Yonesawa, Y. 
(1997) Return reversals in the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange: A test 
of stock market overreaction. 
TSE 
Japan 
20 non 
overlapping 
portfolios. 
Four –year 
rank and test 
periods. 
Listed shares 
1955-1990 
Risk adjusted 
model. 
CARs Following 
De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985). 
Time varying beta 
of Chan (1988) 
Evidence of the overreaction 
phenomenon in the Japanese market.  
Past Losers outperformed Winners by 
11% per annum.  
The variation of CAPM-beta partially 
explains the mean reversion between 
rank and test periods.  
The overreaction hypothesis cannot be 
attributed to the seasonality effect 
anomalies. 
Rouwenhorst, K. (1998) 
International Momentum 
Strategies. 
12 
European 
stock 
markets 
Buy and 
Hold for 
1-4 quarters 
returns 
period. 
Listed shares 
1978-1995 
16 different relative 
strength strategies 
over 3-12 month 
horizons. 
Following the 
methodology of 
Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). 
They found evidence of momentum 
profits in the internationally diversified 
portfolios. 
Past Winners outperform past Losers by 
1.5% per month. 
Return continuations found for Small-
Medium-Big firms in all the 12 
countries 
Results supported the findings of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
Fung, A. (1999) Overreaction 
in the Hong Kong stock 
market.  
HIS 
Hong 
Kong 
Two-year  
rank period. 
Two-year 
non 
overlapping 
formation 
 33 stocks  
constituents of 
the HSI 
market index 
1980-1993 
estimated the 
cumulative excess 
returns using the 
buy and hold 
method of Conrad 
and Kaul (1993) to 
Results supported the overreaction 
phenomenon in the Hong Kong stock 
market. Losers outperform Winners by 
10% in year one after portfolio 
formation. 
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period. reduce the bid-ask 
spread bias  
 
Schiereck, D., De Bondt, W. & 
Weber, M. (1999) Contrarian 
and Momentum in Strategies 
in Germany. 
DAX 
FSE 
Frankfurt 
Rank periods 
1, 3, and 6 
months and 
12 month test 
period. 
375 major 
listed shares 
1961-1991 
CARs and Buy and 
Hold to calculate 
the excess 
cumulative returns. 
Consistent results with the behavioural 
finance literature. 
Momentum strategies were found to be 
profitable in the short run. 
Contrarian strategies were found to be 
profitable in the long horizon.  
Baytas, A. & Cakici, N. (1999) 
Do markets overreact: 
International evidence. 
Seven 
stock 
markets 
namely , 
US, UK, 
Canada, 
Japan, 
Germany, 
France 
and Italy 
Five-year 
rank and test 
period based 
on the 
holding 
period 
returns 
(HPR) 
Five-year 
annual return 
data over the 
period 1982-
1991 
Holding period 
returns are used to 
sort and classify 
stocks into Losers 
and Winners, 
following Conrad 
and Kaul’s (1993) 
Evidence of overreaction phenomenon 
in all countries but the US. 
Consistent results with the literature on 
price overreaction and particularly 
Conrad and Kaul’s (1993). 
Long term investment strategies based 
on size and price outperforms those of 
based on long-term past performance. 
Long–term price reversals might be 
explained by firm size.  
Gaunt, C. (2000) Overreaction 
in the Australian equity 
market: 1974–1997.  
Australia Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
Listed shares 
1974-1997 
Following the 
methodologies of 
De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) and 
Brailsford (1992) 
cumulative 
rebalancing 
methods and buy 
and hold excess 
returns  
Evidence of price reversal phenomenon 
in both Winners and Losers. 
Loser-Winner anomaly disappeared 
when buy and hold method is used.  
Evidence of small firm effect as Losers 
tends to be smaller and less liquidity 
than Winners.  
The profitability of the Loser-Winner 
arbitrage portfolio is not exploitable in 
the Australian Market.  
 
Ahmad, Z. & Hussain, S. 
(2001) KLSE Long Run 
Overreaction and the Chinese 
New Year Effect. 
Malaysia, 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
Stock 
exchange 
Three-year 
non 
overlapping 
portfolios 
166 listed 
shares over the 
period 1986-
1996. 
Market-adjusted 
excess returns to 
rank and construct 
portfolios.  
Cumulative excess 
Evidence of price overreaction in the 
KLSE. 
Both Losers and Winners experienced 
significant reversals over the test period. 
The overreaction phenomenon is not 
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(KLSE return and the buy 
and hold methods, 
dominated by size effect. 
Evidence of the seasonality effect 
(Chinese New Year) in the KLSE.   
Kang, J., Liu, M.-H. & Ni, S. 
(2002) Contrarian and 
momentum strategies in the 
China stock market: 1993–
2000. 
China Eight different 
horizons (i.e., 
1, 2, 4, 8, 12, 
16, 20 and 26 
weeks) for 
both formation 
and holding 
periods. 
163 shares in 
1994 and 286 
companies 
over the period 
1995-2000 
Using the portfolio 
formation 
methodologies of 
Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990) and 
Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1995), 
Evidence of the short- term overreaction 
and intermediate –term momentum 
profits.  
The overreaction profits were 
dominating in case of equal-weighted 
portfolio strategies. 
The high proportion of individual investors 
and the unreliable information (rumors) are 
the main source of the contrarian profits. 
Momentum profits were prevailing when 
they used the value-weighted portfolio 
strategies 
Dissanaike, G. (2002) Does 
the Size Effect Explain the UK 
Winner-Loser Effect? 
FT500 
UK 
Four-year 
ranking 
period. 
Four -year 
non 
overlapping 
formation 
period. 
925 Large 
companies 
1975-1991 
Buy and hold and 
rebalancing 
methods. 
Same methodology 
of Dissanaike 
(1997) 
Results showed that there is no evidence 
to suggest that the Winner-Losers 
anomaly might be explained by size.  
This result is consistent with the 
overreaction literature in the UK (see 
Levis 1989a). 
Dissanaike claimed that the sample of 
FT500 is biased towards big size firms. 
Results were not in favour the efficient 
market hypotheses. 
Benou, G. & Richie, N. (2003) 
The reversal of large stock 
price declines: The case of 
large firms. 
US Three 
different test 
periods. 
One, two and 
three – year 
test periods. 
Monthly return 
data for Large 
firms 
experienced 
dramatic price 
drop (at least 
20%) 1990-
2000. 
The market-
adjusted model. 
The risk-adjusted 
model using 
GARCH 11). 
CARs following 
Fama (1998) 
Positive and significant abnormal 
returns over one year following the 
event.  
Highly significant price reversal for 
technology stocks.  
Evidence of underreaction for the 
service stocks. 
 Their results support the overreaction 
hypothesis in the US.  
Buying large firms that experienced 
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large price drop is a profitable 
investment strategy. 
Forner, C. & Marhuenda, J. 
(2003) Contrarian and 
Momentum Strategies in the 
Spanish Stock Market. 
Spain 6, 12, 36, 60 
month- 
formation 
and test 
periods 
Monthly return 
data 1963-
1997. 
Losers and Winners 
portfolios extreme  
based on the 
extreme residual 
returns using CARs  
following of De 
Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) and BAH 
following Conrad 
and Kaul (1993) 
The one-year and five-year momentum 
and contrarian strategies earn significant 
abnormal return.  
Their results supported the existence of 
the momentum profits in the short run 
and the contrarian profits in the longer 
horizons even after controlling for time 
varying risk. 
 Finally, they argued that their results 
were not due to the data snooping bias. 
Chiao, C., Cheng, D. & Hung, 
W. (2005) Overreaction after 
Controlling for Size and Book-
to-Market Effects and its 
Mimicking Portfolio in Japan. 
TSE 
Japan 
Five-year 
formation 
and test 
periods 
Monthly return 
data for the 
listed shares  
1975-1999. 
Two main 
portfolios namely; 
size-BM based and 
prior returns based 
portfolios. 
FF3-factor model. 
Strong evidence of persistent 
overreaction phenomenon in the 
Japanese market. 
Size and book-to-market ration were 
correlated with the overreaction. 
 Fama French three-factor model 
explained portfolios excess returns.  
Siganos, A. (2007) Momentum 
returns and size of Winner and 
Loser portfolios. 
LSE 
UK 
Winner and 
Loser 
portfolios,  
includes the 
best and the 
worst 10, 20, 
30, and 300 
shares. 
Monthly return 
data for the 
listed shares  
1975-2001 
Calculate 
momentum profits 
by ranking all the 
company based 
past six months 
market 
performance 
months. 
Three size 
portfolios were 
constructed based 
on mcap. 
Evidence of the momentum profits in 
the UK. 
Investors can maximise their momentum 
profits by including small firms of both 
Losers and Winners in their portfolios. 
It is not necessarily for the investors to 
sell-short Losers as the momentum 
returns for the large portfolios remain 
constant.   
Mazouz, K. & Li, X. (2007) 
The overreaction hypothesis in 
LSE 
UK 
Three-year 
non 
The 
constituent of 
CARS and BAH, 
and following the 
Strong evidence of price overreaction in 
the London stock exchange 
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the UK market: empirical 
analysis. 
overlapping 
portfolios 
the FTSE All 
shares market 
index over the 
period 1972-
2002 
methodology of De 
Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) in portfolio 
formation 
Losers outperform Winners by 16.4% 
and 18.3% using CARS and BAH 
methods respectively. 
 No evidence of January effect on the 
contrarian profits; however size effect 
cannot fully explain the overreaction 
phenomenon. 
George, T. & Hwang, C.-Y. 
(2007) Long-Term Return 
Reversals: Overreaction or 
Taxes? 
NYSE, 
AMEX, 
and 
Nasdaq 
US and 
Hong 
Kong 
Five-year-
formation 
and test 
periods 
 
All listed 
shares  
1963-2001 
(US) 
1980-2000 
(HK) 
three alternative 
measures to test the 
OH; traditional 
return, Five-year 
high and five-year 
low measures,  
Two additional 
measures to test the 
lock-in hypothesis 
equal-weighted 
gain and loss and 
equal-weighted 
gain only measures 
They found strong evidence of the tax 
hypothesis. 
Winner reversal diminished as the 
traditional reversal measures were 
subsumed in the locked-in measures. 
No price reversals were found for non 
January Loser portfolios.  
No price reversals for both Winners and 
Losers in Hong Kong where no capital 
gain or dividends tax.  
Their results are inconsistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis.  
 
Dissanaike, G. & Lim, K.-H. 
(2010) The Sophisticated and 
the Simple: the Profitability of 
Contrarian Strategies. 
LSE 
UK 
Three-year  
formation 
and test 
periods 
 
All the listed 
shares 
(excluding 
investment and 
unit trusts) 
over the period 
1987-2001 
Portfolio formation 
methodologies: 
book value, 
earnings, cash flow 
or operating cash 
flow or residual 
income model and 
Ohlson model.  
Buy-and-hold 
returns 
The residual earnings and the Ohlson 
models outperform the traditional 
strategies based on B/M and E/P. 
The traditional cash flow to price ratio 
outperforms the advanced accounting 
measures. They recommended that 
investors’ size and the technical 
knowledge of more advanced models are 
the main determinants of the optimal 
portfolio formation.  
 
Wu, Y. (2011) Momentum 
Trading, Mean Reversal and 
Overreaction in Chinese Stock 
Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange 
Six and 12 
months 
formation 
Daily data for 
the “A” listed 
shares 1990-
2001 
methodology of 
Fama and French 
(1988) and Balvers 
and Wu (2006) 
No significant abnormal returns for the 
pure short-term (3 - 12 months) 
momentum strategy of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993).  
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Market. (SHSE) and test 
periods 
Highly significant abnormal returns for 
the pure contrarian strategy for all 
holding periods.  
The combined strategy (momentum + 
contrarian) results in a significant excess 
return 22.2%. 
their results supported the overreaction 
hypothesis in the Chinese market. 
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Chapter 3 : Short-term overreaction: Unobservable portfolios? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The existing body of literature on the overreaction phenomenon has extensively used time 
series analysis. This can be found in the papers of De Bondt and Thaler, (1985), Conrad and 
Kaul (1993), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), Da Costa, (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1996) and 
Dissanaike (1997). Another much smaller strand of the literature has used cross-sectional 
analysis to investigate the phenomenon. The work of Bremer and Sweeney (1991), Cox and 
Petersen (1994), Otchere and Chan (2003), Larson and Madura (2003), Ma, Beach, and Hasan 
(2005) is illustrative. If these two dimensions have not been combined, the analysis is subject 
to criticism. Hsiao (2004) and Baltagi (2010), for example, argue that ignoring the time 
dimension raises the question of bias due to group (company) heterogeneity. Ignoring the 
dynamics of the process also raises questions of bias in the estimation (Arellano and Bond 
(1991). 
 
Therefore, in this chapter I present a new methodology to investigate the overreaction 
phenomenon, the two-way fixed effects panel data model (see Farag and Cressy (2010)
14
), and 
in addressing the dynamics of the process I employ the Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step 
Difference GMM estimator which adds dynamics into the process. Finally, I attempt to 
explain the measured unobservable effects by means of observable variables. These include 
                                                          
14
  This paper has been published based on my earlier work in this chapter and based on small sample of 20 
companies. 
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corporate governance compliance, political connection of board members, and management 
quality.  
The main contribution of this chapter then is, firstly, the use of static and dynamic panel data 
models to investigate the overreaction phenomenon; secondly, to use the results from this 
analysis to form ‘unobservable’ portfolios based on the fixed effects model. Interestingly, we 
shall see that the Unobservable portfolios outperform the traditional size portfolios. Thirdly, I 
investigate the relationship between firms’ corporate governance compliance, the political 
connections of the board of directors and the overreaction phenomenon.  
 
I use data from the Egyptian stock market. This adds an additional dimension since my study 
is the first to empirically investigate the overreaction phenomenon in this market, one of the 
leading markets in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical background about the 
traditional models and the proposed new model to explain the short – term overreaction. 
Sections 3 describes the dataset used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the econometric 
modeling and the empirical results. Finally, section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical background 
 3.2.1 Traditional theories 
According to the overreaction hypothesis, the greater the initial shock proportional price 
change at time 0 the greater the subsequent price reversals (De Bondt and Thaler (1985)). 
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Cressy and Farag (2011) argue that small companies are riskier and more informationally 
opaque compared with large companies. Therefore, the inverse relationship between 
cumulative abnormal returns CARst and the initial abnormal return ARs0 is expected to be 
stronger for small firms. This relationship is econometrically represented by a negative slope 
of the regression line with respect to a measure of firm size (Cox and Peterson (1994)).  
  
3.2.2 A new model: Unobservable effects 
Fixed, unobservable effects in two dimensions, I argue, can potentially provide a better 
explanation of the behavior of cumulative abnormal returns compared with the traditional one-
dimensional models. The panel data model, in particular the fixed effects model, allows that in 
addition to observable factors i.e. typically size and trading volume, can explain the 
overreaction to dramatic price changes between companies, there are also unobservable effects 
(group and period) that may play a potentially important role (Farag and Cressy (2010)). 
Cressy and Farag (2011) argue that company effects can be described as ‘permanent’ 
(independent of time in the reversal window) or ’temporary’ (one period duration). They 
suggest that these effects might be explained as a proxy of firm quality; however they were not 
able to empirically identify observable correlates for these effects.   
 
 Figure 3.1 presents a graphical illustration of the relationship between initial price reaction 
(AR(i,0)) and subsequent cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). In the traditional model the 
CARs are the same (   for high and low quality firms. However, and in the light of the 
unobservable effects model, these CARs shift up or down based on company heterogeneity 
86 
 
(quality) ( 2   for higher quality firms,   for average quality firms and 1  for low 
quality firms) where 12 0   . If alpha is positive, the effect of (permanent) firm quality on 
a price fall (e.g.) is to counteract the fall; if negative, to reinforce it (Cressy and Farag (2011).  
Thus for high quality firms, dramatic price fall is subsequently corrected (reversed) to some 
degree. For low quality firms, it is subsequently accentuated. 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, temporary factors (period effects) common to all companies may shift the 
intercepts 1   and 2   up (positive effects) or down (negative effects) in any given 
period (Cressy and Farag (2011)).  
 
  AR(i,0) 
  CAR(i,t+s) 
  0  
 
  2   
    
  1   
12 0    
  Low quality firm 
  High quality firm 
  Average quality firm 
Figure  3-1: Post-event CARs determined by market cap and unobservable effects 
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3.3 Data 
To examine the short-term overreaction hypothesis in the Egyptian stock market, daily data for 
stock prices, free float market capitalisation and the EGX 30 market index are utilised for 100 
listed stocks with no price limits on the exchange (EGX) over the period 2003-2009. I define 
the event for a given stock as the experience of a one-day price rise (Winners) or price fall 
(Losers) of at least 10% as the result of one of the following events:  
Event (A): Sharm El Sheikh Terrorist Attacks (24 July 2005). 
Event (B): The Lebanon War, (12 Jul 2006) as a proxy for the tension in the Middle  
                    East region. 
Event (C): The Announcement of the Constitutional Change, (25-Dec 2006) as a proxy 
for a political reform. 
Event (D): The formation of the new government, (27-Dec 2005). 
 
I initially defined the events in the line of the literature (shares that experienced at least 10% 
one day price change). I then clarified the main causes of these events. Therefore these events 
are the most influential events in the Egyptian stock exchange during the period of study. 
 
 I use the EGX 30 index, a free-floated market capitalisation weighted index to represent the 
Egyptian stock market benchmark Farag and Cressy (2010). Data were collected from the, 
Egyptian stock exchange in addition to Egypt for Information Dissemination Company 
(EGID).  
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It is worth mentioning that the 100 companies included in the sample are the most actively 
traded companies in the Egyptian stock exchange (EGX). Therefore, the sample seems to be 
homogeneous and highly unlikely to be affected by the less frequently traded shares or outlier 
bias.    
Following Cox and Peterson (1994), Cressy and Farag (2011) and Farag and Cressy (2010) 
methodologies, the estimation period for betas is (-105, -6) and test period is (+1, +120) days. 
I use the market model as a benchmark to measure the abnormal returns with betas estimated 
for each security over the 100 days prior to the event. Other measures are also tried, namely, 
the CAPM model and market-adjusted abnormal return, but qualitatively the results remain the 
same. This is also in line with the literature (Cox and Peterson, 1994). 
 
3.4 Econometric modeling and empirical results 
I use the Event Study methodology to estimate the abnormal returns during the test period. 
Following the methodology of Bremer and Sweeney (1991) and Cox and Peterson (1994), I 
begin by defining daily returns. 
 
3.4.1 Daily Returns  
The return variable tR is defined as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing 
price over two consecutive trading days:  
         1
 ttt PLogPLogR                                                                            (1) 
Where tp  is the closing price of the stock in day (t) adjusted for dividends, rights issue, stock 
dividends, and stock split.  
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3.4.2 Stock abnormal returns (ARs) 
Stocks’ abnormal returns in the test period are defined as the residuals of the market model 
following Cox and Peterson, (1994) and Farag and Cressy (2010).  
 
   TtRRAR mtiiitit .....,2,1,0,                              (2) 
where 
itmtjjit RR                                                                                          (3)  
where, i  and i  are the results of the market model, itR is the stock return on day (t), mtR is 
the daily market returns of the EGX market index and T = 120 days. The parameters of the 
market model are estimated over the estimation window (-105—6). I used both symmetric 
GARCH and asymmetric TARCH models to estimate the abnormal returns and to control for 
any potential serial correlation in the return time series. I obtained similar results for the two 
methods (Benou and Richie (2003). 
 
3.4.3 Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are 
calculated as follows following Cox and Peterson, (1994) and Farag and Cressy (2010): 
 
   


t
iit ARCAR
1
                                                                                      (4) 
  ICARCAAR
I
i
itt /
1


                                  (5) 
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where I = 100 is the number of stocks in the sample 
I use t-test statistic to examine whether or not there is a significant difference in CARs 
between Winners and Losers for a given day within the event window. The statistic is defined 
as follows: 




n
at
t
tt
nAARARARS
ARSARstatt
1/)()(
)(/
2
                                                      (6) 
Where S is the standard deviation of securities’ abnormal returns. 
  
3.4.4 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the four events (A-D) are presented in Table 3.1. The sample size 
is 100 companies over 120 days as test periods. The initial one-day abnormal return on event 
day ( 0iAR ) for the Loser events (A and B) are -5.60% and -3.17% respectively. However, the 
initial abnormal return on event day for the Winner events (C and D) is 7.11% and 6.52% 
respectively. Cumulative abnormal returns ( itCar ) over event window (120 days) for the 
Losers are 14.59% and 7.46 % for events A and B respectively and for the Winners are -
20.52% and -35.19% for events C and D respectively.  
 
This suggests that buying Losers on average not only earn positive abnormal returns over the 
period following the event but also (as in DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) these portfolios 
outperform the Winner portfolios. Specifically, cumulative average abnormal returns three 
days before the event - as a proxy for the leakage of information (Leak) - for the Losers are 
1.07% and -0.12 % respectively and for the Winners are 0.66% and -0.56% respectively. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean S.D Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A: Loser Event A 
itCar   0.1459  0.5331  0.8378  3.5184 
0iAR  -0.0560 0.0305 -0.9938 5.4384 
Lnmcap  19.557  2.1201 -0.2359  3.4275 
Leak  0.0107  0.0364  0.3326  3.9305 
Private  0.5000  0.5051  0.0000  1.0000 
Panel B: Loser Event B 
itCar   0.0746  0.4560  0.8879  4.2309 
0iAR  -0.0317 0.0515 2.4385 5.3944 
Lnmcap  19.684  1.6846  0.1821  2.4302 
Leak -0.0012  0.0619 -3.9771  2.3192 
Private  0.5000  0.5051  0.0000  1.0000 
Panel C: Winner Event C 
itCar  -0.2052  0.6675  0.2085  6.1621 
0iAR  0.0711 0.0389 1.3019 4.4327 
Lnmcap  19.731  1.8593 -0.3922  3.6710 
Leak  0.0066 0.0422  0.9448  4.0901 
Private  0.5000  0.5051  0.0000  1.0000 
Panel D: Winner Event D 
itCar  -0.3519  0.5917 -0.3775  2.7186 
0iAR   0.0652   0.0312  1.86134  6.0601  
Lnmcap  19.604  1.3670 0.1102  2.3783 
Leak -0.0056  0.0417 -2.1486  3.1620 
Private  0.5000  0.5051  0.0000  1.0000 
Number of observations is 12000 observations (100 companies * 120 days). 
 
Average firm size proxied by market capitalisation of the Losers are 312 million and 354 
million Egyptian pounds respectively, whereas the average firm size for the Winners are 370 
million and 326 million Egyptian pounds. Finally, 50% of the sample was formerly state-
owned companies.  
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3.4.5 Correlation matrix 
 Table 3.2 presents the correlation matrix for the Winners and Losers covariates.  
 
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix 
 Lnmcap ARio Leak Private 
Panel A: Loser Event A 
Lnmcap 1.0000    
ARio -0.0388 1.0000   
Leak 0.0040 -0.1455 1.0000  
Private 0.1262 -0.2257 -0.2555 1.0000 
Panel B: Loser Event B 
Lnmcap 1.0000    
ARio 0.0146 1.0000   
Leak 0.1174 -0.0589 1.0000  
Private 0.4507 0.2362 -0.0816 1.0000 
Panel C: Winner Event C 
Lnmcap 1.0000    
ARio -0.1087 1.0000   
Leak 0.2641 0.3422 1.0000  
Private 0.2989 -0.0848 -0.0007 1.0000 
Panel D: Winner Event D 
Lnmcap 1.0000    
ARio 0.0014 1.0000   
Leak 0.0562 -0.1267 1.0000  
Private -0.1532 -0.0597 0.1030 1.0000 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.    
Number of observations is 12000 observations (100 companies * 120 days). 
 
The reported correlations show that there is no potential multicollinearity as none of these 
correlations is above 0.50 or statistically significant, even at 10%. 
 
3.4.6 The overreaction hypothesis 
I investigate the overreaction phenomenon firstly by examining the significance of the 
abnormal returns pre- and post- each of the four events. Table 3.3 presents the average 
abnormal returns and t- statistics for the Losers and Winners over event window (–5 to +5). It 
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is clear that both Losers and Winners - as expected - have highly significant abnormal returns 
on event day (p value < 0.001).  
 
For event A (Terrorist Attacks), we notice positive abnormal returns pre-event (-4 to -1 days) 
which may indicate investors' optimism and herding behaviour. The average abnormal return 
on event day is negative -5.61% and highly significant at 0.001. We also notice that the effect 
of event (A) continues (the so-called price continuation phenomenon, (Kim and Rhree (1997)) 
for the subsequent three days post-event, as the average abnormal return is negative and highly 
significant (at 5%). Price reversal occurs on the fourth day, as positive abnormal returns are 
found on day 4 as well as a positive and significant (at 10%) abnormal return on day 5.  
 
Table 3.3: Average abnormal returns (AARs) for Losers and Winners 
 
 Losers Winners 
 Event A Event B Event C Event D 
 AR t. value AR t. value AR t. value AR t. value 
-5 0.0076 1.5545 0.0164 3.6968
***
 -0.0082 -1.6781
*
 -0.0139 -3.8321
***
 
-4 0.0132 3.2188
***
 0.0036 0.9181 -0.0076 -1.6032 -0.0021 -0.5180 
-3 0.0057 1.6057
**
 -0.0021 -0.4622 -0.0015 -0.2217 -0.0065 -1.8253
*
 
-2 0.0071 1.8626
*
 0.0013 0.2268 0.0016 0.3584 -0.0038 -0.6696 
-1 0.0107 2.0852
**
 -0.0012 -0.1316 0.0165 2.0974
**
 -0.0155 -0.9416 
0 -0.0561 -12.9808
***
 -0.0317 -4.351
***
 0.0711 12.9446
***
 0.0652 14.7585
***
 
1 -0.0102 -2.0736
**
 0.0135 2.3198
**
 -0.0019 -0.2682 -0.0045 -0.7875 
2 -0.0027 -2.0399
**
 0.0071 1.4715 -0.0042 -0.6728 -0.0141 -2.4994
**
 
3 -0.0029 -2.0098
**
 0.0027 0.6223 -0.0023 -0.4373 -0.0027 -0.6476 
4 0.0009 0.2347 0.0004 0.1173 0.0015 0.2596 0.0029 0.6588 
5 0.0076 1.8693
*
 0.0019 0.4245 0.0044 0.7254 0.0024 0.4093 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Number of observations is 12000 observations (100 companies * 120 days). 
 
With regard to event B (the Lebanon War), the average abnormal return on event day is 
negative -3.17% and highly significant at 0.001. However, price reversal occurs on day one 
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post-event as we notice positive (1.35%) and highly significant (at 5%) abnormal returns on 
day one post-event. There is no leakage of information, as insignificant abnormal returns are 
found over the five days pre-event B.  
 
Figure 3-2 shows the results of plotting cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) over 
time, for the Losers over one week pre and post-events. The asymmetric overreaction is clear 
from figure 3-2 as stock price reversal of event (B) occurs on day one while the price reversal 
of event (A) occurs in the fourth day post-event.  
Figure  3-2: Cumulative average abnormal returns for Losers 
 
Winners have highly significant (p value < 0.001) abnormal returns (7.11% and 6.52%) on 
event day for events C (the announcement of the constitutional change) and D (the formation 
of the new government) respectively. In addition, price reversal occurs on day one post-event 
for both events. We also notice positive and significant (at 5%) abnormal returns for event C 
on day one pre-event; this implies the leakage of information effect. 
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 It is worth mentioning that the overreaction phenomenon and the subsequent price reversals 
are clear for the Losers rather than those of the Winners. Chan (1988) argues that Losers are 
more risky during the estimation window compared with Winners. This suggests that Losers 
are on average bigger in size, therefore they are expected to react to the new information more 
efficiently that those of Winners (Chan (1988)). These results are consistent with the literature 
on overreaction hypothesis as Losers on the short- term are expected to outperform Winners 
(Cox and Peterson (1994) and Bremer and Sweeney (1991)). 
Figure 3-3 shows the results of plotting Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) over 
time, for the Winners over one week pre and post-events.  
Figure  3-3: Cumulative average abnormal returns for Winners 
 
I conclude that the terrorist attacks have significant effects on stock price movements for three 
days post event. However, the Lebanon war as a proxy for the tension in the Middle East 
region had no effect on the average abnormal returns in the Egyptian stock exchange. 
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Furthermore, there was no significant average abnormal return as the result of the 
announcement of constitutional change and the formation of a new government.  
Figure 3-4 shows the results of plotting Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) over 
time, for the Winners and Losers over one week pre- and post-events. 
Figure  3-4: Cumulative average abnormal returns for Winners and Losers 
 
To summarise, findings are consistent with the literature on overreaction. Past Losers 
outperform past Winners so that investors may achieve abnormal returns by selling Winners 
and buying Losers. 
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 I now discuss the optimal holding period for Winners and Losers. Table 3.4 reports the 
cumulative average abnormal returns for Losers and Winners over the following periods 
CAAR(-5, -1), CAAR (+1, +3), CAAR (+4, +10), CAAR (+21, +50), CAAR (+51, +120), and 
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and investor optimism. Highly significant negative abnormal returns are reported on the 
following day due to the terrorist attacks. CAAR (+21, +50), and (+51, +120) windows have 
positive and abnormal return at a level of 5%. The optimal holding periods are (+21, +30), 
(+51, +60), and (+41, +50) as the cumulative average abnormal returns are 4.40%, 3.89% and 
3.72% respectively. However, the optimal holding period for event (B) is (+31, +40), as the 
cumulative average abnormal returns is 5.36%. The optimal selling period for the Winners 
events (C) and (D) are (+41, +50), and (+71, +80) respectively as we notice positive 
cumulative average abnormal returns over these periods (1.75% and 0.01% respectively). 
These findings support the argument that past Losers outperform past Winners. 
 
The results presented in table 3.4 suggest that stock prices in the short term for both Losers 
and Winners are not predictable as the cumulative average abnormal returns  five days pre 
event (as a proxy for the leakage of information) are positive and highly significant for event 
A and negative and highly significant for event D. This may imply the effect of investor 
optimism and herding behavior in the Egyptian stock market. 
 
On the other hand, Losers may achieve cumulative average abnormal returns quicker than 
those of Winners as the optimal holding periods for the Losers are (+21, +30) and (+31, +40) 
days for events A and B respectively. However, the optimal holding period returns for the 
Winners are (+41, +50) and (+71, +80) days for events C and D respectively. This suggests 
that Losers on average outperform Winners and investors may achieve abnormal return by 
adopting the contrarian strategy by selling Winners and Buying Losers. 
 
98 
 
 
Table 3.4: Cumulative average abnormal returns for Losers and Winners over event window 
 
 Loser Winner 
 Event A Event B Event C Event D 
 CAAR t. value CAAR t. value CAAR t. value CAAR t. value 
CAAR(-5, -1) 0.0442 4.3367
***
 0.0182 1.0320 -0.0091 -0.6260 -0.0318 -2.2355
**
 
CAAR (+1,+3) -0.0103 -1.3035 0.0232 2.4000
**
 -0.0084 -0.8859 -0.0213 -2.5359
**
 
CAAR (+4, +10) -0.0202 -1.5722 0.0096 0.6974 -0.0207 -1.2872 -0.0130 -0.8731 
CAAR (+11,+20) -0.0258 -1.5302 0.0286 1.7410
*
 -0.0364 -1.8625
*
 -0.0744 -4.8753
***
 
CAAR (+21,+30) 0.0440 2.6806
**
 -0.0214 -1.7046
*
 -0.0284 -1.6095 -0.0297 -2.8938
***
 
CAAR (+31,+40) 0.0129 0.8168 0.0536 3.3828
***
 -0.0044 -0.2696 -0.0119 -0.8013 
CAAR (+41,+50) 0.0372 2.1367
**
 -0.0003 -0.0159 0.0175 1.0686 -0.0105 -0.7185 
CAAR (+51,+60) 0.0389 2.2478
**
 0.0037 0.3419 -0.0277 -2.7228
**
 -0.0282 -2.0974
**
 
CAAR (+61,+70) 0.0181 1.1175 -0.0015 -0.1280 -0.0138 -0.7880 -0.0333 -2.5463
**
 
CAAR (+71,+80) 0.0258 1.5835 -0.0121 -0.9497 -0.0222 -1.5291 0.0001 0.0027 
CAAR (+81,+90) 0.0191 1.1156 0.0156 0.8437 -0.0168 -0.9501 -0.0173 -1.0317 
CAAR (+91,+100) 0.0085 0.5045 -0.0073 -0.5856 -0.0216 -1.8115
**
 -0.0242 -1.2570 
CAAR (+101,+110) -0.0140 -0.6897 -0.0072 -0.5663 -0.0336 -3.0108
***
 -0.0348 -2.3560
**
 
CAAR (+111,+120) 0.0089 0.4647 -0.0090 -0.7796 0.0116 1.2655 -0.0567 -4.9903
***
 
CAAR (+21,+50) 0.0941 3.1020
***
 0.0319 1.0002 -0.0153 -0.4314 -0.0521 -1.9923
*
 
CAAR (+51,+120) 0.1053 2.1986
**
 -0.0178 -0.4985 -0.1240 -2.6274
**
 -0.1945 -3.2825
***
 
CAAR (+1,+120) 0.1455 1.9336
*
 0.0737 1.1440 -0.2022 -2.1365
**
 -0.3736 -4.2565
***
 
  ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Number of observations is 12000 observations (100 companies * 120 days). 
     
99 
 
Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7 show the results of plotting Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAARs), for Winners and Losers over 120 days post-event. It is clear from the figures that 
past losers outperform past winners, so that investors can achieve abnormal returns by selling 
winners and buying losers (the disposition effect). These results are consistent with the 
literature on price reversal (De Bondt and Thaler1985). Similar results were found by Cox and 
Petersen, (1994); Larson & Madura, (2003); Ma, Tang and Hasan, (2005) and Farag and 
Cressy (2011). 
 
 
Figure  3-5: Cumulative average abnormal returns for Losers over event window 
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Figure  3-6: Cumulative average abnormal returns for Winners over event window 
 
 
Figure  3-7:  Cumulative average abnormal returns for Winners and Losers 
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3.4.8 Cross-sectional regression 
 Following Cox and Petersen, (1994), Farag and Cressy (2010), Cressy and Farag (2011), 
Larson and Madura, (2003); Ma, Tang and Hasan, (2005), I obtain average returns on each 
firm’s stock over the whole time period. I then estimate the following cross-sectional 
regression by regressing cumulative average abnormal returns iCAR  against initial abnormal 
returns in event day i0AR , along with firm size (natural log of the free float mcap one day 
before the event to avoid the endogeniety problem), and a dummy variable representing the 
company ownership which will be defined below.  
 
In addition, I include a iLeak variable representing the cumulative average abnormal returns 
for three days before the event date to capture the leakage of information into the market and 
the effects of insider information. These can be considered proxies for market inefficiency (see 
Larson and Madura 2003). 
 
The dummy variable (Private) is a proxy of firm ownership and is equal to one if the company 
was privately held before IPO. This is consistent with the Egyptian economic reform 
programme started in 1997; as we have seen in chapter (1) a number of -state-owned 
companies were floated on the Egyptian stock exchange in the period. I model CAR(i), then, 
as follows: 
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100,...1,privateLeaklnmcap AR 4i3i2i01  iCAR iii             (7)  
where  
           100/
120
1



t
iti CAARCAR  
 0iAR = Initial abnormal return in event day t = 0.  
 iprivate is a dummy variable = 1 if the company was privately held before   
            IPO; = 0 otherwise 
imcapln  is the natural log of the free floated market cap of company (i) one day 
before the event. 
iLeak  is cumulative average abnormal returns for three days before event date as a 
proxy for the leakage of information.  
            i
 = a white noise error term for stock (i) 
 
Cox and Peterson (1994) argue that there is a negative relationship between firm size and the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (small firm effect). If so small firms have higher price 
reversals compared to large firms; this is due to higher degree of risk. If size effect holds in the 
Egyptian stock market we are expecting negative sign for lnmcap variable. 
 
Moreover, Cox and Peterson (1994) and Larson and Madura (2003) argue that there is a 
positive relationship between abnormal returns on event day ( 0iAR ) and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns. This suggests the magnitude effects of the overreaction hypothesis 
(the higher the initial price changes the higher the subsequent price reversals). Therefore we 
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expect positive sign for 0iAR . Larson and Madura (2003) on the other hand argue that the 
leakage of information may play an important role in explaining the overreaction hypothesis 
due to the role of noise trading and information inefficiency in emerging markets. Therefore 
iLeak  
is expected to have positive and significant coefficient. Finally, I incorporate iprivate  
variable into the analysis to investigate the performance of private and state owned companies; 
this is due to the recent economic reform programme adopted by the Egyptian government.  
 
Table 3.5 presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regression of equation 7. It is clear 
that the models are reasonably well specified (F statistics are highly significant for Winners 
and Losers). The average adjusted R-squared is 23.29% and 22.63% for the Losers and 
Winners respectively.  
 
The negative sign of lnmcap as a proxy for firm size suggests the presence of a small firm 
effect, as small firms tend to have greater reversals compared with large firms in the post-
event period. This result is consistent with the literature on the overreaction phenomenon (e.g., 
Cox and Peterson (1994) and Farag and Cressy (2010).  
 
Interestingly, the leakage of information variable (Leak(i)) is positive and highly significant 
for events A and D respectively. This suggests the role of insider trading and information 
inefficiency in the Egyptian stock market for particular types of events namely terrorist attacks 
(some international agencies issue warning about potential terrorist acts in some regions) and 
the formation of the new government. 
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Table 3.5: Cross Sectional Regressions 
 
 Losers Winners 
 Event A Event B Event C Event D 
C 1.2342
** 
(0.5963) 
1.7719
**
 
(0.7581) 
1.9500
*
 
(1.0102) 
1.1827 
(1.1555) 
Lnmcap -0.0665
**
 
(0.0319) 
-0.1042
***
 
(0.0410) 
-0.0988
*
 
(0.0501) 
-0.0174 
(0.0575) 
Leak 0.4020
***
 
(0.0721) 
-0.9480 
(1.1972) 
-2.9608 
(2.2338) 
4.5557
**
 
(1.8844) 
ARio 2.6280 
(2.3067) 
-2.9834
**
 
(1.4622) 
-5.2833
**
 
(2.3474) 
0.7006 
(2.5030) 
Private 0.4371
***
 
(0.1438) 
0.3391
**
 
(0.1453) 
0.3517
*
 
(0.1747) 
-0.4660
***
 
(0.1568) 
R
2
 0.2896 0.2704 0.2942 0.2596 
Adj R
2
 0.2265 0.2394 0.2315 0.2211 
F.stat 4.5868
***
 
(0.0034) 
3.8202
***
 
(0.0059) 
4.6895
***
 
(0.0030) 
3.3522
**
 
(0.0174) 
White  test for heteroskedasticity 0.9545 0.1837 0.4293 0.6241 
*, **,*** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Number of observations is 100 observations.  
 
The initial abnormal returns on event day (ARi0) on the other hand are insignificant for both 
events A and D. This result is consistent with Cox and Peterson (1994) as incorporating size 
effect in the regression does remove the effect of the initial abnormal returns. However, initial 
abnormal returns on event day (ARi0) are highly significant for events B and C.   
 
Furthermore, private firms have greater CARs than state-owned firms for both Losers and 
Winners (except in the case of Event D). The management quality of private firms usually 
outperforms the management quality of state owned firms in the Egyptian context. This may 
explain the positive and significant relationship of private variable in table 3.5. However event 
D has the least significant results in table 3.5 (i.e. firm size and initial abnormal returns on 
event day). This may explain the weak investor reaction to this event. In addition, Private 
variable will be dropped from the analysis due to the assumptions of panel data model.     
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As mentioned above, it is necessary to drop the dummy variable (Private) from the fixed 
effects regression due to collinearity problems it introduces.  Therefore I re-estimated the cross 
section regression of equation 7, dropping the dummy variable (Private). The results were 
virtually unchanged. 
 
3.4.9 Panel data econometrics 
In this section I explain the structure of the two-way panel data econometrics I use 
subsequently. 
There are two main competing models of panel data econometrics, namely, fixed and random 
effect as in equations 8 and 9. 
 ittiitity                              
 (Two way fixed effect model)                   (8) 
ittiiitit uhy   )()(         
(Two way random effect model)               (9) 
where: i  is unobserved firm-specific (time-constant) effect for company i, t is time-specific 
effect for period t, iu is group-specific random effect, ih is a random vector that induces the 
variability of the parameters across individuals, it  
is a white noise error term.  
 
Unobservable factors in stock price reversal may thus be either random or fixed (Farag and 
Cressy 2010). The fundamental distinction between the FE and RE model is whether the 
unobservable effects embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors. A fixed effects 
model allows that the effects may be correlated with the regressors (covariates) whilst a 
random effects model does not: random effects are part of the error term and hence any 
correlation with the covariates implies an endogeneity problem. (Greene 2012). 
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 Farag and Cressy (2010) and Cressy and Farag (2011) argue that observable factors 
(variables) e.g. size, trading volume and the leakage of information are not the only variables 
that explain the price reversal phenomenon
15
.In equation 8, unlike equation 7, the relationship 
may shift up or down based on the sign of the firm fixed effect coefficient P  (positive) or 
N  (negative).  It may also shift up or down as a results of factors common to firms in a given 
time period, via the time-specific effect t  
. I argue that these effects may explain the 
company heterogeneity in response the dramatic change in stock prices.  
 
I estimate the two-way first order autoregressive fixed/random effect (FE/RE) models to 
obviate the serial correlation in itCAR , as in the following equation:  
ittiit
ittiitit
itittiit
retiuxCAR
fetixCAR






1,
0
0
120,....1;100,...1, )('
120,....1;100,...1,' 
      (10) 
Where  
0 =common intercept for all i,t 
 itx = independent variables  
 i
  = company-specific effect for company i  
 t
 = time-specific effect for period t 
 it
 = white noise error term.  
Note that for the random effects model I use the GLS-estimator, a weighted average of 
between-firm and within-firm effects. 1 and it is independent and identically distributed 
                                                          
15
 This paper has been published based on my earlier work in this chapter and based on small sample of 20 
companies. 
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(i.i.d.) with zero mean and variance =
2
 . Baltagi and Wu (1999) derive a transformation of 
the data that removes the AR (1) component. Their )(iC  can be written as: 
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Using the analogous transform on the independent variables generates transformed data 
without the AR (1) component.  
 
 3.4.10 Fixed effects (FE) or Random effects (RE)? 
An advantage of the RE model is that we can include time-invariant variables (e.g. Private and 
AR(i,0), to obviate the problem of errors being correlated with independent variables. This 
allows time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. However, in the fixed 
effect model these variables are absorbed in the intercept. 
 
To decide whether a fixed or random effect model should be used in the estimation, I use the 
Hausman test with the Null "individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors". The 
Hausman test statistic is distributed as )(2 K . Rejecting the Null is in favour of the fixed 
effect model.  
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There are two methodological problems in using the Hausman test: Firstly, the test requires 
strict exogeneity of the error term. Hence correlation between regressors and the error term 
causes both the FE and RE estimators to be inconsistent. Secondly, the test is usually 
implemented assuming that both the idiosyncratic error term and the unobserved effect have 
constant variances. If this assumption fails to hold, the Hausman test has a non-standard 
limiting distribution implying that the resulting test could have an asymptotic size smaller or 
larger than the nominal size of the test. Therefore I estimate the Wooldridge (2002) robust 
version of Hausman test. Finally, the Hausman test is an asymptotic one, implying that the 
sample size should be large for it to be valid. 
 
 In addition to Hausman, I use the Lagrange Multiplier statistic of Breusch and Pagan (1980) 
to investigate the existence of the random effect. Following Farag and Cressy (2010) this is 
defined as. 
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                                                   (12) 
Where ite is the OLS pooled regression residual, LM statistic is distributed as )1(
2 for 
company and period effects (Baltagi (2008)). 
 
As a robustness check, I also generate the RE estimator by applying pooled OLS after the 
following transformation (Wooldridge 2002): 
 
120,....1;100,...1)},()1{()1()(')(
'


tixCARCAR
CAR
iitiiitiit
itiitit


   (13)
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where   
22
2
1







T
                                                                              
 
  Note that i are assumed to be random variables (i.i.d. random effect) and that
0),( iitCov  .  Then we are able to obtain consistent estimates using pooled OLS.   
ranges from 0 and1and if 1 then the estimation of both FE and RE is identical; if 0 then 
the RE estimators is identical with the pooled OLS. The degree of biasness of the RE 
estimator depends on the magnitude of . If 
22
    then  will be close to 1and the RE 
estimator will be least biased.  
 
In addition to these tests, I run the main panel data diagnostic tests to examine autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity as well as the stationarity of residuals specifically I use the Wooldridge and 
Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity, LM test and Baltagi-Wu LBI tests for 
serial correlation. However, to test the stationarity of residuals I use the Levin–Lin–Chu 
(LLC) stationarity test. 
 
Table 3.6 presents the results of the two-way random and fixed effect models of equation 10. 
All time-invariant variables, namely, Private and ARio are removed from the fixed effect 
estimation for reasons of collinearity. 
 
Table 3.6 reports similar coefficients and signs for both random and fixed effect models. 
Interestingly, and in contrast with the cross-sectional regressions, the sign of lnmcap (our 
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proxy for firm size) is positive for both Losers and Winners. This suggests underlying 
company heterogeneity in the data and the biased estimation of the OLS regressions.  
 In addition, size coefficients in the two-way model are highly significant for both Losers and 
Winners. The leakage of information variable is positive in sign and highly significant for all 
the events except C. This reflects the increasing role of insider information in the Egyptian 
stock market and thus market inefficiency.  
Table 3.6: Static Panel Data Models 
 
 Loser Winner 
 Event A Event B Event C Event D 
 RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
C -2.6871
*** 
(0.1517) 
-2.6741
*** 
(0.0012) 
-3.633
*** 
(0.1312) 
-3.7991
*** 
(0.0016) 
-4.5833
*** 
(0.1896) 
-4.7388
*** 
(0.0011) 
-9.1548
*** 
(0.2268) 
-9.7601
*** 
(0.0009) 
Lnmcap 0.1487
*** 
(0.0046) 
0.1494
*** 
(0.0047) 
0.1947
*** 
(0.0052) 
0.3830
*** 
(0.0213) 
0.2298
*** 
(0.0051) 
0.2262
*** 
(0.0051) 
0.4538
*** 
(0.0065) 
0.4613
*** 
(0.0063) 
Leak 0.0396
*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0388
*** 
(0.0091) 
0.0357
*** 
(0.0085) 
0.0351
*** 
(0.0083) 
-0.0017
 
(0.0080) 
-0.0034
 
(0.0078) 
0.0355
*** 
(0.0072) 
0.0328
*** 
(0.0068) 
ARio 
0.1443
 
(0.7930) 
--- 
0.6973
 
(0.9868) 
--- 
-.0.3260
 
(0.9072) 
--- 
-0.5599
 
(0.6307) 
--- 
Private 
-0.0203
 
(0.1083) 
--- 
-0.2149
** 
(0.1015) 
--- 
0.0434
 
(0.1415) 
--- 
0.1075
 
(0.1626) 
--- 
Adj R
2 
0.2849 0.2707 0.3673 0.4199 0.3979 0.3156 0.2704 0.5736 
Wald 
test chi
2
 
130.46
***
 --- 118.61
***
 --- 223.20
***
 --- 248.51
***
 --- 
F.stat --- 12.77
***
 --- 18.28
***
 --- 16.55
***
 --- 334.97
***
 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Number of observations is 12000 observations (100 companies * 120 days). 
 
The initial abnormal return in event day variable (ARio) is insignificant for all events, 
however its sign changes from positive (Losers) to negative (Winners). This result is 
consistent with Cox and Peterson (1994) as size does remove the effect of initial returns on 
subsequent price behavior. The time-invariant variable Private is insignificant except for B, 
however its sign changes from negative (Losers) to positive (Winners).  
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Results reported in table 3.6 show that we can reject the null that all independent variables are 
zero (at well below 1 percent for both Winners and Losers). Finally, the average adjusted R-
squared is 34% and 39% for the Losers and Winners respectively
16
.  
 
Table 3.7 presents the diagnostic tests for the static panel data models. To establish the 
existence of fixed effects, I run the redundant fixed effect tests (company and time effects) of 
equation 10. This rejects the null hypothesis that all fixed effects are zero. In addition, we also 
reject the nulls that specifically company and periods fixed effects are zero for both Winners 
and Losers.  
 
To determine which of the random or fixed effects model a better description of the data is I 
perform the Breusch & Pagan LM random effect test using the residuals of the OLS 
regression. The Chi-squared values for company and period effects for events B and D are 
marginally significant. However for events A and C they are insignificant, so that we cannot 
confidently reject the null of no random effects.  
 
However, we can reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman test that "individual effects are 
uncorrelated with the regressors". This suggests that the random effect estimators are biased 
and that therefore the fixed effects model is preferred. I also estimate the Wooldridge (2002) 
robust version of Hausman test and got the same conclusion.  
 
                                                          
16
 I deal with time-invariant variables, the potential endogeniety between market capitalisation and 
CARs and the problem of slope instability by using the system GMM model of equation 19.  
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Testing for the presence of heteroscedasticity, I run the modified Wald test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity in the fixed effects model. The test rejects the null of homosksdasicity 
implying that the estimated standard errors of the coefficients of the model are biased. I shall 
shortly deal more effectively with this problem using the system GMM estimator. 
 
Table 3.7: Panel Data Diagnostic tests 
 
 Losers Winners 
 Event A Event B Event C Event D 
Redundant fixed effects     
By group 3.1641
***
 3.3458
***
 5.0966
***
 3.5145
***
 
By time 1.5459
***
 1.6517
***
 1.3238
**
 1.1990
*
 
By group & time 1.9898
***
 2.1962
***
 2.4661
***
 1.8869
***
 
Breusch & Pagan LM random effect test 2.1421 2.076* 2.012 2.1119* 
Hausman test 12.359
***
 10.958
***
 14.646
***
 9.278
***
 
Modified Wald test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity in fixed effects 
models. 
42.781
***
 39.854
***
 49.511
***
 32.874
***
 
Modified Bhargave et al DW test 1.9981 1.9778 1.9697 1.9785 
Baltagi-Wu LBI serial correlation 2.0057 2.0001 1.9921 1.9822 
Theta 0.8781 0.8685 0.8268 0.8297 
Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC)  -33.057*** -31.758*** -41.257*** -15.861*** 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Number of observations is 12000 observations (100 companies * 120 days). 
 
We note, however, that the random effect model is estimated using GLS which relaxes the 
assumption of heteroskedasticity, so that bias in this model from this source at least is 
obviated. Modified Bhargave et al DW and Baltagi-Wu LBI serial correlation tests are also 
applied and indicate that the estimated residuals are serially uncorrelated. 
 
Regarding the choice between random and fixed effects models, theta-estimates range from 
82% to 86%, suggesting no significant difference between fixed and random effect approaches 
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in our dataset
17
. Finally, examining stationarity of the time series, the Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC) 
test for the existence of a unit root rejects the null that the panels contain unit root and hence 
the underlying time series can be assumed to be stationary. 
 
3.4.11 Unobservable or size portfolios? 
In this section I introduce Unobservable portfolios and examine their performance compared 
with the traditional portfolios. Unobservable portfolios are formed on the basis of fixed effects 
estimated on the pre-event data.  If the FEs are important predictors of post-event returns such 
portfolios should outperform those constructed according to traditional criteria.  
To further develop the analysis I therefore test the hypothesis that Unobservable portfolios 
outperform traditional size portfolios. Therefore I form two main portfolios, namely, size and 
Unobservable portfolios. Company size quintiles are ranked into an ascending order based on 
the company’s market capitalisation within the estimation window. I use both market 
capitalisation and free float market capitalisation as a proxy of size.  
 
However, to form the Unobservable portfolios I re-estimate equation 10 within the estimation 
window, and then sort the companies’ fixed effects into an ascending order. All sample firms 
are grouped into five quintiles based on company fixed effects and market capitalisation. I 
then estimate the cumulative average abnormal returns CARs for two size portfolios, namely, 
Big and Small portfolios as well as High and Low Fixed effects based on the first and the fifth 
quintile of each portfolio.  
                                                          
17
 Theta - by definition - ranges from 0 and 1 and if theta =1 then the estimation of both FE and RE is 
identical (equation 13). 
114 
 
It is worth mentioning that these portfolios are expected to satisfy the poolability conditions of 
the panel data model. Poolability tests are designed to examine group (company) and time 
slopes stability (Farag and Cressy (2010). The Null hypothesis of poolability by company 
kikH  :0  the test F statistic is: 
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And the F test of the poolability test by time is: 
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Where ee' is the sum squared errors of the pooled OLS, ii ee '  and  tt ee '  are the sum squared 
errors of the OLS regression for company (i) and period (t) respectively. Rejection of the Null 
means that the panel data are not poolable (Cressy and Farag 2011).  
 
Figures 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, and 3-11 present the cumulative average abnormal returns CARs for 
both size and unobservable (fixed effects) portfolios for the Losers (events A and B). It is clear 
that in case of bad news (Losers) low fixed effects portfolios not only outperform high fixed 
effects ones, but they also outperform small and big size portfolios. In addition, the arbitrage 
portfolios LMH outperform SMB portfolios on average. 
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Figure  3-8: Unobservable portfolios for event A 
 
 
 
Figure  3-9: Unobservable portfolios for event B18 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 HQ and LQ stand for high and low fixed effects respectively, however LMH stands for the arbitrage portfolio 
low – high fixed effects. 
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Figure  3-10: Size portfolios for event A 
 
 
 
Figure  3-11 Size portfolios for event B 
 
        
 On the other hand, figures 3-12, 3-13, 3-14, and 3-15 present the cumulative average 
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Winners (events C and D). In cases of good news (Winners), high fixed effects portfolios 
outperform those of low fixed effects. However, small portfolios outperform big. .Finally, the 
arbitrage portfolio HML outperforms SMB portfolios. 
Figure  3-11: Unobservable portfolios for event C 
 
 
Figure  3-12: Unobservable portfolios for event D 
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Figure  3-13: Size portfolios for event C 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3-14: Size portfolios for event D 
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3.4.12   System GMM dynamic panel data model 
Many econometrics problems may arise in the estimation of equation 10. Firstly, firm size 
may be endogenous and correlated with residuals. Secondly, the fixed effect model assumes 
that errors are correlated with company fixed effects. Thirdly, due to the assumptions of these 
models, in order to get estimates of the fixed effects we need to remove all covariates that do 
not vary with time or company (Farag and Cressy 2010). Therefore, by definition, time-
invariant variables cannot be included in FE models (i.e. in our case, AR(i0), Private). Finally, 
serial correlation and heteroskedasicity may bias the estimation.  
 
In this chapter I initially estimate the Arellano and Bond (1991), Arrellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step Difference GMM estimator to obviate the above 
problems. The main assumption of the first step in the estimation is that the errors are 
independent and homoskedastic across companies and over time (Beck and Levine 2004). In 
the second step, we construct a consistent variance- covariance matrix using the residuals 
derived from the first step (Beck and Levine2004).  
 
As linear GMM estimators, the Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond estimators have one- and 
two-step variants, though the two-step method is asymptotically more efficient, and the 
standard errors are less biased (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998). 
The general form of the Difference-GMM is (Roodman 2009): 
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                                                                     (16) 
120 
 
The disturbance term thus has two orthogonal components, namely, the fixed effects i and 
the idiosyncratic shocks itv (Roodman (2009). The GMM estimator uses the first differences to 
transform equation 16 into:
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                                                                (17)  
Lagged levels are used as instruments for the regression in differences.  By transforming the 
regressors by first differencing, the fixed company-specific effects are removed as they are – 
by definition – time-invariant. However, the new error term 1 itit   which is correlated with 
the lagged dependent variable 21   itit CARCAR , now represents a source of potential bias 
(Beck and Levine2004).  
Arellano and Bond (1991) introduce the following moment conditions to deal with this 
problem, assuming that the error term   is not serially correlated and the independent 
variables are uncorrelated with error term.: 
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                                               (18) 
On the other hand, Blundell and Bond (1998) claim that there are major conceptual and 
statistical shortcomings of the first difference GMM i.e. when the explanatory variables are 
persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments. This may lead to 
biased coefficients especially in case of small samples.  
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To overcome these conceptual and statistical drawbacks, Blundell and Bond (1998) introduce 
the system GMM estimator. The new estimator of GMM combines in a system the first 
differenced equation with the same equation expressed in levels.   
 
Lagged levels are used as instruments for the regression in differences; however I used the 
lagged (three lags) differences of Mcap as instruments in the equation in level. Arellano and 
Bover (1995 argue that using additional lagged differences would result in redundant moment 
conditions. Therefore Blundell and Bond (1998) propose additional moment conditions for the 
regression in levels (the second equation in the system) as in equation 19.   
 
 
                                    (19) 
 
Thus, I use the moment conditions presented in equations 18 and 19 to overcome the 
drawbacks of the first difference GMM and to obtain consistent and efficient parameter 
estimates.    
 
The system GMM has main assumptions i.e. fixed individual effects, endogenous regressors, 
the idiosyncratic error terms (not fixed effects) are of hetroskedastic and serially correlated, 
the idiosyncratic error terms are uncorrelated across companies (groups) and, finally, a smaller 
number of time periods (T) compared with the number of groups (N) (small T and large N) 
Roodman (2009).    
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To satisfy the assumptions of the system GMM and in order to alleviate the severe serial 
correlation identified in CARs for the Egyptian stock price data (Cressy and Farag (2010)), I 
chose five-day (weekly) rather than daily returns. This results in 20 pre-event and 24 post-
event observations per firm. 
 
I also include in this analysis a new dummy variable “DumQ” as a proxy for the direction of 
firm reaction to the events or companies’ unobservable effects. It is based on the rankings of 
fixed effects within the estimation window and takes the value of 1 in the case of positive 
unobservable effects and 0 for negative effects. 
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   Where ),,,,(' 54321   and )DumQ,Private,Leak,Lnmcap,(' ii0 ititiit ARx   
 
To examine the residuals of the system GMM, I report the Arellano-Bond test, AR (1) and AR 
(2), for serial correlation with null hypothesis of “No serial correlation”. We are particularly 
interested in AR (2) as the test of AR (1) usually rejects the null hypothesis) (see Roodman, 
2009). I also report the Hanson and Sargan tests of exogeniety of instruments and the over-
identifying restrictions in the two-step GMM criterion function. The Null hypothesis of Sargan 
and Hanson tests is that “the instruments are exogenious” Therefore the insignificant value of 
both tests indicates that the estimation is well specified. 
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 I also examine the residuals of the system GMM for a unit root using Levin, Lin–Chu (2002), 
as in equation 20. The null hypothesis is then 0:0 iH   for all i versus the alternative 
0: iaH   
                

 
p
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ittiijiittiit yZyy
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1,1,                                                         (21) 
 
where ity  is the variable being tested; and it  is a stationary error term. The itZ  term can 
represent panel-specific means and a time trend, finally, p is the number of lags. I also use 
Harris–Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000; Breitung and Das 2005), unit root tests under the null 
hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root. 
 
Table 3.8 presents the outputs for the system GMM model defined of equation 20. The system 
GMM results reject the hypothesis that the lagged CAR coefficient is zero. I interpret this as a 
rejection of a static model in favour of a dynamic model. Interestingly, and consistent with the 
estimation of the two-way fixed effects model, and in contrast with the cross-sectional 
regressions, the sign of lnmcap (our proxy for firm size) is positive for both Losers and 
Winners.  
 
This suggests concealed company heterogeneity and clearly indicates the bias introduced by 
simple OLS estimation involving only one dimension and no fixed effects (Baltagi (2008)). 
The size coefficients are highly significant for Losers but insignificant for the Winners. This 
may reflect the greater effect of size on the cumulative average abnormal return in cases of 
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negative shocks (the so-called ‘leverage’ effect). However, the leakage of information variable 
is positive in sign and highly significant for all the events. This, we believe, reflects the 
important role of insider information and thus the existence of significant market inefficiency 
in the Egyptian stock exchange.  
 
Table 3.8: System GMM estimates 
 Losers Winners 
 Event A Event B Event C Event D 
L.Carit 
0.0398
***
 
(0.0083) 
0.0338
***
 
(0.0064) 
0.0375
***
 
(0.0063) 
0.0500
***
 
(0.0038) 
Lnmcap 
0.0060
***
 
(0.0016) 
0.0075
**
 
(0.0029) 
0.0036 
(0.0024) 
0.0051 
(0.0042) 
Leak  
0.9110
** 
(0.3825) 
0.9518
***
 
(0.1129) 
1.9778
***
 
(0.3992) 
1.4372
***
 
(0.0800) 
ARio 
0.0180 
(0.0179) 
0.1152
***
 
(0.0362) 
-0.1795 
(0.0981) 
-0.0506 
(0.0429) 
Private  
-0.0162
**
 
(0.0074) 
-0.0153
***
 
(0.0038) 
-0.0085 
(0.0092) 
-0.0080
***
 
(0.0032) 
DumQ 
-0.0194
***
 
(0.0065) 
-0.0133
***
 
(0.0044)
 
-0.0050
*
 
(0.0079) 
-0.0046
*
 
(0.0026) 
Wald test chi
2 
111.92
***
 403.33
***
 167.24
***
 213.6
*** 
Arellano Bond test for AR (1) -3.91
***
 -2.60
***
 -4.03
***
 -4.77
***
 
Arellano Bond test for AR (2) -0.93 0.51 1.20 -1.33 
Sargan test  2.884 2.012 2.164 5.156
*
 
P value (0.196) (0.146) (0.179) (0.107) 
Hansen test 20.14 32.58 12.93 35.36 
P value (0.267) (0.341) (0.298) (0.592) 
Difference in Hansen Tests 
for Exogeniety: 
 
   
GMM instruments for 
levels: 
 
   
Hansen test excluding group 8.69 23.49 8.46 30.24 
Difference 11.45 9.09 4.47 5.12 
Instrumental variables     
Hansen test excluding group 17.14 29.46 10.35 28.58 
Difference 3.00 3.12 2.58 6.79 
Levin-Lin- Chu unit root test  -9.2090
***
 -10.699
***
 -13.432
***
 -9.4198
***
 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Number of observations is 2400 observations (100 companies * 24 weeks). 
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The coefficients for initial returns on event day are insignificant for Losers and Winners 
except for event B. This result is consistent with Cox and Peterson (1994) as including size 
removes the effect of initial returns on subsequent price behavior. ARio coefficients are 
positive in sign for Losers, however, and interestingly, they are negative for Winners. This 
suggests the existence of a leverage effect in the Egyptian stock market.   
 
More importantly, the DumQ variable (our proxy for companies’ unobservable factors) is 
negative and highly significant for Winners and Losers. This suggests that low unobservable 
effects portfolios outperform high unobservable effects portfolios. It is worth mentioning that 
both Losers and Winners Unobservable portfolios significantly outperform the traditional size 
portfolios.  
 
This result is new to the literature on price overreaction. Finally, and in contrast with the OLS 
regression results, amongst the Losers and Winners formerly private firms have lower CAARs 
than formerly state-owned firms. This again may suggest potential bias in the estimation 
arising from the absence of the time dimension in the cross-sectional regression. 
 
We also notice that the economic significance of the variables is less than those of the fixed 
and random effects estimation presented in table 3.6. However we are interested in the 
consistency of the signs across different panel data models rather than the economic 
significance to investigate the effect of company heterogeneity on the overreaction hypothesis.  
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We note that the specification tests are satisfactory. The tests regarding serial correlation reject 
the absence of first order, but not second order serial correlation, and the Hansen tests do not 
reject the over-identifying restrictions. The models are well specified as Wald test statistics are 
highly significant.  
 
3.4.13 What are these unobservable factors? 
Cressy and Farag (2011) pointed out that the unobservable firm factors might be interpretable 
as measures of firm quality. However, they were not able to show evidence to support this 
interpretation. To remedy this deficiency in this chapter I shall investigate possible empirical 
correlates for these unobserved factors.  
 
To this end I choose Market Value Added (MVA) as a proxy for management quality and 
performance. MVA is defined as the management value added and is measured by the 
difference between the market value of the company and the value of its capital (equity) 
supplied by ordinary shareholders. Based on the model presented in Cressy and Farag (2011), 
the sign of the management quality variable is expected to be negative as the higher the firm 
quality the lower the company heterogeneity.  
 
The existing body of the literature emphasises the increasing role of corporate governance 
(CG) as a means of improving company performance. See for example Millstein and 
MacAvoy (1998), Core et al. (1999), Mallin (2001), Brown and Caylor (2004), Core et al. 
(2006), Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Mallin (2010). CG characteristics such as the separation 
of the roles of the CEO and Chairman, board independence and various types of committees 
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(e.g. remuneration and audit) are identified in the literature as keys to 'good' governance. But 
the main practical question is, does better CG improve company performance?  Therefore, the 
sign of the corporate governance compliance variable is expected to be negative; this suggests 
that the better corporate governance characteristic the lower the firm heterogeneity and lower 
overreaction to market shocks.  
 
The Egyptian Corporate Governance code (2003-2006) recommended firms to disclose in 
their annual reports whether or not they comply (fully or partially) with the code. There were 
few provisions for the Egyptian Corporate Governance code; however they were not 
obligatory. During the period of study, some companies have partially complied (none has 
fully complied) with the code while the others have not
19
. I define the corporate governance 
compliance variable as a dummy variable takes the value of 1 for company i if it (fully or 
partially) complies with the Egyptian Corporate Governance Code, and is 0 otherwise.  
 
 Despite this, there is a debate in the literature about the relationship between corporate 
governance and agency cost with some authors arguing that CG improvement increases 
agency costs in the company. For example, McKnight and Weir (2009) found that the number 
of non-executive directors and duality had little effect on agency cost and Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998), and Weir, Laing, and McKnight (2002) found that the duality (the 
separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman) has no effect of company performance. Finally, 
McKnight and Weir (2009) using UK data found that the existence of a nomination committee 
                                                          
19
 I collected this information from the companies’ annual reports. 
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did in fact increase agency costs (measured by sales to assets ratio). However, greater board 
ownership was associated with lower agency costs in the company.  
Regarding proxies for agency costs, Ang et al. (2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003) use the 
Sales Assets Ratio (SAR) to measure this variable. SAR can be regarded as a measure of 
management’s efficiency in using assets to generate sales revenue. Ang et al. (2000) thus 
argue that a higher SAR ratio implies lower agency costs as it reflects greater management 
efficiency in doing this. Therefore the sign of the agency cost variable is expected to be 
positive as the higher the agency cost the higher the company heterogeneity and the higher 
overreaction to market shocks. 
 
Finally, I include as an empirical proxy for unobservables the role of political connections of 
the company. In Egypt, political connections have an important direct impact on company 
performance. I argue that the greater the political connections on the board the better a 
company’s performance and the more it is subject to insider information. This suggests a 
higher degree of market inefficiency for stocks of companies with political connections, and 
greater permanent company-specific effects accordingly. Therefore the sign of this variable is 
expected to be positive. I measure political connections by the presence of a Minister, a 
Member of Parliament, and by ruling party members on the board of directors. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the existing body of the literature has not investigated the nature of 
the fixed effects (unobservable factors). These unobservable may lay the estimation open to 
the omitted variable and misspecification biases. One of the contributions of this chapter is to 
try to explain what these factors are. Although the political connection of the board members 
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might be observable factor (it may minimise the omitted variable bias), however for some 
companies this is unobservable factors to the existing shareholders due to the information 
inefficiency and the weak corporate governance practices in the Egyptian stock market. In 
addition, none of the existing studies has investigated the effect of the political connection of 
the board members on the overreaction phenomenon. 
 
To empirically examine the effect of the above variables on company fixed effects, I carry out 
a cross-sectional regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) with the company-specific 
effects (fixed effects) as dependent variable and the lagged value of market value added 
(MVA), the corporate governance dummy and the political connections (dummy) as in the 
following equation. The company fixed effects (company heterogeneity) have been estimated 
based on the residuals of equation 10 (the first order autoregressive fixed effects). 
iiiiiii SARPolconCGMVAFe   4321                   (22) 
where:  iFe is company fixed (specific) effects, 
iMVA  
is the lagged company market value added measured by the difference between 
the market and book value of equity/book value of equity. 
iCG  
is dummy variable takes the value of 1 for company i if it (fully or partially) 
complies with the Egyptian Corporate Governance Code, and is 0 otherwise. 
iPolcon is dummy variable takes the value of 1 if there is a Minister, Member of 
Parliament member, or Ruling Party member on the board of directors, and is 0 
otherwise. 
iSAR is the lagged sales to assets ratio as a proxy for agency costs. 
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To empirically identify the unobservable factors, table 3.9 presents the outputs of equation 22. 
The corporate governance dummy (CG) is negative in sign and highly significant for the 
Losers but only marginally significant for Winners. This suggests an inverse relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and the company heterogeneity (fixed effects).  
 
The negative sign may be interpreted as meaning that better corporate governance 
characteristic indicates lower firm heterogeneity and lower overreaction to market shocks. The 
sustainability in the management policies and company’s strategic objectives are possible 
interpretations for this inverse relationship. This in turn reduces the conflict between 
shareholders and management. 
 
Management value added (MVA, our proxy of the management quality) is also negatively and 
significantly related to permanent differences in the market’s overreaction to news, for all 
events (except for event D). This might be explained as meaning that better management 
quality is associated with smaller permanent differences in investor reaction to news that 
affects its performance. Higher management quality suggests higher efficiency in the firm and 
this in turn is reflected in stock price reactions. Therefore, the better the quality of 
management the more efficiently is the stock priced and the less permanent investors’ 
overreaction accordingly. This result is consistent with Cressy and Farag (2011). Sales to 
assets ratio SAR (our proxy for agency cost) is positive and insignificant for both Winners and 
Losers. This suggests that agency cost has a null effect on company heterogeneity.  
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 Table 3.9: Cross Sectional Regressions explaining unobservable factors 
 Losers Winners 
 Event A Event B Event C Event D 
C 0.0002  
(0.0121)  
-0.0063  
(0.0052)  
0.0413***  
(0.0069)  
0.0912***  
(0.0121)  
Pol 0.0034**  
(0.0014)  
0.0048**  
(0.0021)  
0.0066**  
(0.0031)  
0.0051  
(0.0041)  
CG -0.0034**  
(0.0015)  
-0.0261***  
(0.0062)  
-0.0191*  
(0.0099)  
-0.0322*  
(0.0181)  
MVA -0.0004**  
(0.0002)  
-0.0008***  
(0.0002)  
-0.0004*  
(0.0002)  
-0.0014**  
(0.0007)  
SAR 0.0036  
(0.0032)  
0.0003  
(0.0003)  
0.0002  
(0.0004)  
0.0001  
(0.0006)  
R2 0.2112 0.3734 0.2162 0.2144 
Adj R2 0.2897 0.3177 0.2465 0.2145 
F.stat 3.0112*** 6.7054*** 3.1036*** 3.0706*** 
White test for heteroskedasticity 0.7414 0.3518 0.5392 0.5148 
*, **,*** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Number of observations is 100 observations. 
The descriptive statistics for the company heterogeneity (fixed effects) are 0.052%, 7.056%, - 
0.015 %, and 0.054% for the mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation respectively. 
 
The political connection variable is found positive and highly significant for both Winners and 
Losers (except for event D). This suggests that the higher degree of political connections the 
firm has, the higher the company’s heterogeneity and the less efficiency of its price. 
The models are well specified as F statistics are highly significant. The adjusted R squared 
range from 21% and 32%. In addition, the residuals seem homoskedastic as the results of 
White tests are insignificant. It is worth mentioning that the correlation matrix reports that 
there is no potential correlation between the independent variables. I examine the potential 
endogeniety between a company’s fixed effect (company heterogeneity) and the independent 
variables. The Hausman test cannot reject the null that the regressor is exogenous; therefore 
there is no potential endogeniety problem in the estimation, in particular between firm size and 
the company’s heterogeneity 
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3.5 Summary and conclusions 
Existing empirical studies of stock price reversal have used either cross section or time series 
regressions. I argued that this wastes information and may lead to potential biases in the 
results. Combining group and time dimensions may therefore result in better estimates of the 
coefficients. Such studies also ignore the dynamic aspects of overreaction; namely the 
tendency for past abnormal returns to influence future returns. In this chapter I have used 
Egyptian stock market data and both traditional and dynamic panel data methods to deal with 
these problems. Unobservable factors reflecting heterogeneity in the data emerge 
automatically from this estimation process and I have investigated their potential role as 
criteria for portfolio formation. 
 
Using daily price data from the Egyptian stock market on a sample of 100 companies which 
experienced dramatic one-day price change as the result of four main events over the period 
2003 to 2009, I found negative and significant abnormal returns for one of these, namely the 
terrorist attacks. These lasted for three days after the event. However, the Lebanon war as a 
proxy for the tension in the Middle East region had no effect on the average abnormal returns 
in the Egyptian stock exchange. Furthermore, there was no significant average abnormal 
return from either the announcement of the constitutional change or the formation of the new 
Egyptian government.  
 
The traditional fixed and random effects models showed that – in contrast with the cross-
sectional regressions – the sign of our proxy for firm size (lnmcap)) was positive for both 
133 
 
Losers and Winners. This suggested the presence of underlying company heterogeneity in the 
data and confirmed our suspicions regarding biases introduced by simple OLS estimation. The 
dynamic model estimated using system GMM produced estimates consistent with those of the 
two-way fixed effects model and contrasted with those of the cross-sectional regressions. In 
particular the sign of the firm size variable) was again positive for both Losers and Winners. 
This once more suggests concealed company heterogeneity and indicates biases produced by 
estimation using simple OLS. The size coefficients were highly significant for Losers but 
insignificant for Winners. This may reflect, in case of negative shocks, the greater effect of 
size on the cumulative average abnormal return (the so-called ‘leverage’ effect). 
 
 I found also that the leakage of information variable (Leak) was positive in sign and highly 
significant for all the events. This, I believe, reflects the important role of insider information 
and thus market inefficiency in the Egyptian stock exchange. The coefficients for initial 
returns on event day are insignificant for Losers and Winners except for event C. This result is 
consistent with Cox and Peterson (1994) as size removes the effect of initial returns on 
subsequent price behavior.   
More importantly, including the DumQ variable (the proxy for company unobservables) in the 
system GMM suggests that low unobservable effects portfolios outperform high unobservable 
effects portfolios. Both Losers and Winners Unobservable portfolios significantly 
outperformed the traditional size portfolios. This result is new to the literature on price 
overreaction.  
Interestingly, I found that low fixed effects portfolios for Losers not only outperformed those 
of high fixed effects, but also outperformed small and big size portfolios. In addition, the 
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arbitrage portfolio LMH )fixed effects) outperforms SMB portfolios on average. High fixed 
effects Winners outperform low fixed effects portfolios on average, however small size 
portfolios outperform those of big size on average. This result is new to the literature as I 
argue that the portfolio formation based on fixed effects may be used as a new profitable 
construction strategy to achieve higher abnormal return than the traditional size portfolios. 
To identify the potential unobservable factors, I regressed the company’s fixed effects against 
potential unobservable variables i.e. corporate governance compliance, political connections, 
agency costs and the management quality. I found a positive and significant relationship 
between the political connections of the board members and the company heterogeneity in 
addition and interestingly, I found an inverse relationship between both management quality 
and corporate governance compliance the company heterogeneity. This suggests that the better 
the management quality the lower the company heterogeneity and the more efficiency the 
share price.  
 
I conclude that investors can exploit the Egyptian market imperfection and achieve abnormal 
returns as the results of major events. Past Losers significantly outperform past Winners post-
events over the event window. In addition, the panel data approach adds a new dimension to 
the existing models and offers interesting insights and reveals the importance role of 
unobservable firm-specific factors in addition to the observable size in the analysis of the 
overreaction phenomenon. Finally, constructing portfolios based on some unobserved factors 
i.e. management quality, corporate governance and political connections of board members 
significantly outperform traditional portfolios based on size.  
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Chapter 4 : Long-term performance: momentum or overreaction? 
4.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the long-term overreaction phenomenon for 
all listed shares in the Egyptian stock exchange over the period 1998-2009. The chapter also 
investigates the role of size, the stability of beta and the seasonality effect on the overreaction 
hypothesis in the Egyptian stock market. Finally, I investigate whether the contrarian and the 
unobservable (fixed effect) factors are already incorporated in pricesby using the Fama and 
French three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
 
The main contribution of this chapter is that it is– to the best of my knowledge – the first work 
to link the overreaction hypothesis with a change in regulatory policies, namely, the switch 
from strict price limits to circuit breakers. In addition, I augment the traditional Fama and 
French three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model by including a contrarian 
factor and an unobservable factor based on company heterogeneity. Finally, this is the first 
empirical study of the long-term overreaction phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market – one 
of the leading stock exchanges in the Middle East and Mena reign (MENA). 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) using monthly return data investigated the so called long-term 
overreaction and found that past Losers significantly outperform past Winners by 24.6% of 
positive risk-adjusted abnormal returns in the subsequent period on average. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) argue that the main cause of this market anomaly is due to the overreaction to 
the new information. Huang (1998) argues that in the event of good news stock prices initially 
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overstate the equilibrium prices then price reversals occur in the subsequent periods to move 
them back nearer to equilibrium levels. However, in cases of bad news, stock prices initially 
understate their equilibrium levels followed by reversals in the later period. 
 
The overreaction hypothesis posits that an extreme movement in stock prices will be followed 
by subsequent price reversal (movement in the opposite direction), noting that the bigger the 
initial price movement the greater subsequent price reversal that is expected. This is 
considered a violation of the Weak Form market efficiency (De Bondt and Thaler 1985).  
 
The existing body of literature argues that the claimed overreaction phenomenon of De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) is mainly due to computation errors in beta between the estimation and the 
event window (Chan, 1988), or to the small firm  and seasonality effects (January effect) 
(Zarowin, 1990).   
 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2 presents the academic debate about the 
measurements of the long-term performance using two competing methods, namely, 
cumulative abnormal returns and buy and hold. In section 3, I discuss the alternative sources 
of the contrarian and momentum abnormal returns. Section 4 describes the dataset used in the 
analysis. Section 5 presents the methodology and the empirical results. Finally, section 6 
summarises and concludes. 
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4.2 Empirical literature debate: Long-term performance CARs or BH?  
There is a remarkable debate in the existing body of the finance literature regarding the use of 
different measures of returns in empirical work. The two main rival candidates are Cumulative 
Average Residual returns (CARs) and the Buy and Hold abnormal return (BH). Dissanaike 
(1994) argues that the rebalancing method (RB) provides a more accurate measure for excess 
returns over CARs. He found that the CAR method underestimated the actual excess returns 
36 months after portfolio formation by 28.3%. Dissanaike (1994) also found that the portfolio 
performance is sensitive to the method of test and rank period calculations. In this section I 
present the pros and cons for each methodology. In addition I highlight the different types of 
biases and measurement errors for contrarian and momentum strategies in the empirical 
literature.  
 
4.2.1 Cumulative average residual returns CARs 
The cumulative average residual return is the most and widely used method in the existing 
body of the finance literature. Many researchers used the cumulative average residuals, e.g. De 
Bondt and Thaler, (1985), (1987), Chen, (1988), and Alonso and Rubio, (1990). However, 
Dissanaike (1994) argues that the arithmetic cumulative average residuals as in equation 1 
may result in spurious abnormal returns as the calculated returns are not the same as the actual 
returns that investors experience. 
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Where CAR is the cumulative average residuals, N is the number of shares, T is the number of 
time periods. itR and mtR are the monthly (t) stock and market returns respectively for share i. 
The more realistic technique for measuring long-term abnormal returns is the rebalancing 
method (RB) - which provides more convincing return metric. Within the RB methods 
dividends are assumed to be reinvested in a given portfolio using equal weights as in equation 
2. 
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where N is the total number of securities in the portfolio, T is the total number of months (t) in 
the test period. The RB approach assumes that each portfolio is rebalanced on a monthly basis. 
This implies equal amounts are assumed to be invested in the individual stocks each month 
during the test period. This suggests significant transaction costs may be associated with the 
rebalancing method. Blume and Stambaugh (1983) argue that the results from the RB 
approach are subject to the bid-ask spread bias due to the existing divergence between the 
closing prices observed and the actual prices. This leads returns to be upwardly biased as a 
result. However, the bias may be reduced when the BH approach is adopted. In addition, the 
RB method could negatively affect the contrarian strategy if only a few stocks were to reverse 
and the others do not. In that case the allocation of funds between Losers and Winners may be 
diverted away Dissanaike (1994 and 1997).         
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4.2.2 Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
The BH method assumes that equal investments are invested. There is no monthly rebalancing 
process in the BH method as opposed to the RB and CAR methods. In addition, it assumes 
that all dividends are reinvested for each stock as in the following equation  
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Conrad and Kaul (1993) argue that in comparison with CARs, the abnormal return of the 
contrarian strategy is spuriously exaggerated when calculating long-term performance. 
Furthermore, Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Ball et al. (1995) find that underpriced stocks have 
greater upward bias. Consequently, if Losers have lower returns than the Winners, there will 
be an obvious upward bias to the results and this will generate spurious contrarian profits (see 
also Forner and Marhuenda, 2003).       
         
In contrast with the CARs, the BH method involves lower transaction costs and is less tending 
to the infrequent trading problems, Dissanaike (1994). Dissanaike (1994) argues that the BH 
method is preferred over the RB method when testing the overreaction hypothesis. He claims 
that the rebalancing process may affect the contrarian strategy (negatively or positively).  
 
The overreaction hypothesis states that by buying Losers and selling Winners, investors can 
achieve abnormal returns as Winners are assumed to be overpriced and Losers are assumed to 
be underpriced at the portfolio formation date. The contrarian profits for Loser portfolios are 
likely to be much more significant if price reversals do not occur at the same time for 
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individual shares. Therefore investors would sell shares whose prices have increased and buy 
shares whose prices have not yet reversed, Dissanaike (1994). This suggests that it would be 
more realistic to follow the contrarian strategy without adding the monthly rebalancing effect.    
 
One of the drawbacks of the BH method is that Winners over time carry more weight in the 
portfolio than Losers when a particular stock is delisted or dropped out during the test period; 
this may lead to a reduction in diversification. According to the assumptions of the BH, all 
stocks bought at the beginning of the test period should be held until the end of test period 
(e.g. 24 or 36 months) (Gaunt 2000). This is in fact unrealistic assumption of the BHARs and 
may bias the estimates of abnormal returns. Gaunt (2000) presents three different alternatives 
to overcome this complication. Firstly, to reinvest the proceeds of the delisted stock equally 
amongst the remaining stocks. Secondly, to reinvest the proceeds according to the market 
capitalisation of the remaining stocks. Thirdly, to invest the proceeds in the market index 
(Gaunt 2000).  
 
To conclude, Fama (1998) claims that the RB CARs approach outperforms the Buy and Hold 
BH approach as the later implies fewer theoretical and statistical problems than long-term BH. 
In addition, Roll (1983) argues that using monthly returns is less likely to be affected by the 
choice of CARs or BH. Dissanake (1994) argues that the BH approach may lead to less benefit 
from diversification in the longer run. Finally, Loughran and Ritter (1996) claim that there is a 
little difference between BH and CARs in test period returns calculations, and they argue that 
the results of Conrad and Kaul (1993) are affected by the survivorship bias.     
 
141 
 
 
4.3 Alternative sources of the contrarian and momentum abnormal returns. 
 Chan (1988), Lehman (1990), Park (1995), Dissanaike (1997), and Conrad et al. (1997) 
concluded that the contrarian or momentum abnormal returns have four main sources, namely, 
measurement errors and biases, portfolio construction and evaluation methodology, time-
varying market risk between rank and test windows and, finally, the overreaction to the firm 
specific information (Kang et al. 2002). In this section I shed the light on these four alternative 
sources of overreaction and momentum abnormal returns. 
 
4.3.1 Biases and measurement errors in contrarian strategies. 
Contrarian profits may be spurious due to the bid-ask spread. Stocks may be wrongly 
classified as Winners or Losers when bid-ask prices are used in portfolios’ returns calculation. 
This leads to magnifying the short-term contrarian profits, Lehmann (1990), Park (1995), 
Conrad et al (1997) and Kang et al (2002). The bid-ask spread bias arises when the initial 
transaction of selling Winners and/or buying Losers is done at the bid and ask prices 
respectively. However, the corresponding transaction is done based on ask and bid prices 
respectively Lehmann (1990), Conrad et al (1997) and Kang et al (2002).   
 
A survivorship bias arises when the data base excludes the companies that have ceased to exist 
due to liquidation, delisting, and fail to comply with the stock exchange regulations. As the 
survivor companies look better and have higher performance (returns) than those that no 
longer exist, this leads to overestimation of portfolios’ average return. 
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A data-snooping bias arises when the empirical results of a particular research are driven and 
highly influenced by the results of other empirical researches especially if large number of 
empirical studies is carried on based on same datasets Conrad et al (1997) and Kang et al 
(2002). A data-snooping bias may lead to a data mining bias which is defined as when a 
researcher is drilling into the same dataset to reach to a particular result. 
 
A look-ahead bias occurs especially in testing market efficiency when a researcher assumes 
that all the relevant information is reflected in the share prices while it is not. For example, 
forming portfolios based on June (fiscal year) accounting data, whilst the data will not be 
available for investors due to the information lag in financial reports in addition to the lagged 
response of the market, Conrad et al (1997) and Kang et al (2002).  
 
Roll (1983), Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Lyon et al. (1999) defined the rebalancing bias as 
fixed weights that are commonly used in portfolios’ monthly returns calculations. These 
results in both high and low returns as stocks are sold by the end of the formation period and 
then the proceeds are reinvested at the original (fixed) weights. However, in the rank period, 
high return stocks for instance have increased their weight in the portfolio and the opposite is 
correct for low return stocks. The rebalancing bias results in underweighting the previously 
high return stocks and overweighting the previously low return stocks in the rank period.        
 
Finally, non-synchronous trading may result in cross correlation between returns on traded 
(liquid) and non-traded (illiquid) stocks. This leads to spurious contrarian profits as liquid 
shares tend to react contemporaneously to the new information, however, illiquid shares 
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respond to the new information with lag once the next trading occurs. Therefore, portfolio 
returns are likely to suffer from lead-lag reaction in addition to serial correlation, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990), Cohen (1979) and Miller et al. (1994).   
 
4.3.2 Portfolio construction and evaluation methodology. 
There is a debate about the use of the non-overlapping test periods (three to five years) and 
then estimate one overall statistical test on the aggregate data Dissanaike (1997). In fact, using 
non-overlapping test periods (3-5) results in unavoidable loss of information. In addition, there 
is always the likelihood that the outcome of the contrarian strategy is influenced by economy-
wide cyclical factors, Dissanaike (1997).    
 
Bali and Kothari (1989), Dissanaike (1997) introduce an alternative methodology which 
allows overlapping within the formation and test periods. However, the main drawback to this 
methodology is the inevitable inter-temporal structure in return distribution as well as in the 
betas, Forner and Marhuenda (2003).   
 
4.3.3 Long-term performance with risk and size adjustments.  
Chan (1988) argued that there are many critics to the contrarian strategy in the academic 
literature. He introduced an alternative interpretation to the contrarian profits. Chan (1988) 
argued that the risk of Winners and Losers varies over time between formation and test 
periods. Therefore the achieved abnormal return may be due to the approach used in 
measuring risk and/or measurement errors in beta estimations during the formation and test 
periods of Winners and Losers. Thus the estimation of beta in the formation period will be 
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biased if we used it as a risk factor in the test period. For instance, betas will be 
underestimated in the test periods for Loser portfolios as Losers tend to be riskier in the 
formation period. Conversely, the betas will be overestimated in the test periods for Winner 
portfolios as Winners tend to be less risky in the formation period (Chan, 1988).      
 
On the other hand, the market values of both Winners and Losers vary during the rank period 
(small firm effect). De Bondt and Thaler (1985) found significant large variances between the 
market capitalisation of Losers (-45%) and Winners (365%), however, they found that the 
median of Losers were greater than of those of Winners at the beginning of the rank periods. 
Surprisingly, the median of market capitalisation of the Losers became smaller than those of 
Winners in the subsequent test periods. This suggests that – if market value is a good proxy for 
risk – Losers are safer at the beginning of the rank periods and switch into higher risk class by 
the end of the formation period (Chan 1988).  
 
 4.3.4 Overreaction to firm-specific information and lead-lag structure.  
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) claim that not only the overreaction to firm-specific information is 
the main source of contrarian profits but also the lead-lag structure in stock returns. The lead-
lag structure is considered as one of the main sources of contrarian profits, which is related to 
the market efficiency as some stocks may react more quickly to the information than others 
(Kang et. al 2002). Lo and MacKinlay (1990) found significant and large positive cross-serial 
covariance between small stocks and lagged large stocks returns. However, they found weak 
cross-serial covariance between large stocks and lagged small stocks returns. They claim that 
the main source of short-term contrarian profits is the positive cross-serial covariance (the 
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size-related lead-lag structure) rather than the overreaction to firm-specific information (Kang 
et. al 2002).  
 
Contrastingly, Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) claim that the lead-lag structure is not a 
fundamental source of momentum profits in the US. However, (Kang et. al 2002) found that 
the lead-lag structure is the main source of momentum but not the contrarian profits in the 
Chinese stock market.    
 
4.4 Data 
I used the EGX30 index, a free floated market capitalisation weighted index (Galariotis (2004) 
shows that the selection of a value weighted or an equally weighted index does not alter the 
main findings. However, I used the EFG equally weighted index and obtained similar results. 
Daily stock returns were adjusted for stock dividends, stock split and dividend yields over the 
period January 1998-December 2009 (144 months). The number of stock in the sample ranges 
from 180-251 companies according to the number of listed and traded shares in the Egyptian 
stock exchange. The main source of data is the Egyptian stock exchange. For each stock to be 
included in the sample, I made sure that each stock has continuous trading behaviour during 
the formation period and traded at least once during the test period) Forner and Marhuenda 
(2003).  
 
 The vast majority (84%) of the Egyptian companies have June as the end of their fiscal year. 
Therefore all portfolios are formed starting from January to allow all financial information and 
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financial statements to be disseminated and to be reflected on stock prices in addition, to be 
available for all investors. This will overcome the look-ahead bias. 
 
I excluded all financial sectors and property investment companies from the sample as the 
recorded values of assets in financial sectors’ companies for instance are actually market 
rather than book values. In addition, property investment companies usually reevaluate their 
book value of assets. Therefore the book to market equity ratio may not have same 
interpretation as those of other types. Fama and French (1992) argue that financial sector 
companies have higher leverage than those of other sectors; this may lead to higher degree of 
financial distress. Twelve financial and property investments firms were excluded from the 
initial sample (3% of the total number of firms). The mean values of returns excluding 
financial and investment property firms do not change significantly. 
 
I investigate the effect of delisting following De Bondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987) and 
Brailsford (1992), so that companies that are delisted or dropped out before the formation date 
are not included in the analysis. However, if a firm is delisted or dropped out during the test 
period, it is excluded from the analysis and set its last return to minus one in order to minimise 
the difference between Losers and Winners portfolios, De Bondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987) 
and Brailsford (1992). In the Egyptian stock exchange the number of delisted firms is 11 
during the period of study due to failing to comply with the Egyptian stock exchange 
regulations or upon the company’s request. Therefore the survivorship bias is highly unlikely 
to arise. 
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The portfolio formation process starts from December each year to avoid the so called look-
ahead bias. Therefore there is enough time for the financial statements and reports to be 
available to all participants and to be reflected in stock prices. It worth mentioning that all 
listed shares in the Egyptian stock exchange are required to publish their annual reports within 
90 days of the end of the financial year. 
 
As no other studies in the literature investigated the long-term overreaction phenomenon in the 
Egyptian stock market, there is no potential data-snooping or data mining bias (Sullivan et al. 
1999, 2001). Finally, and following Lehmann (1990) and Kang et al (2002), I skipped one 
trading day between portfolio formation and portfolio holding periods to overcome the bid-ask 
spread bias.   
 
4.5 Methodology and empirical results 
In this section I present the methodology and the main findings of the empirical models. The 
methodology adopted in this chapter is based on identifying non-overlapping 24-month 
periods during 1998-2009.  
4.5.1 Daily Returns  
The monthly return variable tR  is defined as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the 
closing price over one month. The monthly returns are adjusted for dividends, rights issue, 
stock dividends, and stock split.  
1 ttt pLogpLogR                                                                                      (4) 
        where tp  is the closing price of the stock in month (t). 
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4.5.2 Security abnormal returns (ARs) 
There are three widely used methods to calculate the residual returns in the existing financial 
literature, namely, market model, CAPM, and market-adjusted excess returns. The later is a 
special case of CAPM with zero  and 1 .  
Da Costa (1994) found that both CAPM and market-adjusted excess returns have similar 
results. Following De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Brailsford (1992), Da Costa (1994), 
Gaunt (2000) and Forner and Marhuenda (2003) I will adopt the market-adjusted excess 
returns method.   
 
mtitit RR                                                                                                               (5) 
where it : is the market-adjusted abnormal return for stock i in month t . 
 itR : is the monthly return on company i over the period t  
 mtR : is the return on an value weighted EGX30 index in month t  
 
4.5.3 Cumulative residual return over the rank period (CARs) 
All companies are ranked into ascending order based on the cumulative abnormal (CAR) 
returns over the rank period. Then top (best performing) and bottom (worst performing) 
deciles are identified and selected to form the Winner and the Loser portfolios (Brailsford, 
1992) and (Gaunt, 2000).  
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
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
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24t
iiCU                                                                                          (6) 
where iCU : is the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return for stock i over the period from 
24 months prior to the start of the test period.  
 
4.5.4 Cumulative abnormal residual returns over the test period (CARs) 
 I then compute the cumulative average residual returns for all securities in the Losers and 
Winners portfolios for the next 24 months (the test period), they are denoted 
tzLCAR ,,  
and
 
tzWCAR ,, respectively. 
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where
tnpCAR ,,  is cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal residual returns for month t  
of test period n for Winners and Losers portfolios p and N are the number of stocks in each 
portfolio. If a security’s return is missing in a particular month following portfolio formation 
then this stock will be dropped permanently from the portfolio and the CAR is calculated as a 
mean of remaining residual returns, De Bondt and Thaler (1985). This involves an implicit 
rebalancing process (Fama 1998).  
 
The above estimated 
tnpCAR ,,  based on equation (7) assumes implicit monthly rebalancing and 
is not actually consistent with the explicit rebalancing strategy RB (Brailsford (1992).  
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 Roll (1983) describes equation (7) as the arithmetic method in which returns are aggregated 
across all stocks and over time. This involves implicit monthly rebalancing using monthly 
equal weights. Although Roll (1983) argues that the empirical research using monthly returns 
is less affected by the choice of the returns calculation methodology, Dissanaike (1994) argues 
that the arithmetic approach yields unrealistic results as the monthly returns are aggregated not 
multiplied. 
 
To clarify the above debate, if the monthly prices for a particular stock were 50, 25 and 40 for 
a particular three months respectively, the arithmetic returns yields +10% if the relevant 
returns are aggregated while the rebalancing approach (compounding) yields -20% 
(Dissanaike 1994). The heterogeneity in these two results may be greater in case of higher 
volatility in the return time series (Dissanaike, 1994).   
     
For the above reasons, and following Roll (1983), Dissanaike (1994), Loughran and Ritter 
(1996), Fama (1998), I adopt in this chapter the more realistic approach in return calculations, 
namely, the rebalancing approach (RB) in which dividends are assumed to be reinvested in the 
portfolio using equal weights, as in equation 8: 
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.,                                                                (8) 
In this equation N is the total number of securities in the portfolio, T is the total number of 
months in the test period. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the rank period for 
each firm i is then  
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This methodology is repeated for each non-overlapping two-year period so that the rank 
periods are 1998-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, and 2006-2007 and the matching 
test periods are 2000-2001, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, and 2008-2009. 
Average CARs are calculated for both portfolios and each month between t =1 and t =24 for 
all 5 test periods. They are denoted 
tWACAR ,  and tLACAR ,  
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CAR
ACAR
N
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tnp
tp

 1
,,
,                                                                                  (10) 
 where
tpACAR ,  is the average CAR across the test periods (N=5) for each Winner and Loser 
portfolios p for each month between t =1 and t =24 for all the 5 test periods. It is worth 
mentioning that the choice of the formation and test periods is made arbitrarily in the existing 
literature. In addition, due to data limitation I use two-year non-overlapping tests and 
formation periods. Moreover, and to measure the sensitivity to the formation period length, I 
repeated the above methodology using four-year (48 months) non-overlapping formation and 
test periods. 
4.5.5 Long-term overreaction Hypotheses 
 The overreaction hypothesis suggests that 0, tWACAR and 0, tLACAR for ( 0t ), this 
implies that 0)( ,,  tWtL ACARACAR . The contrarian strategy is tested via the following null 
hypotheses: 
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0: ,1 tLACARH , 0: ,2 tWACARH , 0)(: ,,3  tWtL ACARACARH , where 24.......1t  
To test whether or not the average residual returns is significantly different from zero for 
Winners and Losers, I estimate the standard t- test on the means of 
tWACAR ,  and tLACAR ,  as 
follows:    
NS
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t
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,
,                                                                                                   (11) 
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where
pS  is the sample standard deviation for Losers and Winners portfolio p . pS  is mainly 
estimated to test H1 and H2 respectively. 
Then I pooled the estimate of the population variance in iCAR to assess whether or not there is 
a significant difference in investment performance at any time t  
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where 2
tS  is the population standard deviation, and the t-statistic for H3 as in equation 14: 
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Table 4.1 presents the results of the cumulative average abnormal returns for the five test 
periods over the period 2000-2009. The results presented in table 4.1 show that in two out of 
five test periods we can reject the null that the average residual returns are significantly 
different from zero. 
 
In addition, Losers outperform Winners as we notice positive and highly significant market-
adjusted abnormal returns for the arbitrage portfolios (Losers – Winners) in 2006-2007 and 
2009-2009 respectively. This suggests significant contrarian profit in the Egyptian stock 
market starting from 2006. This result is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis and 
indicates a clear violation of the Weak Form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. De Long et.al 
(1991) argues that the noise trading is the main source of the contrarian profits as irrational 
expectations destabilise the stock market.    
 
A closer look at the analysis and the results presented in table 4.1 reveals highly significant 
market-adjusted abnormal returns in the test periods 2006-2007 and 2008-2009. This may be 
due to the change in regulations from strict symmetric (+ / - 5%) price limit to the circuit 
breaker regime. The regulator switched the price limit regime from strict price limits (+/-5) to 
wider limits (+/-20%) associated with trading halts for 30 minutes to cool down the market 
(Circuit Breakers) in the period 2006 to 2009. 
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Table 4.1: Cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal returns for the five two–year 
test periods 2000-2009 
 
Rank  Period Test  Period 
Mean CAR 
Loser Winner Loser - Winner t- value 
1998-99 2000-01 0.2121 0.1439 0.0682 1.5042 
2000-01 2002-03 -0.1561 0.0780 -0.2341 -1.7221
*
 
2002-03 2004-05 -0.1211 0.1029 -0.2241 -1.7913
*
 
2004-05 2006-07 0.1637 -0.2459 0.4097 4.2470
***
 
2006-07 2008-09 0.2312 -0.1906 0.4218 4.9838
***
 
The overreaction hypothesis suggests that 0, tWACAR and 0, tLACAR for ( 0t ). This implies 
that 0)( ,,  tWtL ACARACAR . The contrarian strategy is tested via the following null hypotheses:
0: ,1 tLACARH , 0: ,2 tWACARH , 0)(: ,,3  tWtL ACARACARH , where 24.......1t . To test 
whether or not the average residual returns are significantly different from zero for both Winners 
and Losers, I use a standard t- test on the means of 
tWACAR ,  and tLACAR , .  
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251  companies. 
 
The results presented in table 4.1 suggest that the abnormal return subsequent to 2006 might 
be due to the effect of regulatory policies or price limits regime change
20
. However, it is clear 
from table 4.1 that the overreaction phenomenon is prevailed in the post price-limit period of 
the Egyptian stock market.   
 
Table 4.2 presents the average monthly cumulative average abnormal return ACAR over 24 
months into the test period. The results presented in table 4.2 show that both Losers and 
Winners have significantly reversed after the formation period. We notice that Losers have 
reversed starting from the third month of the test period.  
 
                                                          
20
  I investigate this claim in more detail in chapter 5 
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Table 4.2 reports positive and highly significant cumulative average abnormal returns for the 
losers over the remaining 22 months of the test period. The longer the test period is, the 
greater the average cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal return, and by the 24
th
 
month Losers have achieved a 20% market-adjusted abnormal return. 
 
The Winner portfolios, on the other hand, have also significantly reversed immediately after 
the formation period. Nonetheless, table 4.2 shows that by forming the arbitrage portfolio 
(selling Winners and buying Losers) we can achieve significant and positive abnormal return 
during 3-6 months and 12-24 months after the formation period.  
 
The above results are consistent with the literature on the overreaction phenomenon e.g. De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), Brailsford (1992), Da Costa (1994), Gaunt (2000) and Forner and 
Marhuenda (2003). 
 
I thus argue that investors can achieve significant and positive abnormal return by adopting a 
contrarian strategy (zero-investment portfolio) in the Egyptian stock market taken over a two-
year investment horizon.    
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 Table 4.2: Average monthly cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) over the 
24 months of the test period 
Month into 
Test period 
Loser Winner Loser-Winner 
ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat 
1 -0.0743 -1.9984
**
 -0.0790 -2.4351
**
 0.0047 0.0379 
2 -0.0262 -0.7046 -0.0577 -1.5789 0.0315 0.2523 
3 0.0050 0.1349 -0.0830 -2.5570
**
 0.0880 0.7038 
4 0.0899 2.4178
**
 -0.0838 -2.5818
***
 0.1737 1.9189
**
 
5 0.1430 3.8458
***
 -0.0705 -2.1722
**
 0.2135 2.7071
***
 
6 0.1591 4.2789
***
 -0.0572 -1.5610 0.2162 2.7291
***
 
7 0.0906 2.4364
**
 -0.1009 -3.1085
***
 0.1915 1.9311
*
 
8 0.0676 1.8173
*
 -0.0489 -1.1765 0.1164 1.3310 
9 0.0705 1.8969
*
 -0.0459 -1.1551 0.1664 1.3309 
10 0.0545 1.4649 -0.1117 -3.4412
***
 0.1662 1.3286 
11 0.0697 1.5807 -0.0889 -2.7400
***
 0.1586 1.5081 
12 0.0809 2.1747
**
 -0.1339 -4.1254
***
 0.2148 2.7173
***
 
13 0.1207 3.2467
***
 -0.0553 -1.5158 0.1760 2.2266
**
 
14 0.1622 4.3637
***
 -0.1859 -5.7287
***
 0.3482 3.7842
***
 
15 0.1929 5.1898
***
 -0.1868 -5.7548
***
 0.3797 3.0365
***
 
16 0.1471 3.9564
***
 -0.2213 -6.8191
***
 0.3684 3.4461
***
 
17 0.0717 1.9298
**
 -0.2402 -7.4013
***
 0.3120 3.1947
***
 
18 0.0379 1.0201 -0.2460 -7.5802
***
 0.2840 2.2707
**
 
19 0.0546 1.2745 -0.2160 -6.6537
***
 0.2705 2.4031
**
 
20 0.1860 5.0033
***
 -0.2036 -6.2738
***
 0.3896 3.1158
***
 
21 0.2188 5.8853
***
 -0.1941 -5.9789
***
 0.4129 3.7014
***
 
22 0.1578 4.2440
***
 -0.2162 -6.6596
***
 0.3739 3.0302
***
 
23 0.1798 4.8358
***
 -0.2035 -5.9684
***
 0.3832 3.0646
***
 
24 0.2065 5.5547
***
 -0.2014 -6.2049
***
 0.4079 4.2618
***
 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251  companies.  
 
 
       Figure 4.1 presents the graphics of these findings. The average cumulative average 
market-adjusted abnormal returns, or ACARs, for the Losers, Winners and the arbitrage 
(Loser–Winner) portfolio are charted. It is clear from figure 4.1 that the Losers’ portfolio 
outperforms the Winners’ and that cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal returns can 
be achieved by constructing the zero-investment or arbitrage portfolio of De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985).   
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Figure  4-1 Average cumulative average abnormal return over 24 months 
 
          
4.5.6 Long-term overreaction: the sensitivity to formation period length. 
To measure the sensitivity of our results to the formation (rank) period length, I repeated the 
same methodology using different formation and test periods, namely, four-year (48 months) 
non-overlapping formation and test periods. I calculated the monthly average cumulative 
average abnormal returns (ACARs) for two individual test periods, namely, 2002-2005 and 
2006-2009.  
Table 4.3 presents the average cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal returns for the 
two four-year test periods in 2002-2009. The results show positive and highly significant 
abnormal returns for the arbitrage portfolio (Losers–Winners) in the post-Limit period (2006-
2009). These results are consistent with results of the ACAR over 24 months of the test period 
presented in table 4.1. It suggests also that the overreaction phenomenon is only significant 
during the period 2006-2009. Therefore, I conclude that there is no effect of the change in the 
formation period length on the results.  
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
A
C
A
R
s 
Month into test period 
ACARitL 
ACARitW 
ACARL-ACARW 
158 
 
Table 4.3: Average cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal returns for two four–year test 
periods 2002-2009 
Rank  Period Test  Period 
Mean CAR 
Loser Winner Loser – Winner t- value 
1998-01 2002-05 - 0.7579 - 0.8967 0.3387 1.1603 
2002-05 2006-09 0.4346  - 0.2403  0.6750 2.8990
***
 
The overreaction hypothesis suggests that 0, tWACAR and 0, tLACAR for ( 0t ), this implies that
0)( ,,  tWtL ACARACAR . The contrarian strategy is tested via the following null hypotheses:
0: ,1 tLACARH , 0: ,2 tWACARH , 0)(: ,,3  tWtL ACARACARH , where 48.......1t . To test 
whether or not the average residual returns are significantly different from zero for both Winners and 
Losers, I use the standard t- teat on the means of 
tWACAR ,  and tLACAR , .  
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251  companies. 
 
Figure 4.2 presents the average cumulative average abnormal returns for the Losers, Winners 
and the arbitrage (Loser–Winner) portfolio over the 48 months of the test period 2002-2005.  
The results are shown graphically in Figure 4.2 where I have defined ACARL, ACARW as the 
ACARs for Losers and Winners respectively, and ACARL-W as the ACAR for the arbitrage 
portfolio.  
 
It is clear from figure that initially both Losers and Winners continue to be Losers and 
Winners continue to be Winners (the momentum effect); however, Winners, and more 
dramatically, Losers, reverse near the end of the test period
21
. In addition, the arbitrage 
portfolio achieves positive abnormal returns after 37 months following the formation period 
though never reaching above 20%.  
 
                                                          
21
 It might be argued that this final reversal may reflect other factors uncontrolled for in our model. This criticism 
is potentially correct, and is dealt with in Chapter 3 of the thesis where we allow for unobservable firm- and time-
specific fixed effects (in addition to observable variables). We find that these factors do indeed possess 
explanatory power for the overreaction phenomenon. However, they do not in any way dispose of it.  
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Figure  4.2 Average cumulative average abnormal returnACARs  
for the 48 month period 2002-2005. 
  
 
 
Table 4.4 presents the average cumulative average abnormal returns ACAR for the Losers, 
Winners and the arbitrage (Loser–Winner) portfolio over 48 months into the test period 2002-
2005. It is clear from table 4.4 that Losers reversed immediately after the formation period for 
six months following the formation period. However, losers reversed again and continue to be 
losers (momentum behaviour) until the end of the test period (7-48 months). 
 
Winners, on the other hand, reversed starting from the second month following the formation 
period up till the end of the test period (except for the period 13-16 months following the 
formation period). In addition, the arbitrage portfolio achieves positive (but not significant) 
market-adjusted abnormal returns after 37 months following the formation period. I argue that 
the overreaction behavior is not detected in the Egyptian stock market during the test period 
2002-2006.  
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Table 4.4: Average monthly cumulative average abnormal return over the 48 months of 
the test period 2002-2005 
Month into  
Test period 
Loser Winner Loser-Winner 
ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat 
1 0.0303 0.2016 0.0069 0.0393 0.0234 0.0441 
2 0.0060 0.0402 -0.0203 -0.1160 0.0143 0.0268 
3 0.0017 0.0112 -0.0233 -0.1332 0.0250 0.0470 
4 0.0166 0.1102 -0.0153 -0.0871 0.0318 0.0598 
5 0.0186 0.1238 -0.0104 -0.0594 0.0290 0.0546 
6 0.0277 0.1844 -0.0092 -0.0525 0.0369 0.0694 
7 -0.0579 -0.3852 -0.0078 -0.0446 -0.0501 -0.0942 
8 -0.0708 -0.4704 -0.0023 -0.0132 -0.0685 -0.1287 
9 -0.0960 -0.6382 -0.0096 -0.0546 -0.0864 -0.1625 
10 -0.1017 -0.6762 -0.0225 -0.1283 -0.0792 -0.1490 
11 -0.1124 -0.7470 -0.0292 -0.1667 -0.0832 -0.1563 
12 -0.1400 -0.9307 -0.0286 -0.1634 -0.1113 -0.2093 
13 -0.1223 -0.8132 0.0371 0.2118 -0.1594 -0.2997 
14 -0.1397 -0.9289 0.0485 0.2769 -0.1882 -0.3539 
15 -0.1026 -0.6819 0.0586 0.3344 -0.1612 -0.3029 
16 -0.1386 -0.9216 0.0396 0.2261 -0.1782 -0.3350 
17 -0.1305 -0.8678 -0.0300 -0.1715 -0.1005 -0.1889 
18 -0.1313 -0.8730 -0.0508 -0.2902 -0.0805 -0.1513 
19 -0.0793 -0.5273 -0.0154 -0.0879 -0.0639 -0.1201 
20 -0.1243 -0.8266 -0.0537 -0.3063 -0.0707 -0.1329 
21 -0.1926 -1.2805 -0.1149 -0.6560 -0.0777 -0.1460 
22 -0.2614 -1.7376
*
 -0.1694 -0.9666 -0.0920 -0.1729 
23 -0.2753 -1.8304
*
 -0.1769 -1.0096 -0.0984 -0.1850 
24 -0.3132 -2.0824
*
 -0.2140 -1.2215 -0.0992 -0.1865 
25 -0.3838 -2.5513
**
 -0.2757 -1.5737 -0.1080 -0.2030 
26 -0.3686 -2.4509
**
 -0.2669 -1.5234 -0.1017 -0.1912 
27 -0.3350 -2.2271
**
 -0.2579 -1.4721 -0.0770 -0.1448 
28 -0.3083 -2.0496
**
 -0.2797 -1.5963 -0.0286 -0.0537 
29 -0.2755 -1.8320
*
 -0.2620 -1.4954 -0.0135 -0.0254 
30 -0.2870 -1.9078
**
 -0.2734 -1.5603 -0.0136 -0.0255 
31 -0.3121 -2.0747
**
 -0.2867 -1.6365
*
 -0.0253 -0.0476 
32 -0.3747 -2.4910
**
 -0.3143 -1.7939
*
 -0.0603 -0.1134 
33 -0.4578 -3.0433
***
 -0.3730 -2.1287
**
 -0.0848 -0.1593 
34 -0.5209 -3.4632
***
 -0.4128 -2.3557
**
 -0.1081 -0.2033 
35 -0.4970 -3.3045
***
 -0.4047 -2.3098
**
 -0.0923 -0.1735 
36 -0.5146 -3.4210
***
 -0.4373 -2.4956
**
 -0.0773 -0.1453 
37 -0.5672 -3.7712
***
 -0.5598 -3.1949
***
 -0.0074 -0.0140 
38 -0.4979 -3.3105
***
 -0.5757 -3.2857
***
 0.0778 0.1462 
39 -0.5269 -3.5029
***
 -0.5672 -3.2370
***
 0.0403 0.0758 
40 -0.5669 -3.7687
***
 -0.6040 -3.4470
***
 0.0371 0.0698 
41 -0.6296 -4.1860
***
 -0.6246 -3.5647
***
 -0.0050 -0.0095 
42 -0.6618 -4.4002
***
 -0.6524 -3.7233
***
 -0.0094 -0.0178 
43 -0.6362 -4.2300
***
 -0.6476 -3.6957
***
 0.0113 0.0213 
44 -0.6111 -4.0627
***
 -0.6277 -3.5821
***
 0.0166 0.0312 
45 -0.5475 -3.6400
***
 -0.6148 -3.5086
***
 0.0673 0.1265 
46 -0.5405 -3.5932
***
 -0.6078 -3.4688
***
 0.0673 0.1266 
47 -0.4659 -3.0974
***
 -0.6138 -3.5032
***
 0.1479 0.2781 
48 -0.3790 -2.5196
**
 -0.5984 -3.4149
***
 0.2194 0.4124 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251  companies. 
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Figure 4.3 presents the average cumulative average abnormal returns ACAR for the Losers, 
Winners and the arbitrage portfolio over 48 months into the test period 2006-2009. It is clear 
from figure 4.3 that Losers outperform Winners’ portfolio and cumulative average market-
adjusted abnormal returns can be achieved by constructing the arbitrage portfolio.   
 
Figure  4.3 Average cumulative average abnormal return for 48 months over 2006-2009. 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 presents the monthly cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal return ACAR 
over 48 months into the test period 2006-2009. It is clear from table 4.5 that Winners have 
significantly reversed immediately after the formation period. However, Losers have reversed 
starting from the ninth month as we notice positive market–adjusted abnormal returns during 
the remaining 40 months of the test period (9-48). This suggests that the overreaction 
phenomenon has been detected in the Egyptian stock market over the test period 2006-2009. 
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The arbitrage portfolio earns positive abnormal returns starting from the fifth month after the 
formation period, however, highly significant and positive market-adjusted abnormal returns 
can be detected starting from month 36 (3 years) as the average cumulative abnormal return on 
the arbitrage portfolio is 74%. It is worth mentioning also that by time the arbitrage portfolio 
achieves greater market-adjusted abnormal returns. The maximum abnormal returns of 90% 
can be achieved 39 months into the test period. This suggests that the long-term investors have 
the opportunity to achieve significant and positive abnormal returns by adopting the contrarian 
strategy of selling Winners and buying Losers.  
 
To summarise, the above analysis and findings suggest that the overreaction phenomenon in 
the Egyptian stock market is not sensitive to the length of the formation period. In addition 
and within the two and four non-overlapping formation periods, overreaction phenomenon has 
not been detected for the period governed by the strict price limit regime. Results show that 
there is no significant market-adjusted abnormal return from the contrarian strategy.  Losers 
continue to be Losers and Winners are reversed and thus there are no positive and significant 
abnormal returns for the arbitrage portfolio during the strict price limit period.  
 
On the other hand, the overreaction phenomenon is clear during the circuit breaker regime 
(2006-2009) for both the short (two years) and longer (four years) formation periods. Results 
show positive and highly significant market-adjusted abnormal returns for the arbitrage 
portfolio. The main interpretation to this is the delayed price discovery hypothesis (Kim and 
Rhee, 1997).  
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Table 4.5: Average monthly cumulative average abnormal return over 48 months into 
the test period 2006-2009 
Month into  
Test period 
Loser Winner Loser-Winner 
ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat 
1 -0.1272 -0.7841 -0.0418 -0.5862 -0.0854 -0.2182 
2 -0.1430 -0.8810 -0.0331 -0.4639 -0.1099 -0.2807 
3 -0.1548 -0.9537 -0.1012 -1.4173 -0.0536 -0.1370 
4 -0.0959 -0.5912 -0.0649 -0.9100 -0.0310 -0.0792 
5 -0.0381 -0.2349 -0.0771 -1.0805 0.0390 0.0997 
6 0.1000 0.6163 -0.0458 -0.6423 0.1459 0.3727 
7 -0.0665 -0.4097 -0.1028 -1.4405 0.0363 0.0928 
8 -0.0440 -0.2710 -0.0480 -0.6731 0.0041 0.0104 
9 0.0243 0.1500 -0.0126 -0.1768 0.0370 0.0944 
10 0.1292 0.7963 -0.0063 -0.0888 0.1356 0.3464 
11 0.1766 1.0885 0.0086 0.1211 0.1680 0.4292 
12 0.2593 1.5981 -0.0497 -0.6968 0.3091 0.7897 
13 0.2686 1.6552 -0.0711 -0.9965 0.3397 0.8680 
14 0.1962 1.2088 -0.0709 -0.9941 0.2671 0.6825 
15 0.2945 1.8150
*
 -0.0614 -0.8604 0.3559 0.9094 
16 0.3826 2.3579
**
 -0.0793 -1.1117 0.4620 1.1803 
17 0.4089 2.5200
**
 -0.0432 -0.6059 0.4522 1.1553 
18 0.3037 1.8717
*
 -0.0686 -0.9612 0.3723 0.9513 
19 0.2948 1.8164
*
 -0.1002 -1.4038 0.3949 1.0091 
20 0.5601 3.4517
***
 -0.0762 -1.0680 0.6363 1.6258 
21 0.4180 2.5757
***
 -0.1467 -2.0556
**
 0.5647 1.4427 
22 0.3870 2.3846
**
 -0.1661 -2.3277
**
 0.5531 1.4132 
23 0.2690 1.6579
*
 -0.2094 -2.9342
***
 0.4784 1.2224 
24 0.1637 1.0091 -0.2860 -4.0067
***
 0.4497 1.1490 
25 0.2263 1.3947 -0.2754 -3.8581
***
 0.5017 1.2818 
26 0.2630 1.6206
*
 -0.2689 -3.7681
***
 0.5319 1.3590 
27 0.3109 1.9158
**
 -0.1959 -2.7454
***
 0.5068 1.2949 
28 0.3090 1.9039
**
 -0.2586 -3.6227
***
 0.5675 1.4500 
29 0.4158 2.5625
**
 -0.2202 -3.0846
***
 0.6360 1.6249
*
 
30 0.4080 2.5145
***
 -0.2460 -3.4465
***
 0.6540 1.6710
*
 
31 0.2823 1.7399
*
 -0.3419 -4.7904
***
 0.6242 1.5949 
32 0.2825 1.7411
*
 -0.3173 -4.4460
***
 0.5998 1.5326 
33 0.3020 1.8609
*
 -0.2851 -3.9942
***
 0.5870 1.4999 
34 0.3097 1.9086
*
 -0.2457 -3.4424
***
 0.5554 1.4190 
35 0.4481 2.7617
***
 -0.2421 -3.3919
***
 0.6902 1.7635
*
 
36 0.4160 2.5635
***
 -0.3291 -4.6116
***
 0.7451 1.9938
**
 
37 0.6029 3.7150
***
 -0.2604 -3.6486
***
 0.8633 2.2056
**
 
38 0.6070 3.7407
***
 -0.2390 -3.3492
***
 0.8460 2.1616
**
 
39 0.6899 4.2515
***
 -0.2163 -3.0302
***
 0.9062 2.3153
**
 
40 0.6246 3.8491
***
 -0.2385 -3.3416
***
 0.8631 2.2052
**
 
41 0.5057 3.1163
***
 -0.2608 -3.6549
***
 0.7665 1.9585
**
 
42 0.5495 3.3865
***
 -0.2448 -3.4298
***
 0.7943 2.0295
**
 
43 0.6377 3.9299
***
 -0.1812 -2.5395
**
 0.8190 2.0925
**
 
44 0.5727 3.5291
***
 -0.2106 -2.9512
***
 0.7833 2.0013
**
 
45 0.7013 4.3215
***
 -0.1435 -2.0111
**
 0.8448 2.1585
**
 
46 0.4833 2.9785
***
 -0.2716 -3.8055
***
 0.7549 1.9889
**
 
47 0.5286 3.2575
***
 -0.2232 -3.1279
***
 0.7518 1.9710
**
 
48 0.4346 2.6784
***
 -0.2404 -3.3682
***
 0.6750 1.9947
**
 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251  companies. 
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Fama (1989), Lehmann (1989), and Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994) argued that price limits 
interfere with the price discovery mechanism as trading usually ceased (when prices hit the 
limit) until the limits were revised. Therefore, at the limit hit day these constraints (limits) 
prevent stock prices from reaching their equilibrium levels until the following trading day 
(session) (Kim and Rhee, 1997). On the other hand, within the circuit breaker regime (wider 
price limits) investors have more time (during the trading halts) to adjust their portfolios. This 
may lead to overreactive behavior by some speculative traders due to the lack of informational 
efficiency and the noise trading in emerging markets. 
 
The existing body of the literature argues that the reported overreaction phenomenon by De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) is mainly due to computation errors in beta between the estimation 
and the event window (Chan, 1988), or due to small firm effect (size effect) and seasonality 
effects (January effect) (Zarowin, 1990). In this section of the chapter, I investigate firstly the 
role of the size effect and whether or not the overreaction phenomenon is mainly due to small 
firm effects. I also investigate the stability of beta within the formation and test periods. 
Finally, I present the results of the effects of the seasonality effect on the overreaction 
phenomenon.  
 
4.5.7 Long-term overreaction: the sensitivity to size effect. 
The above methodology is repeated using Small and Big size portfolios based on the 
companies’ market capitalisation to investigate whether or not the overreaction phenomenon 
can be explained by the size effect. In December of each year all listed shares (excluding 
financial sector and property investment companies) are ranked - based on market 
165 
 
capitalisation (firm size) - in an ascending order. This is done over the period 1998-2009 and 
for each of the formation and test periods. The median value of firm size is then used to split 
the stocks into two main categories, namely, Small and Big (S and B)
 22
. 
 
To investigate the size effect on the long-term overreaction, I estimate the average monthly 
cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal return over 24 months into the test period for 
small and big firms based on market capitalisation. 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the monthly cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal 
return over 24 months for small firms.  
 
The results presented in table 4.6 shows that price reversal for the Losers occurs starting from 
the fourth month until the sixth month and then reverse again and continue to be Losers 
(momentum effect) until month 12. However, starting from month 15 until the end of the test 
period, Losers earn positive and significant market-adjusted abnormal returns.  
 
The price reversals of the small Winners, on the other hand, occur immediately after the 
formation period as we notice highly significant and negative abnormal returns on the first 
month of the test period and then starting from the eighth month.  
 
                                                          
22
 Following the literature on price limits, I use market capitalisation as a proxy for firm size as all the firms 
included in the sample are listed in the EGX. None of the literature used other measures i.e. total assets due to the 
drawback of accounting measures. 
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The results of the arbitrage portfolio report highly significant and positive abnormal returns 
starting from month 13; this suggests that the overreaction behavior is prevailing in small 
firms’ portfolios. 
 
Table 4.6: Average monthly cumulative average abnormal return over 24 months into the test 
period for small firms 
 
Month into  
Test period 
Loser Winner Loser-Winner 
ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat 
1 -0.1096 -3.5021
***
 -0.0897 -2.1113
***
 -0.0199 -0.1977 
2 -0.0931 -2.9727
***
 -0.0392 -0.9231 -0.0538 -0.5351 
3 -0.0535 -1.7080
*
 -0.0460 -1.0821 -0.0075 -0.0743 
4 0.0215 0.6872 -0.0294 -0.6912 0.0509 0.5059 
5 0.0186 0.5943 -0.0015 -0.0355 0.0201 0.2000 
6 0.0322 1.0296 0.0134 0.3151 0.0188 0.1873 
7 -0.0360 -1.1494 -0.0758 -1.7834
*
 0.0398 0.3959 
8 -0.0584 -1.8655
**
 -0.0892 -2.0991
***
 0.0308 0.3064 
9 -0.0714 -2.2821
***
 -0.0915 -2.1524
***
 0.0200 0.1993 
10 -0.0823 -2.6279
***
 -0.1419 -3.3392
***
 0.0597 0.5932 
11 -0.0063 -0.2026 -0.1110 -2.6105
***
 0.1173 1.1661 
12 -0.0138 -0.4396 -0.1588 -3.7367
***
 0.1451 1.4421 
13 0.0039 0.1252 -0.2147 -5.0515
***
 0.2186 2.1734
***
 
14 0.0480 1.5331 -0.2245 -5.2822
***
 0.2725 2.7091
***
 
15 0.0953 3.0455
***
 -0.1994 -4.6926
***
 0.2948 2.9306
***
 
16 0.0668 2.1352
***
 -0.2442 -5.7451
***
 0.3110 3.0920
***
 
17 0.0247 0.7881 -0.2785 -6.5532
***
 0.2539 2.5237
***
 
18 0.0342 1.0917 -0.2805 -6.6009
***
 0.3147 2.4494
***
 
19 0.0133 0.4241 -0.2388 -5.6187
***
 0.2521 2.5061
***
 
20 0.0625 1.9970
***
 -0.2358 -5.5488
***
 0.2983 2.9660
***
 
21 0.0951 3.0369
***
 -0.2091 -4.9193
***
 0.3041 3.0237
***
 
22 0.0721 2.3049
***
 -0.2524 -5.9376
***
 0.3245 3.2262
***
 
23 0.1078 3.4428
***
 -0.2343 -5.5134
***
 0.3421 3.4011
***
 
24 0.1582 5.0524
***
 -0.2652 -6.2406
***
 0.4234 4.2092
***
 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies. 
 
Figure 4.4 presents the average cumulative average abnormal returns ACARs for the Losers, 
Winners and the arbitrage (Loser–Winner) portfolio over 24 months into the test period 2006-
2009 for small firms. 
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Figure  4.4 Average cumulative average abnormal return over 24 months into the test 
period 2000-2009 for small firms 
 
 
It is clear from figure 4.4 that small Losers outperform small Winners’ portfolio and 
cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal returns can be achieved by constructing the 
arbitrage portfolio. Table 4.7 presents the results of the average monthly cumulative average 
abnormal return over 24 months for big firms.  
 
The results presented in table 4.7 show that price reversal for the big Losers occurs 
immediately after the second month following the formation period. In addition, highly 
significant and negative abnormal returns for the Losers are found in months five and six and 
from month 10-16 and finally from month 20-24.  
 
The price reversal for the big Winners occurs immediately after the formation period as we 
notice highly significant and negative abnormal returns over the 24 months following the 
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formation period. In addition, the arbitrage portfolio earns highly significant and positive 
abnormal returns over the period 11-24 month. It is clear from the table that big Losers 
outperform big Winners and investors can achieve abnormal returns by forming the arbitrage 
portfolio (Losers–Winners).   
 
Table 4.7: Average monthly cumulative average abnormal return over 24 months into the test 
period for big firms 
Month into  
Test period 
Loser Winner Loser-Winner 
ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat ACAR t-stat 
1 -0.0115 -0.5541 -0.0591 -2.0687
**
 0.0476 0.3810 
2 0.0148 0.7134 -0.0881 -3.0863
***
 0.1029 0.8238 
3 0.0282 1.3630 -0.1185 -4.1505
***
 0.1467 1.1747 
4 0.0358 1.7283
*
 -0.1414 -4.9529
***
 0.1772 1.4187 
5 0.0403 1.9463
**
 -0.1641 -5.7466
***
 0.2044 1.6363 
6 0.0535 2.5829
***
 -0.1749 -2.1248** 0.2283 1.8282* 
7 0.0040 0.1940 -0.2065 -2.2337
***
 0.2105 1.6857
*
 
8 -0.0131 -0.6345 -0.2175 -2.6183
***
 0.2044 1.6363 
9 0.0105 0.5049 -0.2593 -3.0822
***
 0.2698 2.1598
**
 
10 -0.0122 -0.5898 -0.2209 -2.7385
***
 0.2087 1.6712
*
 
11 0.1004 4.8503
***
 -0.1846 -2.4645** 0.2850 2.2818** 
12 0.0624 3.0131
***
 -0.2003 -2.0148** 0.2627 2.1030** 
13 0.0569 2.7503
***
 -0.2571 -3.0037*** 0.3140 2.5141** 
14 0.1035 4.9986
***
 -0.2390 -3.3696*** 0.3425 2.7419*** 
15 0.1092 5.2747
***
 -0.2556 -3.9531*** 0.3648 2.9210*** 
16 0.0506 2.4438
**
 -0.2736 -4.5832*** 0.3242 2.5958*** 
17 0.0192 0.9277 -0.2893 -5.1321
***
 0.3085 2.4699
**
 
18 0.0117 0.5660 -0.2920 -5.2267
***
 0.3037 2.4316
**
 
19 0.0159 0.7681 -0.2780 -4.7363
***
 0.2939 2.3530
**
 
20 0.0660 3.1881
***
 -0.2579 -4.0345*** 0.3240 2.5937*** 
21 0.1077 5.2021
***
 -0.2533 -3.8714*** 0.3610 2.8903*** 
22 0.0755 3.6455
***
 -0.2668 -4.3457*** 0.3423 2.7407*** 
23 0.1247 6.0241
***
 -0.2564 -3.9822*** 0.3812 3.0519*** 
24 0.1472 7.1108
***
 -0.2410 -3.4397*** 0.3882 3.1080*** 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies. 
 
Figure 4.5 presents the average cumulative average abnormal returns ACARs for the Losers, 
Winners and the arbitrage (Loser–Winner) portfolio over 24 months into the test period 2006-
2009 for big firms. It is clear from figure 4.5 that big Losers outperform big Winners’ 
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portfolio and cumulative average market-adjusted abnormal returns can be achieved by 
constructing the arbitrage portfolio.   
 
Figure  4.5 Average cumulative average abnormal return over 24 months into the test 
period 2000-2009 for big firms. 
 
 
 
To conclude, the findings presented in the above tables and figures show evidence of a 
genuine investors’ overreactive behavior in the Egyptian stock market and it is not due to 
small firm effect. Losers are found to outperform Winners for big and small firms and 
abnormal returns can be achieved by forming the arbitrage portfolios. Therefore contrarian 
strategy by buying Losers and selling Winners is likely to be a profitable strategy by the 
investors in the Egyptian stock market. 
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4.5.8 Long-term performance with risk adjustment (robustness to time-varying market 
risk)  
In order to investigate the overreaction/momentum hypothesis, Claire and Thomas (1995) run 
the following regression: 
ntRRR iiiPWPLPLMW .........1       Overreaction hypothesis                 (15) 
 
where PLMWR is the difference between the returns on the Loser and Winner portfolios i  
is 
the constant term and it is the white noise error term. The simple t- statistic of i  
suggests 
whether or not there is a significant positive or negative difference in means for the Losers and 
Winners. Significant and positive i  
supports the overreaction hypothesis; however 
significant and negative i  supports the momentum hypothesis.   
In addition, Zarowin (1990) controls for time-varying risk. Therefore to take this into account 
I run two additional regressions (after controlling for autocorrelation) as follows: 
 
),()( LWPrrrr itftmtiiftPt                                             (16) 
ntrrR itftmtiiPLMW .........1)(                                                 (17) 
where i is the Jensen performance index,  are the CAPM betas as a difference between the 
respective market risk of the two portfolios (Winner and Losers) and
ftr  
is the risk free rate 
(one month Treasury Bill at the beginning of each month (Zarowin,(1990)) . 
Significant and positive 
i  implies the overreaction hypothesis while significant and negative 
i  suggests the momentum hypothesis.  
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Significant and positive  suggests that Losers may embody higher systematic risk than 
Winners. In addition, Winners may imply higher degree of systematic risk in case of 
significant and negative  is found.  
 
To investigate the overreaction hypothesis, and following Zarowin (1990), Claire and Thomas 
(1995) and Kang et.al (2002), table 4.8 shows the long-term performance with risk adjustment 
(robustness to time-varying market risks) as in equations 16 and 17 (estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares). The results presented in table 4.8 show that the coefficients of systematic risk 
 are positive in all periods and highly significant in the aggregate period of the arbitrage 
portfolio. In addition, the coefficients of beta for the Losers are greater than those of Winners; 
this suggests that Losers tend to be riskier than Winners and the difference in returns can be 
explained by the differences in the systematic risk.  
 
The positive and significant 
i  of the arbitrage portfolio supports the overreaction hypothesis 
in the test periods during the circuit breakers regime (2006-2007 and 2008-2009). However, 
the negative 
i supports the momentum hypothesis during the strict price limit regime (2001-
2002 and 2002-2003). 
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Table 4.8: Long- term performance with risk adjustment (Robustness to time – varying risk) 
Test  Loser  Winner  Loser - Winner 
Period  α β F-test ADJ R2  α β F-test ADJ R2  α β F-test ADJ R2 
2000-01 
 0.0049 
(0.0092) 
0.3626*** 
(0.1131) 
10.277*** 0.0190 
 -0.0210*** 
(0.0079) 
0.3461*** 
(0.0979) 
12.509*** 0.0235 
 -0.0259 
(0.0218) 
0.0165 
(0.1459) 
0.0128 0.0021 
2002–03 
 0.0115 
(0.0106) 
0.3807** 
(0.1584) 
5.781** 0.0099 
 -0.0012 
(0.0072) 
0.2799*** 
(0.1069) 
6.8557*** 0.0121 
 -0.0128 
(0.0125) 
0.1009 
(0.1866) 
0.2922 0.0015 
2004–05 
 0.0190* 
(0.0109) 
0.6062*** 
(0.0967) 
39.278*** 0.0740 
 -0.0135* 
(0.0072) 
0.4141*** 
(0.0643) 
41.423*** 0.0778 
 0.0325 
(0.0224) 
0.1921* 
(0.1106) 
3.0171* 0.0042 
2006-07 
 0.0210** 
(0.0088) 
0.4826*** 
(0.0916) 
17.460*** 0.0332 
 -0.0086 
(0.0058) 
0.2572*** 
(0.0604) 
21.64*** 0.2952 
 0.0296*** 
(0.0102) 
0.2254*** 
(0.0964) 
19.911*** 0.0380 
2008-09 
 0.0079 
(0.0087) 
0.8156*** 
(0.0626) 
19.68*** 0.2604 
 -0.0036 
(0.0064) 
0.5169*** 
(0.0462) 
23.79*** 0.4506 
 0.0115*** 
(0.0006) 
0.2987*** 
(0.0764) 
1.7550 0.0016 
Aggregate 
 0.0055 
(0.0039) 
0.6197*** 
(0.0379) 
26.70*** 0.0997 
 -0.0068** 
(0.0028) 
0.5004*** 
(0.0274) 
25.16*** 0.2143 
 0.0123*** 
(0.0048) 
0.1193*** 
(0.0471) 
28.24*** 0.0830 
To control for risk I run these additional regression models (after controlling for auto correlation) following Zarowin (1990), Claire and Thomas (1995) and Kang 
et.al (2002), 
).()( LWPrrrr itftmtiiftPt    
ntrrR itftmtiiPLMW .........1)(     
where PLMWR is the difference between the returns on the Loser and Winner portfolios i  (the constant term) is the Jensen performance index,  are the 
CAPM betas as a difference between the respective market risk of the two portfolios (Winner and Losers), 
ftr is the risk free rate (one month Treasury Bill at the 
beginning of each month and it is the white noise error term. Significant positive i  confirms the overreaction hypothesis while significant negative i  
confirms the momentum hypothesis. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies. 
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4.5.9 The variation of risk performance between rank and test periods 
Brailsford (1992) argues that risk adjusted returns are biased due to the bias in the market-
adjusted model parameters estimated in the rank period. Following Chan (1988), and Gaunt, 
(2000), abnormal returns can be tested by examining the value of  in the following Sharp –
Linter CAPM equation: 
itftmtiiftit rrrr   )(                                                              (18) 
Where the value weighed EGX30 market index is the market portfolio mtr . I initially estimate 
equation 18 over the test period in which beta is assumed to be constant. The null hypothesis is 
0i this suggests that asset (i) has no abnormal return. This implies that size effect is 
ignored in the above equation. However, at the beginning of the test period Loser stocks are 
usually smaller in size than Winners – if the size effect if significant – this suggests that our 
null hypothesis is biased by the size effect (Chan 1988). I then estimate the betas and the 
abnormal returns simultaneously in the test period.  
 
To examine risk performance and whether or not betas are stable over the rank period and test 
periods, I modify equation 18 following Chan (1988) for the Losers, Winners and the arbitrage 
portfolio (Losers –Winners) as follows: 
       ittftmtiDftmtititiftit DrrrrDDrr   )()()1( 21                      (19) 
where t= 1 to 48 months, itr is continuously compounded return on portfolio i at time t, mtr  is 
the return on an value weighted EGX30 index in month t , 
ftr  is the risk-free rate. Importantly, 
tD is a dummy variable equal to zero in the rank period (t< 25) and is equal to one in the test 
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period (t > 24). it  is assumed to be normally distributed with two variances 
2
1i and 
2
2i for 
the rank and test periods respectively. Chan (1988) argues that there should not be significant 
difference in ’s between equation 18 and 19 in the rank and test periods separately.  
  
The outcomes of the above regression allow us to estimate different ii  and  for the rank 
and test periods. i1ˆ  and i2ˆ are the average abnormal returns for the rank and test periods 
respectively, however, iˆ  and )
ˆˆ( iDi   are the estimated betas for the rank and test periods 
respectively. If iDˆ  is not significantly different from zero, then betas are assumed to be 
constant throughout the rank and test periods. 
Finally, I run the aggregate t test statistics for the entire period (1998-2009) under the null 
hypothesis and using the Central Limit theorem (Chan 1988). The test statistics is given as 
follows:  
)1,0()1/()3(
1
1
NTTt
N
U
N
i
iii  

                                                  (20) 
Table 4.9 presents the findings of testing the existence of the abnormal returns and the 
Stability of risk factor (beta) throughout rank and test periods. The results presented in table 
4.9 show that the abnormal return during the rank periods i1  
is negative for Losers for all 
rank periods and highly significant for the aggregate period. However, the average abnormal 
return for the Winners is positive for all the rank periods and highly significant in the 
aggregate period. The abnormal return for the arbitrage portfolio (Losers-Winners (LMW)) is 
negative and highly significant in all rank periods in addition to the aggregate rank period.  
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Price reversal behaviour can be detected as the abnormal return coefficient i2 is positive for 
the Losers and negative for the Winners in all test periods. In addition, the arbitrage portfolio 
(LMW) supports the overreaction behaviour as we notice a change in the sign of i2  from 
negative in the rank period to positive in the test period. Moreover, highly significant 
abnormal return is detected in the aggregate test period.    
 
Table 4.9 also shows that test period betas iDi    
for the Losers are greater than those of 
rank periods i  except for the following test periods: 2000–2001 and 2002-2003. In addition, 
the aggregate beta for the test period for Loser portfolios is highly significant and outperforms 
beta in the rank period. This suggests that Losers are more risky during the test period. This 
result is consistent with Chan (1988). Chan argues that the risk of Loser portfolios is higher 
during the test period and moreover, Losers are on average bigger in size than those of 
Winners. 
 
 Betas of the Winner portfolios in the rank periods significantly exceed those of test periods 
(except for the 2008- 2009 test period). The coefficient of iD  (the change in beta from rank to 
test period) is negative and highly significant in the aggregate test period for the winners. We 
also notice that betas of the Losers are greater than those of Winners in the aggregate test 
period; iD  
is positive and highly significant. This suggests that beta is not constant over time 
throughout the rank and the test periods. These results are consistent with Chan (1988) and 
Gaunt (2000).  
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Table 4.9: Abnormal returns and the Stability of risk throughout rank and test periods 
 
Rank Test Loser  Winner  Loser - Winner 
Period Period 
i1  i2  i  iD  i1  i2  i  iD  
 
i1  i2  i  iD  
1998-
1999 
2000-
2001 
-0.0823*** 
(0.0122) 
0.0049 
(0.0146) 
0.4445*** 
(0.1202) 
-0.1901 
(0.2168) 
0.0031 
(0.0057) 
-0.0210*** 
(0.0068) 
0.4110*** 
(0.0591) 
-0.0649 
(0.1029) 
 -0.0854*** 
(0.0133) 
0.0259 
(0.0160) 
0.0335 
(0.1383) 
-0.1252 
(0.2409) 
2000-
2001 
2002-
2003 
-0.0148 
(0.0120) 
0.0115 
(0.0092) 
0.5948*** 
(0.1493) 
-0.2140 
(0.2033) 
0.0168* 
(0.0089) 
-0.0012 
(0.0070) 
0.4594*** 
(0.1128) 
-0.1795 
(0.1535) 
 -0.0316** 
(0.0143) 
0.0128 
(0.0112) 
0.1345 
(0.1815) 
-0.0345 
(0.2470) 
2002–
2003 
2004-
2005 
-0.0292** 
(0.0119) 
0.0190 
(0.0140) 
0.1818 
(0.1817) 
0.4244* 
(0.2202) 
0.0205*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0135* 
(0.0071) 
0.6182*** 
(0.0932) 
-0.2041* 
(0.1129) 
 -0.0498*** 
(0.0133) 
0.0325*** 
(0.0155) 
-0.4363** 
(0.2023) 
0.6285** 
(0.2451) 
2004–
2005 
2006-
2007 
- 0.0029 
(0.0103) 
0.0210*** 
(0.0080) 
0.4113*** 
(0.0935) 
0.0287 
(0.1249) 
0.0322*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0086 
(0.0068) 
0.5673*** 
(0.0808) 
-0.2899*** 
(0.1075) 
 -0.0351** 
(0.0129) 
0.0296*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.1560 
(0.1174) 
-0.3186** 
(0.1569) 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
-0.0084 
(0.0076) 
0.0086 
(0.0074) 
0.5988*** 
(0.0690) 
0.2405*** 
(0.0807) 
0.0087 
(0.0067) 
-0.0036 
(0.0065) 
0.8078*** 
(0.0771) 
0.1091 
(0.0904) 
 -0.0171* 
(0.0099) 
0.0123 
(0.0097) 
-0.2090** 
(0.1150) 
0.1314 
(0.1347) 
Aggregate 
-0.0302*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0054 
(0.0042) 
0.4911*** 
(0.0458) 
0.1324** 
(0.0603) 
0.0176*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0068** 
(0.0027) 
0.4103*** 
(0.0328) 
-0.1013** 
(0.0426) 
 -0.0478*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0123** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0808*** 
(0.0585) 
0.2337*** 
(0.0460) 
Table 8 presents the results of Chan’s (1988) model estimated using ordinary least squares. 
ittftmtiDftmtititiftit DrrrrDDrr   )()()1( 21  
where t= 1 to 48 months, itr is continuously compounded return on portfolio I at time t, mtr  is the return on an value weighted EGX30 index in month t , ftr  is the 
risk- free rate , tD is a dummy variable equal to zero in the rank period (t<25) and is equal to one in the test period (t >24). it  is assumed to be normally distributed 
with two variances 
2
1i and 
2
2i for the rank and test periods respectively. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies. 
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4.5.10 Long-term overreaction with adjustment for the seasonality effect. 
The existing body of the literature documented that the overreaction phenomenon is highly 
likely to occur in January (the January Effect). See for example, De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 
1987), Zarowin (1990), and Clare and Thomas (1995).  
 
In this section I investigate the seasonality effect in the Egyptian stock exchange by regressing 
the average monthly abnormal returns for the Losers, Winners and the arbitrage portfolio 
(Losers–Winners) on a set of dummy variables which take the value of one in the respective 
month and zero otherwise. I exclude the intercept to avoid the dummy variable trap., t  is a 
stochastic IID error term as in the following regression. 
 
itDectMartFebtJantitLMW
MMMMAR   12321 ............                          (21) 
 
In addition I use the Cochrane-Orcutt two-step iterative technique to overcome the potential 
autocorrelation in equation 21. In the first step I estimate the following regression based on the 
residuals of the equation 21, i.e. tt   1ˆˆ  . Then in the second step I run the Cochrane-
Orcutt method using the following generalized least squares (GLS) equation. This equation is 
repeated in cases of higher order of autocorrelation. 
 
            )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ1(ˆ 11101   tttttt XXyy                                 (22) 
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Table 4.10 presents the findings of long-term overreaction with adjustment to seasonality 
effect. The findings presented in table 4.10 show evidence of the January effect in the 
arbitrage portfolio, as we notice positive and highly significant abnormal returns in January, 
whereas December reports negative and highly significant abnormal returns for the contrarian 
portfolio.  
 
This result is consistent with the literature on the calendar effect and the tax–loss hypothesis as 
investors tend to sell Losers by the end of December to increase the capital losses and to 
reduce the tax burden at the end of the financial year followed by buying Winners in January. 
We also notice significant and positive abnormal returns in July as the vast majority of the 
listed companies in the Egyptian stock exchange have June as end of their financial year. 
 
 We notice positive and marginal significant abnormal returns in June (the end of financial 
year). This suggests that the significant abnormal return resulting from the overreaction 
phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market is not primarily due to the seasonality effect.  
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Table 4.10: Long–term overreaction with adjustment to seasonality effect 
 
Test Period Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct  Nov Dec ADJ 
R2 
DW 
Aggregate               
Loser 0.0038 
(0.0132) 
0.0600*** 
(0.0132) 
0.0014 
(0.0132) 
0.0138 
(0.0132) 
-0.0219* 
(0.0132) 
0.0171 
(0.0132) 
-0.0163 
(0.0132) 
0.0253** 
(0.0132) 
0.0024 
(0.0132) 
-0.0469*** 
(0.0132) 
0.0125 
(0.0132) 
-0.0027 
(0.0132) 
0.014 2.14 
Winner -0.0120 
(0.0105) 
-0.0290* 
(0.0148) 
0.0691*** 
(0.0148) 
-0.0063 
(0.0148) 
0.0138 
(0.0148) 
-0.0159 
(0.0148) 
0.0310** 
(0.0148) 
0.0161 
(0.0148) 
0.0142 
(0.0148) 
0.0096 
(0.0148) 
-0.0211 
(0.0148) 
0.0192 
(0.0148) 
0.024 2.14 
Loser-Winner 0.0394
*** 
(0.0177) 
0.0231 
(0.0250) 
0.0665*** 
(0.0250) 
0.0726*** 
(0.0250) 
0.0184 
(0.0250) 
0.0435* 
(0.0250) 
0.0629** 
(0.0250) 
0.0083 
(0.0250) 
0.0292 
(0.0250) 
0.0142 
(0.0250) 
0.0284 
(0.0250) 
-0.0730*** 
(0.0250) 
0.005 1.92 
The table included the outputs of the equation 21 estimated using ordinary least squares.   DecJan MM ....  are set of dummy variables which take the value of one 
in the respective month and zero otherwise. I excluded the intercept to avoid the dummy variable trap, t  is a stochastic IID error term as in the following 
regression. 
itDectMartFebtJantitLMW
MMMMAR   12321 ............                           
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies. 
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4.5.11  Is the contrarian factor priced? The Fama and French three-factor model. 
In this section I investigate whether or not the overreaction factor is priced in the Egyptian 
stock market. Initially I estimate the traditional Fama and French three-factor model. I expect 
that Fama French three-factor model provides better explanation in risk-return relationship in 
the Egyptian stock market. Fama and French’s three-factor model not only overcomes the 
major drawbacks of CAPM (a one –factor model) but it also does well in explaining the risk-
return relationship in emerging markets. Cheung et al. (1993) found a weak risk-return 
relationship in both Korean and Taiwanese stock exchanges using the CAPM whilst, Huang 
(1998) found a negative risk–return relationship in the Taiwanese stock exchange.  
 
        ittititiiftit
HMLhSMBsMKTrr  
                                          (23) 
 
Following Fama and French (1993) the dependent variable in equations 23 is the excess 
returns (monthly returns minus the one month Treasury bill rate of return). ir  
is the return on 
asset (i), 
fr is the risk- free return, i  is the abnormal returns that cannot be explained by the 
factors in the models, MKT is the value-weighted average market return (
ftmt rr  ) as in 
CAPM; mr is the return on the market portfolio, i is the systematic risk of asset (i) relative to 
the market portfolio beta 2/),( Mmii rrCov   and 
2
M  is the variance of market portfolio. 
 
SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a 
portfolio of big stocks. HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-
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to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. i is the 
sensitivity of the asset returns to market portfolio, is is the sensitivity of the asset returns to 
return of SMB, ih  is the sensitivity of the asset returns to return of HML.  
 
Considering now the mechanics of the estimation, in December of each year all listed shares 
(excluding financial sector and property investment companies) are ranked - based on market 
capitalisation (firm size) - in an ascending order over the period 1998-2009. The median value 
of firm size is then used to split the stocks into two main categories, namely, Small and Big 
size (S and B). All the listed firms are grouped into three main categories - based on book to 
market equity BE/ME - namely, Low BE/ME (bottom 30%), Medium BE/ME (middle 40%) 
and High BE/ME (high 30%).  
 
Following Fama and French (1993), the book value of common equity = book value of  
shareholders’  equity  + deferred tax (balance sheet) + investment tax credit – book value of 
preferred stock.  
 
Fama and French (1992b) arbitrarily grouped firm size and BE/ME into two and three 
categories as they found that BE/ME plays a much more important role in explaining the 
variation in stock returns. In addition they argued that there is no reason for the test results to 
vary according to these grouping choices.   
 
182 
 
Based on the intersection of the above two classifications (two size portfolios and three 
BE/ME portfolios), I construct six different portfolios namely, (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M and 
B/H).  
 
I match the BE/ME ratio for firms with fiscal year ending in June t-1 with monthly stock 
returns from January of year t to December of year t+1 (Fama and French 1993). I exclude all 
negative equity book values. BE/ME is then book common equity for the fiscal year ending in 
June t-1 divided by market equity at the end of December of t-1 (Fama and French 1993). (For 
example, the B/H portfolio contains the stocks in the Big size group and the High -BE/ME 
group as well.) 
 
I calculate the monthly-weighted average returns on the six portfolios from January of year t 
to December of year t and the portfolios are reformed in January of the year t+1. 
SMB portfolio returns are the monthly differences between the simple average of the returns 
on the three small size portfolios, namely, (S/L, S/M and S/H), and the big size portfolios, 
namely, (B/S, B/M and B/H).  
 
                )]///()///[(3/1 HBMBLBHSMSLSSMB                     (24) 
 While the HML portfolios are the monthly difference between the simple average of the 
returns on the two high- BE/ME portfolios, namely, S/H and B/H and the two low- BE/ME 
portfolios, namely, S/L and B/L. 
                )]//()//[(2/1 LBLSHBHSHML                                             (25) 
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4.5.12  Augmented Fama and French and Carhart models. 
Carhart (1997) augmented Fama and French three-factor model by adding a momentum factor. 
The main intuition of Carhart’s model is to investigate whether the momentum factor is priced 
or not. Carhart‘s model is known in the financial literature as the Carhart four-factor model. In 
this section I augment further the Carhart (1997) four-factor model by including two 
additional variables, namely, LMW and HMLFE representing loser minus winner and high 
minus low fixed effects respectively. I include both LMW and HMLFE to examine whether or 
not the overreaction factor as well as the unobservable factors have been priced into returns. 
The model is then written: 
 
    
itititititiiftit HMLFELMWHMLhSMBsMKTrr                     (26) 
In a well specified asset pricing model i should not be statistically different from zero. 
Therefore i  is considered a simple excess-return measure. In the Fama and French three-
factor model, the market factor, in addition to size and book-to-market equity factors, seems to 
explain better variations in stock returns. Equation on 26 then, provides an augmented Fama 
and French three-factor model by including an overreaction/momentum factor as well as the 
difference between low and high fixed effects portfolios. The main objective of including 
theses two additional factors is to examine whether or not the overreaction/momentum and/or 
other unobservable factors are already priced in to returns.    
   
 
In terms of the mechanics of estimation, LMW is constructed as the difference between the 
returns on the Losers portfolio and the returns on the Winners portfolio for a given time 
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period. To construct contrarian (overreaction) portfolios, six value-weighted portfolios are 
formed as follows; in December of each year all listed shares (excluding financial sector and 
property investment companies) are ranked - based on market capitalisation (firm size) - in an 
ascending order over the period 1998-2009. The median value of firm size is then used to split 
the stocks into two main categories, namely, Small(S) and Big (B).  
 
All listed firms are grouped into three main categories based on cumulative abnormal return in 
year t-1, namely, Low CARs (bottom 30%), Medium CARs (middle 40%) and High CARs 
(high 30%). Based on the intersection of the above two classifications (two size portfolios and 
three CARs portfolios), I construct six different portfolios, namely, (S/LCARs, S/MCARs, 
S/HCARs, B/LCARs, B/MCARS and B/HCARs).  
 
LMW portfolios are the monthly difference between the simple average of the returns on the 
two low CARs portfolios (Losers), namely, (LCARs/S, LCARs/B) and the two high CARs 
portfolios (Winners) namely; (HCARs/S, HCARs/B).     
 
          )//()//(2/1 BHCARsSHCARsBLCARsSLCARsLMW                           (27) 
 
To construct the unobservable (fixed effects) portfolios I estimated equation 23 for all 
formation and the aggregate windows using panel data model. To construct the six 
unobservable value-weighted portfolios, in December of each year all listed shares (excluding 
financial sector and property investment companies) are ranked - based on market 
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capitalisation (firm size) - in an ascending order over the period 1998-2009. The median value 
of firm size is then used to split the stocks into two main categories, namely, Small and Big 
size (S and B). 
 
All the listed firms are then grouped into three main categories based on company fixed 
effects in year t-1, namely, Low FEs (bottom 30%), Medium FEs (middle 40%) and High FEs 
(high 30%). Based on the intersection of the above two classifications (two size portfolios and 
three FEs portfolios), I construct six different portfolios, namely, (S/LFEs, S/MFEs, S/HFEs, 
B/LFEs, B/MFEs and B/HFEs).  
 
HMLFE portfolios are the monthly difference between the simple average of the returns on the 
two high FEs (unobservable) portfolios namely (HFEs/S, HFEs/B) and the low FEs portfolios 
(Winners), namely, (LFEs/S, LFEs/B).            
                )//()//(2/1 BLFEsSLFEsBHFEsSHFEsHMLFE                 (28) 
 
Table 4.11 reports the Fama and French three-factor model and the augmented versions four 
and five-factor models over the period 2000-2009. The results show that the model is well 
specified as we cannot reject the null that all i ’s are insignificantly different from zero for all 
the models and for both Losers and Winners. Therefore the Fama and French three-factor 
model and the augmented models do well in explaining the returns on Losers, Winners and 
aggregate portfolios. MKT, HML LMW, and HMLFE are highly significant at 1% and 5% for 
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the Winners and Losers. The MKT factor dominates all the other factors in the model and 
explains much of the variation in the portfolio returns.  
 
HML loadings are positive in sign for the Losers and negative for the Winners; this implies 
that HML is positively correlated with the return on Loser portfolios and negatively correlated 
with the return on Winners. This suggests that value stocks (high book-to-market ratio) 
outperform growth stocks (low book-to-market ratio) for the Losers and the opposite is correct 
for the Winners.  
 
The contrarian factor LMW on the other hand is positive for the Losers and negative for the 
Winners. This supports the previous results as Losers outperform Winners. Interestingly, 
HMLFE (High minus Low fixed effects) is negative in sign for both Winners and Losers; this 
suggests that lower fixed effects portfolios are not only positively correlated with the 
portfolios return but also outperform higher fixed effects portfolios. This result is consistent 
with main findings of the system GMM of chapter 3. The loadings of SMB are insignificant 
and quite small compared with other loadings; this suggests that size effect has a minor role in 
explaining portfolio returns in the Egyptian stock exchange. 
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Table 4.11: The Fama and French three-factor model and the augmented model for returns over the period 2000-2009 
 
                     Loser Winner                                    Aggregate   
  Model 1      Model 2    Model 3        Model 1   Model 2     Model 3        Model 1        Model 2  Model 3     
C -0.0002 
(0.0071) 
-0.0041 
(0.0046) 
-0.0050 
(0.0050) 
-0.0070 
(0.0048) 
-0.0053 
(0.0044) 
-0.0066 
(0.0050) 
-0.0003 
(0.0041) 
-0.0021 
(0.0037) 
-0.0028 
(0.0050) 
HML 0.2661
**
 
(0.1325) 
0.2922
***
 
(0.1089) 
0.1907
**
 
(0.0992) 
-0.1282
**
 
(0.0673) 
-0.1577
***
 
(0.0540) 
-0.1866
**
 
(0.0742) 
0.1751
**
 
(0.0844) 
0.2188
**
 
(0.1098) 
0.1907
**
 
(0.0911) 
SMB 0.0415 
(0.1222) 
-0.0080 
(0.0728) 
-0.0179 
(0.0750) 
0.0598 
(0.0597) 
0.0705 
(0.0550) 
0.0796 
(0.0575) 
0.0229 
(0.0736) 
0.0009 
(0.0674) 
0.0011 
(0.0677) 
MKT 0.6829
***
 
(0.0694) 
0.7842
***
 
(0.0435) 
0.7800
***
 
(0.0443) 
0.8157
***
 
(0.0482) 
0.7898
***
 
(0.0447) 
0.7994
***
 
(0.0481) 
0.6439
***
 
(0.0397) 
0.6676
***
 
(0.0366) 
0.6668
***
 
(0.0370) 
LMW --- 0.7825
***
 
(0.0541) 
0.7795
***
 
(0.0544) 
--- -0.2553
***
 
(0.0548) 
-0.2588
***
 
(0.0553) 
--- 0.2261
***
 
(0.0465) 
0.2236
***
 
(0.0486) 
HMLFE --- --- -0.2146
***
 
(0.0284) 
--- --- -0.1744
***
 
-(0.0258) 
--- --- -0.2506
***
 
(0.0547) 
ADJ R
2
 0.4672 0.8053 0.8040 0.7217 0.7639 0.7625 0.6953 0.7451 0.7429 
F.TEST 33.092
***
 98.597
***
 81.671
***
 103.86
***
 97.265
***
 77.410
***
 91.510
***
 87.940
***
 69.770
***
 
The table presents the outputs of augmented Fama and French three- factor and the Carhart four- factor models as in equation 26 
itititititiiftit HMLFELMWHMLhSMBsMKTrr    
SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of big stocks. HML is the difference between 
the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. i  
is the sensitivity of the 
asset returns to market portfolio, is  
is the sensitivity of the asset returns to return of SMB, ih  is the sensitivity of the asset returns to return of 
HML. LMW is constructed as the difference between the returns on the Losers portfolio and the returns on the Winners portfolio for a given time 
period. HMLFE portfolios are the monthly difference between the simple average of the returns on the two high FEs (unobservable) portfolios 
and the low FEs portfolios (Winners). ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies. 
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Finally, all the models are well specified as F statistics are highly significant and the 
adjusted R squared range from 46%-80% for the Losers and from 69% to 76% for the 
Winners. I concluded that both the contrarian factor (LMW) and the fixed effects factor 
(HMLFE) are priced in the augmented 4 and 5 - factor models. This result is new to the 
literature on overreaction phenomenon. 
 
4.6 Summary and conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter has been to examine the long-term overreaction for all 
listed shares in the Egyptian Stock exchange over the period 1998-2009. In addition, I have 
investigated the validity of competing hypotheses to explain the phenomenon observed. 
These include the so-called size effect, the effects of time-varying risk, the stability of beta 
over the rank and test periods and the seasonality (calendar effect), Huang (1998). Finally, 
I investigate whether the contrarian and the unobservable (fixed effect) factors are priced 
in to returns by augmenting the Fama and French three-factor model and the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model to include the contrarian and fixed effects factors. 
 
The chapter has also helped to resolve the academic debate over alternative measures of 
long-term stock performance. The debate concerns the relative merits of cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) over the rebalancing method (RB) and buy and hold returns 
(BAHARs). Following Roll (1983), Dissanaike (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1996), and 
Fama (1998), in this chapter I adopted the more realistic approach in return calculations, 
namely, the rebalancing approach (RB). 
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I have argued that – following Fama (1998) – the RB CARs approach outperforms the buy 
and hold BH approach as the latter implies fewer theoretical and statistical problems than 
long-term BH. Roll (1983) argues that using monthly returns is less likely to be affected by 
the choice of CARs or BH. Dissanake (1994) argues that the BH approach may lead to less 
benefit from diversification in the longer term. Moreover, Loughran and Ritter (1996) 
claim that there is a little difference between BH and CARs in test period returns 
calculations, and they argue that the results of Conrad and Kaul (1993) are affected by the 
survivorship bias.     
The chapter has also investigated the different types of biases and measurement errors that 
may explain the overreaction phenomenon i.e. bid-ask spread, survivorship bias, data- 
snooping bias, data mining bias, look-ahead bias, rebalancing bias and the non-
synchronous trading bias. I adopted in the econometrics analysis methods to avoid and 
minimise the effect of the above mentioned biases. 
 
The main contribution of this chapter is that it is – the first attempt to link the overreaction 
hypothesis with a change in regulatory policies, namely, the switch from strict price limits 
to circuit breakers. I augmented the traditional Fama and French three-factor model and the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model by including the contrarian and the unobservable factors 
based on the company heterogeneity. 
This is the first empirical study of the long-term overreaction phenomenon in the Egyptian 
stock market – one of the leading stock exchanges in the Middle East and Mena region 
(MENA). 
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The main findings presented in the chapter are evidence of a genuine overreaction 
phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market. The overreactive behaviour is not due to the 
small firm effect. Losers are found to outperform Winners for big and small firms and 
abnormal returns can be achieved by forming the arbitrage portfolio. Therefore a 
contrarian strategy of buying Losers and selling Winners is likely to be a profitable for 
investors in the Egyptian stock market. Combining with the short run results, the findings 
suggest that the overreaction phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market is not sensitive to 
the length of the formation period. 
 
Interestingly, I found a link between changes in regulatory policies and the overreaction 
phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market. Results show that within the two and four non-
overlapping formation periods, overreaction was not detected within the strict price limit 
regime. There is no significant market-adjusted abnormal return to adopting the contrarian 
strategy within the strict price limits regime as Losers continue to be Losers and Winners 
continue to be Winners; and thus there are no positive and significant abnormal returns for 
the arbitrage portfolio during the strict price limit period.  
 
On the other hand, the overreaction phenomenon is present in the circuit breaker regime 
for both short (two years) and longer (four years) formation periods. Results here show 
positive and highly significant market-adjusted abnormal returns for the arbitrage portfolio. 
The main explanation of this seems to be the delayed price discovery hypothesis (Kim and 
Rhee, 1997).  
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The tests of the stability of beta coefficients show that beta for Loser portfolios in the 
aggregate test period is highly significant and outperforms beta in the rank period. This 
suggests that Losers are more risky during the test period. This result is consistent with 
Chan (1988) who argues that the risk of Loser portfolios is higher during the test period, 
with Losers are on average being bigger in size than those of Winners.  
 
Conversely, betas of the Winner portfolios in the rank periods significantly exceeded those 
of the test periods (except for the 2008-2009 test period). In addition, the change in beta 
from rank to test period was negative and highly significant in the aggregate test period for 
the Winners. We also noticed that betas of the Losers are greater than those of Winners in 
the aggregate test period. This suggests that beta is not constant over time throughout the 
rank and the test periods. These results are consistent with Chan (1988) and Gaunt (2000).  
 
The findings presented in the chapter also show evidence of the January effect in the 
arbitrage portfolio, as we notice positive and highly significant abnormal returns in 
January, whereas December reports negative and highly significant abnormal returns for 
the contrarian portfolio. This result is consistent with the literature on the calendar effect 
and the tax–loss hypothesis. Investors tend to sell Losers by the end of December to 
increase the capital losses and to reduce the tax burden at the end of the financial year 
followed by buying Winners in January. 
 
We also noticed significant and positive abnormal returns in June and July of the year as 
the vast majority (84%) of the listed companies in the Egyptian stock exchange have June 
as the end of their financial year. This suggests that the significant abnormal returns 
192 
 
resulting from the overreaction phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market is not mainly 
due to the seasonality effect.  
 
The results of the augmented Fama and French and the Carhart (1997) models showed that 
the HML loadings were positive in sign for the Losers and negative for the Winners; this 
implies that HML is positively correlated with the return on Loser portfolios and 
negatively correlated with the return on Winners. This suggests that value stocks (high 
book-to-market ratio) outperformed growth stocks (low book-to-market ratio) for the 
Losers and the opposite is true for the Winners.  
 
The contrarian factor LMW was found to be positive for the Losers and negative for the 
Winners. This suggests that Losers outperform Winners. Interestingly, HMLFE (High 
minus Low fixed effects) is negative in sign for both Winners and Losers; this suggests 
that lower fixed effects portfolios are positively correlated with the portfolios return and is 
consistent with main findings of the system GMM of chapter 3. Finally, the size effect has 
a minor role in explaining portfolio returns in the Egyptian stock exchange. 
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Chapter 5 Price limits and the overreaction phenomenon 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The term ‘circuit breaker’ originates in electrical engineering. In electrical engineering, 
circuit breakers are automated electrical shut downs of electrical activity designed to 
protect an electrical circuit from damage when the system’s capacity is exceeded. The 
circuit breakers – in the context of Finance – were first launched in the NYSE in 1988 
(Brady, 1988) following the stock market crash in 1987. During the market crash the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) decreased by 7.2% (554) points on 27th October 1987 
(see Ackert et al., 2001). The main reason for launching this regulatory policy was to 
protect investors from the excessive stock price volatility by cooling down the market.  
 
Circuit breakers became very popular and widely used by different stock exchanges over 
the world; however, the rules of the circuit breakers vary amongst the world’s stock 
exchanges. Despite the popularity of the circuit breakers, there is a remarkable debate in 
the academic literature regarding the effectiveness of such regulatory tools, and whether or 
not circuit breakers actually reduce price volatility as intended.  
 
According to the efficient market hypotheses (EMH), stock prices should reflect all 
information disseminated in the market, so that circuit breakers or any other regulatory 
policies may have a negative impact on stock markets (trading interference and volatility 
spillover hypotheses). In addition, imposing these regulatory polices itself implies a degree 
of market inefficiency and a clear violation of the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis, 
as circuit breakers prevent stock prices from reaching their equilibrium levels (Kim and 
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Rhee, 1997). According to Kim and Yang (2004), there are three main categories of circuit 
breakers, namely, price limits, firm-specific trading halts and market-wide circuit breakers. 
 
5.1.1 Price limits 
Price limits are regulatory tools in both equity and futures markets in which further trading 
is prevented for a period of time with the intention of cooling market traders’ emotions and 
reducing price volatility. The trigger for such limits is when prices hit particular pre-
specified price boundaries
23
. Table 5.1 presents price limits rules for a sample of 
international stock exchanges. 
 
The proponents of price limits argue that they are efficient in reducing price volatility and 
providing time for both brokers and investors to adjust their portfolio positions. However, 
the opponents claim that these regulatory tools are useless as they lead to spreading out 
price volatility over a longer time, delaying price discovery, and interfering with trading 
activity.  
 
5.1.2 Firm –specific trading halts 
With firm-specific trading halts, trading is ceased for a given period of time within the 
session, or until the end of the trading session, for a particular stock(s) if prices hit the 
predetermined limit. The history of the firm-specific trading halts started in 1934 when 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the power to suspend trading on 
                                                          
23 Price limits have a long history and were first implemented in the Japanese rice futures market (the Dojima 
exchange) in the eighteenth century (see Chung and Gan, 2005). In 1917, price limits on cotton futures 
contracts were used in the US. The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) adopted this regulatory tool in 1925 
(Kim and Yang, 2004). 
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particular shares in the organised market (Kim and Yang (2004). The SEC extended this to 
the over-the-counter market in 1964 (Kim and Yang (2004).  
The most popular example of firm-specific trading halts is that operated in the NYSE 
where there are two main types of trading halts, namely, news and order imbalance trading 
halts (Kim and Yang (2004). The former comes into operation when the regulator expects 
that disseminated news will have an impact on prices, whereas the latter comes into 
operation when there are large discrepancies between buy and sell orders (Kim and Yang 
(2004).  
Table 5.1: Price limit rules for a sample of world stock exchanges. 
Country Stock exchange Price limit 
Austria Wiener Borse AG 5% 
Bangladesh Dhaka SE 7.5–20% 
Belgium Brussels SE 5–10% 
China ** 10% 
Czech Republic Prague SE 5% 
Ecuador Guayaquil SE 10–20% 
Egypt Egyptian SE 5–20% 
Finland Helsinki Exchange 15% 
France Paris SE 10–20% 
Israel Tel Aviv SE 15% (during opening) 
Italy Italian SE 10–20% 
Japan Tokyo SE 10–60% 
Korea Korea SE 15% 
Latvia Riga SE 15% 
Lithuania NSE of Lithuania 5–10% 
Luxembourg Luxembourg SE 5% 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur SE 30% 
Mauritius SE of Mauritius 6% 
Mexico Mexican SE 10% 
Peru Lima SE 15% 
Philippines PSE 50% up, 40% down 
Portugal Lisbon and Oporto E 15% 
Romania Bucharest SE 15% 
Spain ** 10% 
Taiwan Taiwan SE 7% 
Thailand Thailand SE 30% 
Turkey Istanbul SE 5% 
Thailand Thailand SE 30% 
Source: Chung, J and Li Gan (2005), Estimating the Effect of Price Limit Hitting Days. Econometric Journal, Vol. 8, 
81-82.  **These countries have multiple exchanges where the same price limit rules apply. 
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Kyle (1988) argues that trading halts reduce price volatility and cool the markets down as 
they allow investors to adjust their portfolios or to cancel their orders. Therefore – from the 
perspective of regulators – trading halts may protect investors from incurring heavy losses. 
However, Kim and Rhee (1997) argue that trading halts also may delay price discovery 
mechanism. Trading halts, it is suggested, imply welfare loss for traders as they are unable 
to trade during the halts (Kim and Yang (2004).    
 
Greenwald and Stein (1988) and Greenwald and Stein (1991) are regarded the main 
proponents of trading halts as they argue that trading halts provide a suitable time for the 
dissemination of information between brokers and traders, so that large price movements 
are expected post trading halts. Greenwald and Stein (1988) claim that these large price 
movements are not a cause for concern as long as there are no asymmetries of information 
between the traders and specialists. The appropriate objective of trading halts is to re-
provide the timely information to all market participants.  
 
Fama (1989) argues that trading halts historically failed to cool markets down and to 
decrease price volatility. In contrast, volatility is found to be higher under such halts (Lee, 
Ready, and Seguin (1994). Fama believes that all investors implement their own trading 
halts if they wish to analyse the disseminated information; these are called “homemade’’ 
trading halts, Fama (1989).   
 
5.1.3 Market-wide circuit-breakers 
Finally, with market-wide circuit breakers, trading may be stopped - for a pre-specified 
duration – across the whole market if the market index hits a pre-determined level. The 
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NYSE experience demonstrates that this is the most popular market-wide circuit breaker. 
Table 5.2 reports the regulations of market-wide circuit breakers in the NYSE since the 
market crash in 1987. 
 
Table 5.2: The history of market-wide circuit breaker regulations 
 
October 1988: the first implementation for circuit breaker 
250 point drop in DJIA 60 minutes trading halt  
400 point drop in DJIA 120 minutes trading halt if additional 150 point drop 
in DJIA after trading resumes 
January 1997: Circuit breakers have widener limits  
350 points drop in DJIA 30 minutes trading halt   
550 points drop in DJIA 60 minutes trading halt if additional 200 point drop in 
DJIA after trading resumes 
February 1998- present  
10% drop 60 minutes trading halt if before 2:00 p.m. 
30 minutes trading halt if between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. 
No trading halt if after 2:30 p.m. 
20% drop 120 minutes trading halt if before 1:00 p.m. 
60 minutes trading halt if between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. 
Stop trading until the following trading day if after 
2:00 p.m. 
30% drop Close the market for the day 
Source: Ackert, L., Church, B. & Jayaraman, N. (2001) An experimental study of circuit breakers: 
The effects of mandated market closures and temporary halts on market behaviour. Journal of 
Future Markets 4, 182-208.  
NYSE website 
 
 
The theoretical and empirical models of trading halts can be extended and applied to 
market-wide circuit breakers (Kim and Yang, 2004). However, there are few papers 
analysing market-wide circuit breakers due to data availability. The NYSE, for instance, 
has applied market-wide circuit breakers only once since 1988 (see for example, 
Subrahmanyam (1994 &1997), Gerety and Mulherin (1992), Lauterbach and Ben-Zion 
(1993), and Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000)). 
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The existing body of literature on price limits studies narrow price limits in many stock 
exchanges i.e. Taiwan, Tokyo and Athens Stock Exchanges, Chen (1997), Kim and Rhee 
(1997), Phylaktis et al. (1999). The empirical findings of these papers are mixed, therefore 
we cannot really decide whether strict and narrow price limits decrease stock returns 
volatility and cool down the market.  
 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate, in the context of the Egyptian stock 
market, the effect of regulatory policies (price limits, circuit breakers) on four main 
hypotheses, namely, (i) the overreaction hypothesis, (ii) volatility spillover hypothesis, (iii) 
the delayed price discovery hypothesis and (iv) the trading interference hypothesis. In 
addition, the chapter investigates the impact of regulatory policies on the dynamic 
relationship between volume volatility relationships. Finally, it examines the effect of the 
regime switch (from strict price limits to circuit breakers) on the long-term volatility. In 
achieving these objectives the chapter provides a comprehensive literature review of price 
limits and the theoretical motivation for the evolution of regulatory policies.  
 
One of the compelling reasons for studying price limits in the context of the Egyptian stock 
exchange is that it uniquely provides an example of the switch from strict price limits to 
circuit breakers The switch is accompanied by a move to much wider price limits (+/-20%) 
(see table 5.1). 
 
The main contribution of this chapter is that it is the first study to investigate the 
overreaction hypothesis, volatility spillover hypothesis, the delayed price discovery 
hypothesis and the trading interference hypothesis simultaneously in the Egyptian stock 
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market. Most importantly, it examines theses hypotheses across two different regimes, 
namely, strict price limits and circuit breakers. The existing body of the literature has 
investigated the effect of price limits or circuit breakers by examining the above mentioned 
hypothesis. However, due to the unique regulatory policies in the Egyptian stock market 
we can investigate and compare the effect of regime switch on the overreaction, volatility 
spillover, the delayed price discovery and the trading interference hypotheses. 
 
There are a few stock exchanges throughout the world that have switched to a wider price 
limits, i.e. Thailand from 10% to 30%, and the Korean Stock Exchange from 6% to 15%. 
Therefore, there is an obvious policy implication in this chapter as we can identify the right 
band of price limits.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2 presents the academic debate about the 
impact of the circuit breakers and price limits. In section 3 I present a detailed literature 
survey of price limits and circuit breakers in both emerging and developed markets. 
Section 4 describes the dataset used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the econometric 
modeling and the empirical results.  Finally, section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
5.2 The impact of circuit breakers and price limits  
In this section I present the theory of main effects of circuit breakers and price limits on 
volatility derived from the literature. 
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5.2.1 Information Hypothesis (Delayed price discovery) 
The information hypothesis and the delayed price discovery hypothesis are used 
interchangeably in the Finance literature. According to this hypothesis, the price discovery 
mechanism is delayed due to the suspension of trading for a period of time. Therefore, it is 
argued, price limits prevent security prices from immediately reaching their intrinsic values 
and equilibrium levels (Phylaktis et al.(1999) and Kim and Rhee(1997)). Fama (1989), 
Lehmann (1989), and Lee, Ready, and Seguin (1994) argue that price limits interfere with 
the price discovery mechanism as trading usually ceases (when prices hit the limit) until 
the limits are revised. Therefore, at the limit-hit day these constraints (limits) prevent stock 
prices from reaching their equilibrium levels until the following trading day (session) (Kim 
and Rhee, 1997). 
 
5.2.2 Overreaction Hypothesis 
According to the overreaction hypothesis, price limits play an important role in cooling 
down stock price volatility. In efficient markets, investors usually react to new information 
arriving in the market, as a result of which, stock prices reach their equilibrium levels 
instantly. However, in less efficient markets i.e. emerging markets, information does not 
get disseminated to all investors at the same time. Therefore when new information arrives 
to the market, investors tend to overreact or underreact; share prices then move (up or 
down) towards their equilibrium levels.  
 
Imposing price limits, on this theory, prevents speculative traders from overreacting to the 
information and allows more time for investors to analyse this new information and to 
adjust their portfolios, particularly during the trading halt period until the next trading 
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session. Therefore price limits– in theory –should cool down market sentiment and reduce 
stock price volatility (Phylaktis et al. (1999), Chen (1997), Kim and Rhee (1997) and Chan 
et al. (2005).   
  
 5.2.3 Information asymmetry  
The literature on price limits suggests that price limits provide time for information 
dissemination. Price limits are designed to minimise uncertainty and information 
asymmetry. Thus the improvement in information asymmetry depends on the effectiveness 
of the price limits (Chan et al. (2005), Madhavan and Smidt (1991) and Choi and 
Subrahmanyam (1994). 
 
5.2.4 Order imbalance  
The proponents of price limits argue that price limits provide enough time for the stock 
markets to correct order imbalance and to absorb large one-sided volume (supply or 
demand) (Chen et al., 2005). Contrary to that, Chan et al (2005) argued that price limits 
may be the main reason of order imbalance. They claim that as informed traders know in 
advance that trading will be ceased once prices hit the Upper or Lower limits, they will 
then buy or sell massively before trading is halted. Therefore the volume will be one-sided 
creating the problem of order imbalance, which in turn leads to speeding up the prices 
towards limits hits (magnet effect of price limits) (Cho et al. (2003) and Chen et al., 
(2005).  
 
During the post limit period investors can adjust their orders based on their fundamental 
prices. This suggests that the trading will no longer be a one-sided volume and thus no 
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order imbalance phenomenon will be observed during post limits period (Cho et al. 
(2003) and Chen et al., (2005).  
 
5.2.5 Volatility spillover 
Kyle (1988) and Kuhn et al. (1991) among others find that price limits are an inefficient 
tool in reducing volatility in the US. In addition, they find that price limits cause stock 
price volatility to spread out over a few days subsequent to the event (limit hit). Kuhn et al. 
(1991) argue that price limits prevent price changes above the target limit, therefore 
preventing immediate corrections in order imbalance. Lee et al. (1994) argue that when 
trading halts are announced, the news is disseminated by the media coverage, leading to 
dispersion of investors’ belief about the equilibrium prices and thus some irrational traders 
are drawn to the market under the effect of excessive media coverage. This leads to an 
increase in both trading volume and volatility (Farag and Cressy (2011)).   
 
5.2.6 Trading (liquidity) interference hypothesis 
Fama (1989), Telser (1989), Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993) and Kim and Rhee (1997) 
claim that if trading is prevented by price limits, then shares become less liquid and this 
leads to intensive trading activity during the following trading days. Lehmann (1989) 
argued that order imbalances are corrected in the following days as informed traders will 
wait until the prices reach their equilibrium levels.  
 
5.2.7 Magnet effect 
Price limits may have a magnet effect in which stock prices are pulled closer to the upper 
or lower band. This leads to higher levels of volatility and trading volumes, see for 
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example Subrahmanyam (1994) and Cho et al. (2003). The main reason for this 
phenomenon is the aggressive trading strategy by some investors (high trading volumes), 
who try to avoid position lock and illiquidity caused by imminent price limits hit. 
In such cases traders may rush to submit orders that sometimes do not match with their 
trading objectives, which may lead to destabilising of the stock price behaviour (Goldstein 
and Kavajecz, 2004; Chanet al. 2005; Fernandes and Rocha, 2007; Wong, Chang & Tu, 
2009, Hsieh et al. 2009). 
 
5.2.8 Closing price manipulation 
McDonald and Michayluk (2003) define the so called ‘suspicious’ trading halts when stock 
price movement during the trading session is in an opposite direction of a trading halt. 
Some noise traders (opportunistic) submit orders outside the limits and they know that 
these orders are unexecutable, so that they can terminate the trading session and preserve 
the most recent trade as the day’s closing price. Therefore closing prices may be subject to 
manipulation by noise trading investors or by fund managers, McDonald and Michayluk 
(2003), Felixson and Pelli (1999) and Carhart et al. (2002).   
 
5.2.9 Information arrival modes 
Farag and Cressy (2011)
24
 show that there is a link between regulatory policies and the 
information arrival modes in emerging markets. They examine the effect of the switch 
from a strict price limit regime to a wider band limit regime with trading halts (circuit 
breakers) on the dissemination of information in the Egyptian stock exchange over the 
period 1998-2008. Farag and Cressy used the Mixture of Distributions Hypothesis (MDH) 
                                                          
24
 This paper has been published based on my earlier work in this chapter. 
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and the Sequential of Information Arrival Hypothesis (SIAH) as a proxy of the information 
arrival modes to the market. The former hypothesis assumes that information is reflected 
into the share price instantly; however the latter assumes that information arrives to the 
market in a sequential order and hence not all investors are informed and able to react upon 
this information. Therefore there is a delayed price reaction based on this hypothesis.  
 
Farag and Cressy (2011) find that the mixture of distributions hypothesis (MDH) is 
prevailing within the Strict Price Limits. However, the sequential of information arrival 
hypothesis is prevailing within the circuit breakers regime. They claim that price volatility 
is higher within the circuit breakers regime due to the role of insider information and noise 
trading in emerging markets. They argue that during the trading halts period, investors 
have the chance to adjust their portfolios based on the new information arriving in the 
market. However, not all investors are informed; therefore price volatility might be greater 
within the circuit breakers regime.    
 
5.3 Literature Review 
In this section I summarise the literature on circuit breakers in both developed and 
emerging markets. Primarily I summarise the effect of imposing different types of circuit 
breakers on five main areas, namely, volatility and overreaction, price discovery and 
trading (liquidity) interference, magnet effect, market efficiency and equilibrium prices. 
Finally, I present the summary of the literature on the price limits in futures markets. 
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The effect of price limits on stock markets has been investigated in emerging markets 
rather than developed markets (except for futures markets). Firm-specific trading halts and 
market-wide circuit breakers are widely used in the developed markets. 
 
5.3.1 Developed markets. 
5.3.1.1 Volatility and overreaction 
Gerety and Mulherin (1992) investigate the performance of daily trading volume when 
trading is halted in a particular trading session. They use hourly trading volume data of 
three market indices - the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 1933-1988, the Dow 
Jones (DJ) 30 industrial index from 1933-1940 and the Dow Jones 65 Composite Index 
over the period 1941-1988. They estimate the expected and unexpected volatility following 
Brock and Kleidon (1992), and Davidian and Carroll (1987). Gerety and Mulherin (1992) 
find that the circuit breaker regime leads to an overreactive behaviour rather than cooling 
the market down as was intended. In addition they find that trading volume at the closing 
hour is highly related to the previous day’s trading volume at the opening hour.   
 
Lee et al. (1994) investigate the effect of trading halts on stock price volatility and trading 
volume. They adopt the price-matched case control methodology to isolate the volume - 
volatility effects on the share prices. Lee et al. (1994) control for firm-specific effects, the 
amount of information released and the relationship between media coverage and post 
trading halt activity. Using a sample of 852 trading halts of 449 firms on the NYSE during 
1988, they find that trading halts increase both trading volume and stock price volatility by 
230% higher than the following non halt control. In addition they find little evidence that 
the flow of information is not facilitated by the trading halts.  
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They argue that the media coverage plays an important role in explaining the post halt 
price behaviour due to the increase in heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs. 
 
Subrahmanyam (1994) examines the effect of circuit breakers on stock price volatility. 
Using the daily date of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA), the main finding of this paper is that imposing circuit breakers increases 
stock price volatility rather than cooling the volatility down as was intended. Furthermore, 
Subrahmanyam (1994) argues that circuit breakers regime has negative impact on stock 
market liquidity.    
 
Santoni and Liu (1994) look at the volatility of the NYSE under circuit breakers and 
whether or not price limits reduce stock price volatility. Daily data are collected for the 
S&P 500 over the period July 1962 to May 1991. Using the ARCH model they find that 
imposing circuit breakers do not reduce the stock price volatility in the US.  Edelen and 
Gervais (2003) investigate the effect of trading halts in the NYSE and find significant 
increases in volatility and information asymmetry following trading halts.  
 
George and Hwang (1995) investigate stock price volatility over 24 hours for the most 
actively traded against the least traded shares listed in Tokyo stock exchange (TSE) over 
the period from January 1975 to December 1989. Using the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM), they find that price limits prevent share prices from reaching their 
equilibrium level when changes in share price are associated with order imbalance. 
Therefore, the most actively traded shares exhibit price continuation with high trading 
volumes.    
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Kim et al. (2008) look at the trading activity, liquidity, stock price volatility in addition to 
price discovery mechanism in the Spanish stock exchange around trading halts and price 
limit (Upper or Lower) hits. The Spanish stock market has a unique price limit regime 
which combines Strict Price Limits (+/- 15%) with discretionary trading halts based on 
news announcements for individual firms.  
 
The data set consists of daily stock returns, trading volume for the listed shares in the 
Spanish Stock Exchange over the period January 1, 1998, to April 30, 2001. Kim et al. 
(2008) find that both trading volume and volatility increase immediately after trading halts. 
However, liquidity tends to be higher within trading halts regime compared to Strict Price 
Limits. They argue that investors are willing to provide liquidity as the degree of 
information asymmetry is reduced by the release of the new information during the trading 
halts.  
5.3.1.2 Price discovery and trading (liquidity) interference 
Greenwald and Stein (1991) investigate the relationship between the imperfection 
transactional mechanisms and the stock market crash in the NYSE. They find that circuit 
breakers play an important role in absorbing stock markets’ large volume shocks and 
enhance the information inefficiency problems.  
 
Kim and Rhee (1997) use daily stock price date from Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) over 
the period 1989-1992 to examine the price limits mechanism. Kim and Rhee (1997) 
investigate three main hypotheses, namely, volatility spillover, delayed price discovery, 
and trading Interference hypotheses. In TSE there are no Strict Price Limits as individual 
shares have different limit sizes based on the closing price in the previous day. They use 
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the squared stock returns as a measure of stock returns volatility for all the listed shares in 
the TSE over a 21-day window for three different events, namely, stock hitting the limit, 
stocks hitting 0.90 and 0.80 of the limits.  
The main finding of this paper is that imposing price limits leads to volatility spillover 
effects, as price limits prevent larger price changes. Therefore price limits do not cool 
down volatility but just spread the volatility over the subsequent days following hitting the 
Upper or the Lower limit. In addition they find evidence of price continuation and trading 
inference hypotheses as trading activity was found to increase following the limit-hit 
day(s).  
 
Booth and Broussard (1998) investigate the probability that the predetermined circuit 
breakers will lead to trading halts in the US. Using daily data from the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) over the period 1928-1995, they find that fixed point circuit 
breakers in the DJIA are inefficient and inflexible, and would be more flexible by setting 
the trigger in relative measures.    
 
Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (1998) examine whether the relationship between price 
discovery and the regulatory polices (trading halts) are stable over time. They analyse 823 
trading halts from the Montreal stock exchange over three six-month sub periods arbitrarily 
chosen during the period 1988-1989. Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (1998) use the mean-
adjusted model to measure the abnormal returns for stocks that experienced trading halts. 
They find that both volatility and trading volume tend to increase significantly around 
trading halts over two days subsequent to trading halts.    
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Corwin and Lipson (2000) investigate daily trading behaviour and shares liquidity around 
trading halts in the NYSE. The data set consists of 469 intraday trading halts for all listed 
shares over the period 1995-1996. They compare the normal trading activity (non halts 
sessions) with those of trading halts for 10 days before and after the halt. The NYSE 
individual shares may be subject to trading halts when a large order imbalance exists or 
when significant news is released and expected to affect the market value of shares. They 
find consistent results with Lee et al. (1994) as volatility tends to be higher following 
trading halts due to the decrease in liquidity around trading halts. In addition, they find 
higher volume of order submission and cancellation around trading halts; this suggests that 
investors are trying to adjust their portfolios during the halt period.  
 
Christie et al. (2002) investigate the relationship between trading halts and the 
dissemination of information during the halts. In the NASDAQ there are two types of price 
discovery mechanisms associated with trading halts. One is the five-minute quotation 
period pre the resumption of trading. The second type is if a trading halt occurs after 4pm. 
In this case, trading will reopen the following day (trading session) with 90 minutes trading 
quotation. Christie et al. (2002) examine the effect of these two different reopening 
mechanisms on stock price movements, transaction costs, and trading activity. Data consist 
of 714 news-related trading halts in the NASDAQ over the period 1997- 1998.  
 
They find that liquidity can be enhanced during the market closure as trading halts allow 
the dissemination of information and enable investors to adjust their portfolios. They also 
find highly significant increases in trading volume and stock price volatility during the 90 
minutes quotation period in the following day (trading session).  
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McDonald and Michayluk (2003), on the other hand, examine such a type of trading halts 
that stimulate investors to take advantage due to the imperfection of the Paris Bourse.  
They do not argue about the effectiveness of the trading halts mechanism; however they 
define the suspicious trading halts as when stock price movement during the trading 
session is in an opposite direction of a trading halt.  
 
Some noise traders submit orders outside the limits and they know that these orders are 
unexecutable, so that they can terminate the trading session and preserve the most recent 
trade as the day’s closing price. Therefore closing prices may be manipulated by noise 
trading investors or by fund managers. The data set consists of daily transactions, quotes 
and orders of all continuously traded shares listed in the Paris Bourse during 1997-1998.  
Using the Wilcoxon rank sums test and ANOVA F-test they find that the closing price in 
the Paris Bourse can be manipulated by some noise traders using trading halt mechanism 
and this leads to a dramatic decrease in market liquidity for the rest of the trading session. 
Madura et al. (2006) investigate the consequences of trading halts for 656 trading halts in 
the NASDAQ in 1998. They compare the price behaviour pre, and post trading halts in 
order to examine investors’ reaction to the halts. They find significant abnormal returns pre 
trading halts period in the NASDAQ however, they find no significant abnormal returns 
post trading halts. 
 
Jiang et al. (2009) investigate the effect of trading halts on the informationally related 
shares in the NYSE. They define the informationally related shares based on the 
correlation between stock returns, trading volume and volatility within the same four digits 
of the SIC (industry classification). The data set consists of daily stock returns for the 
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halted shares in the NYSE over the period 2003-2005. Using the methodology of Spiegel 
and Subrahmanyam (2000), they find a direct impact of liquidity on the correlation 
between halted and reference (non-halted) stocks. They also find that the effect of the 
liquidity is more significant for small firms. 
 
5.3.1.3 Magnet effect 
Abad and Pascual (2007) investigate the so called magnet effect of price limits (the 
acceleration of stock price movements towards their Upper/Lower limits) in the Spanish 
stock exchange (SSE) over the period from 2001-2003 for 114 listed shares. The Spanish 
stock exchange has a unique price limits mechanism in which trading session is 
temporarily ceased and switched to a volatility auction regime for five minutes when stock 
prices hit the limit. Following Madhavan (1992), they compare trading sessions with the 
limit hits with other normal trading sessions (no limit hits). Using FGLS they find that 
switching the limit regime does not create a magnet effect in the Spanish stock exchange.  
 
5.3.2 Emerging markets 
5.3.2.1 Volatility and overreaction 
Huang (1998) investigates the overreaction hypothesis following up and down limit moves 
for all the listed shares in the Taiwan stock exchange during the period 1971-1993. Using 
the market model in the context of the event study methodology, he finds highly significant 
price reversals following up and down limit moves; these reversals are not due to size 
effects. Therefore the overreaction hypothesis is dominated in the Taiwanese stock market 
under a price limit regime. Diacogiannis et al. (2005) using the same methodology find 
similar results in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). 
212 
 
Phylaktis et al. (1999) investigate the effect of price limits on stock price volatility in the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). They also examine the information and overreaction 
hypotheses. The dataset consists of daily and monthly closing prices for the most active 10 
stocks in the ASE over the period from January 1990 to June 1996. Using the serial 
correlations of the daily returns and the time varying model (Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity - GARCH), they find that price limits have no effects on 
stock price volatility. Their results support the information and the overreaction hypotheses 
in the ASE.  
 
Shen and Wang (1998) examine the effect of price limits on stock return autocorrelation 
and trading volume. Using daily date from the Taiwan stock exchange over the period 
from November 1988 to December 1995, and using the Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) and the Generalized Method of Moment 
(GMM), they find evidence of the impact of price limits on stock returns autocorrelation. 
They also find that the Upper limits have a positive and stronger impact than the Lower 
limits.   
 
Kim and Limpaphayom (2000) look at the characteristics of shares that frequently hit the 
limit in Taiwan and Thailand stock exchanges. The dataset consists of daily and monthly 
returns over four years 1990-1993. They find that it is highly likely for the share to hit the 
limits if it has small market capitalisation (small firm effect), high volatility, and high 
trading volume. 
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Huang et al. (2001) investigate the information and overreaction hypothesis in the Taiwan 
stock market. The dataset consists of all Upper and Lower limit hits for three consecutive 
days for all listed shares in the Taiwan stock exchange over the period 1990-1996. The 
study extends the analysis to further investigate the intraday limit moves and near-limit 
cases. They use the market model in the context of the event study methodology to 
examine the overnight and trading time abnormal returns. The main findings of the paper 
support both the information and the overreaction hypotheses as a continuation pattern is 
found in the overnight period following limit moves and price reversal behaviour is 
reported in the subsequent trading days due to noise trading.  
 
Lee and Chou (2004) investigate the characteristics of stock returns around intra-day price 
limits in Taiwan stock exchange and conclude that there is no significant relationship 
between intra-day price limits and stock return dynamics. The sign of the pre-event (limit) 
price movement and the market capitalisation play an important role in explaining the 
intraday return dynamics. 
 
Nath (2005) investigates the effect of price limits on different groups of stocks listed in the 
National Stock Exchange (NSE) in India over the period 1999-2000. Nath concludes that 
price limits are found to be a useful tool in captivating volatility for some individual shares 
but not for the entire Indian stock market.  
 
Kim and Yang (2008) examine the relationship between price limits and both information 
asymmetry and intra-day price volatility by investigating the information and the 
overreaction hypotheses in the Taiwanese Stock Exchange (TWSE). They identify three 
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main types of limit hits, namely, closing, single, and consecutive. They use transaction data 
for all listed shares in the TWSE during 2000. They compare stock returns and variances 
during five-minutes in either 30 or 15 minutes before and after limits hit. Results show that 
there is a dramatic decrease in price volatility following consecutive limit hits; in addition, 
price limits are found unable to reduce information asymmetry in the TWSE.  
 
5.3.2.2 Price discovery and trading (liquidity) interference  
Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993) analyse stock price movements of small firms after 
imposing circuit breakers during the stock market crash of 1987 in the Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange (TASE). They use a short window (form 13
th
 to 28
th
 October) of daily stock 
prices, firm characteristic and order imbalances data around the stock market crash (1987). 
Regressing order imbalances on firm specific characteristics, they find no evidence that 
circuit breakers affect the magnitude of the market decline. In addition, they find that 
during the crash (1987) the selling pressure were concentrated on both higher beta and 
bigger companies. They conclude that circuit breakers might have smoothed the 
fluctuations in share prices, i.e. reduced volatility.   
 
Chen et al. (2004) following the methodology of Bossaerts and Hillion (2001), investigate 
the learning behaviour of rational investors and the role of past information within the 
strict (7%) price limits regime in Taiwan. Using daily data of 362 IPOs over the period 
1991-1998, they find significant and positive abnormal returns in the four months post 
IPO. This suggests underreaction behaviour due to the delayed information hypothesis 
under price limits regime.  
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Chen et al. (2005) use daily data of 83 firms over the period from July 1999 to December 
2002 form the Chinese stock exchange to investigate whether illiquid stocks are highly 
affected by price limits and are more vulnerable to hitting the limit more frequently than 
liquid shares. The regulator in the Chinese stock exchange set Strict Price Limits +-10% on 
the daily prices. Chen et al. (2005) analyse a sample of both A-shares (shares that are 
owned and traded by the Chinese investors) and B-shares (shares that are owned and traded 
by the non-Chinese investors).  
 
Their main argument is that B-shares are less liquid than those of A-shares due to the 
discrepancies in ownership structure. If this is the case then there should be wider price 
limits for B-shares compared to A-shares. They find that B-shares are less liquid and have 
a wider bid-ask spread than those of A-shares. This suggests that B-shares hit the limits 
more frequently than those of A-shares. They also find a positive and systematic 
relationship between the bids - ask spread and the tendency to hit the limits.  
 
Chan et al. (2005) investigate the effect of imposing wider price limits (+/- 30%) on price 
discovery mechanism, information asymmetry and order imbalance in the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) of Malaysia. They use order flow data and real-time transaction 
data over the period from January 1995 to December 1996. They identify two main groups, 
namely, the limit-hit and non limit-hit groups. Using the methodology of Madhavan and 
Smidt (1991) and Choi and Subrahmanyam (1994) and by comparing pre- and post-hit 
periods, they find no evidence that price limit enhances information asymmetry. They also 
find that price limits delay the information flow and lead to order imbalance. Kim (2001) 
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finds similar results on the Taiwanese Stock Exchange and argues that the more restricted 
bands of price limits the higher the volatility of stock returns.  
 
Bildik and Gulay (2006) investigate the effects of price limits on the volatility spillover, 
delayed price discovery, and trading interference hypotheses using the methodology of 
Kim and Rhee (1997). The data are collected from Istanbul stock market over the period 
1998–2002. They find that volume weighted average prices (VWAP) provide stronger 
evidence for the volatility spillover, delayed price discovery, and trading interference 
hypotheses.    
 
Chou et al. (2006) estimate the Value at Risk (VaR) using the two-limit type Tobit models. 
Following the methodology of Scholes and Williams (1977), they investigate the potential 
bias at VaR estimation due to the infrequent trading and price limits. Using daily stock 
returns of all listed shares in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) together with the over 
the counter market data over the period 1998-2003, they find that the simulation models 
are reasonably well specified in the TWSE except for the OLS even in cases of higher 
volatility when prices hit the limits. 
 
Chen et al. (2005) used the methodology of Kim and Rhee (1997) to investigate the 
volatility spillover and the trading interference hypotheses in the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Their results support the two 
hypotheses; in addition they find that the higher the book-to-market ratio the greater 
tendency to hit the limit.  
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5.3.2.3 Magnet effect 
Cho et al. (2003), investigate the so-called ‘magnet’ effect of price limits. This effect 
implies the acceleration of stock price movements towards their Upper/Lower limits when 
limits are imposed. They use high-frequency data, namely, intra-day data from Taiwan 
stock exchange TWSE (5-minute return series on all the listed shares from January 3, 1998 
to March 20, 1999). Cho et al. (2003) tackle the deterministic volatility pattern by 
standardising the 5-minute returns by its standard deviations. They find evidence of the so 
called ceiling magnet effect (price acceleration towards upper limits); however they find 
only weak evidence of floor magnet effect (price acceleration towards lower limits). They 
argue that the magnet effect is considered strong evidence against the overreaction 
hypothesis so that price limits fail as a tool to control price overreaction.  
 
Hsieh et al. (2009) use transactional data from the TWSE to investigate the magnet effect. 
Using the Logit model their findings support the magnet effect in the Taiwanese stock 
exchange; they also find significant increase in the conditional probability when prices 
reach their upper limits and the opposite is correct when prices approach the lower limits. 
 
Wong et al. (2009) investigate the intra-day dynamics of magnet effect (ceiling and floor) 
of the price limits in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) using intra-day data (5-minute 
price returns half an hour prior to the limit hits) over the period January 2002 to December 
2002. They use the methodology of Du et al. (2005) and find evidence of an acceleration of 
both trading activity and stock price volatility when prices approach limits hit. In addition 
they find an asymmetric price limit effect between ceiling and floor limits as trading 
volume tends to be lower when stock prices approach the lower limits. 
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5.3.2.4 Market efficiency 
Lee and Chung (1996) investigate the effect of price limits on market efficiency in the 
Korean Stock Exchange KSE. The dataset consists of thirty active individual stocks over 
the period from January 1990 to December 1993. They use the conditional 
heteroscedasticity to test for efficient market hypotheses in the Korean Stock Exchange 
(KSE). They find evidence that the KSE seems to be inefficient due to price limit regime. 
They argue that opening prices reflect all the information that is not fully reflected during 
the previous trading session (day) due to price limits. 
 
Lee and Kim (1995) investigate the effect of price limits on the parameters of the market 
model particularly on beta in the Korean stock exchange. They use the methodology of 
restricted regression analysis together with the two-pass regression to investigate whether 
or not the estimation of beta is biased. The dataset consists of all listed shares in the 
Korean Stock Exchange over the period 1990-1993. They find that the stochastic process 
of the returns and the parameters of market models are significantly affected by the price 
limits regime. They also find that the estimation of beta is biased and unstable over the 
time.  
 
Rayoo and Smith (2002) investigate the random walk hypothesis in the Korean stock 
exchange (KSE) under different regimes of price limits during the period 1988-1998. They 
conclude that stock prices in the Korean stock exchange under wider bands of price limits 
(+-15%) follow the random walk hypothesis; however within thinner bands of limits the 
random walk process is not detected. Berkman and Lee (2002) conclude that the wider the 
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price limits band the greater the long-term volatility and the lower the trading activities in 
the Korean stock exchange. 
 
Naughton and Veeraraghavan (2004) investigate whether or not price limits are priced. The 
dataset consists of monthly stock returns over the period 1975-1996 in the Taiwanese stock 
exchange (TWSE). They augment the Fama and French three-factor model by adding the 
price limit factor. Naughton and Veeraraghavan (2004) find that size and price limits 
factors significantly explain the cross section of stock returns in Taiwan. They find that 
shares that hit the limit less frequently have significant returns and risk premium. 
 
Kim and Park (2010) interestingly find a high direct relationship between the level of 
corruption together with low-quality public enforcement and the likelihood of adopting 
price limit regimes using a sample of international stock exchanges. They find no 
significant relationship between the information asymmetry and price limits regimes. 
 
Recently, Farag and Cressy (2011) investigate the relationship between regulatory policies 
and the information arrival modes in the Egyptian stock market. They examine the effect 
of the switch from strict price limit regime to a wider band limit regime with trading halts 
(circuit breakers) on the dissemination of information in the Egyptian stock exchange over 
the period 1998-2008. Farag and Cressy (2011) use the Mixture of Distributions 
Hypothesis (MDH) and the Sequential of Information Arrival Hypothesis (SIAH) as a 
proxy of the information arrival modes. The former hypothesis assumes that information 
arriving in the market is reflected into the share price instantly; however the latter assumes 
that information arrives in a sequential order and hence not all investors are informed and 
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able to react upon this information. Therefore there is a delayed price reaction based on 
this hypothesis.  
 
Farag and Cressy (2011) find that the mixture of distributions hypothesis (MDH) is 
prevailing within the Strict Price Limits. However, the sequential of information arrival 
hypothesis is prevailing within the circuit breakers regime. They claim that price volatility 
is higher within the circuit breakers regime due to the role of insider information and noise 
trading in emerging markets. They argue that during the trading halts period, investors 
have the chance to adjust their portfolios based on the new information arriving in the 
market, however not all investors are informed; therefore, price volatility might be greater 
within circuit breakers regime.   
 
5.3.2.5 Equilibrium prices 
Chung and Gan (2005) investigate the relationship between price limits and the underlying 
equilibrium prices on limit-hitting days. In addition they examine the ceiling and cooling 
effects. The sample consists of 69 continuously traded stocks over the period 1987-1997. 
They use a mixture normal density and the Mixture of Distributions Hypothesis (MDH) - 
introduced by Clark (1973) and then developed by Epps and Epps (1976) and Tauchen and 
Pitts (1983) - as a proxy of the latent information content of the price limits. Using the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the effect of price limits on all listed shares in the 
Taiwanese stock exchange, they find evidence of the cooling effect as imposing price 
limits leads to cooling down the average stock returns. In addition, they find a significant 
effect of price limits on stock return volatility assuming that stock returns follow a simple 
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normal density function. However, these effects disappear if the mixture normal density 
function is used.      
  
Hsieh and Yang (2009) argue that equilibrium prices are unobservable when share prices 
hit the limit. Therefore they use the censored stochastic volatility model (SCV) to examine 
shares return process under price limits. The dataset consists of a sample of two actively 
traded shares in the Taiwanese stock exchange (TWSE) in addition to two futures contracts 
in the Chicago Board of Trade CBOT. They find that the SCV model offers better 
interpretation to risk–return relationships under price limits. In addition, they suggest that 
portfolio managers may use the censored stochastic volatility model (SCV) in order to 
obtain better estimates for risk under price limits.  
 
Wei (2002) uses the censored generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity – 
GARCH – to model returns process under price limits. Wei (2002) concludes that price 
limits should be taken in consideration when modelling securities returns. He argues that 
price limits distort the behaviour of the return distribution causing negative kurtosis. 
 
Hauser et al. (2006) investigate the effect of trading halts on the price discovery 
mechanism and the speed of adjustments to the new information. The dataset consists of all 
company announcements during 2001 in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE). They find 
that during trading halts information dissemination of the announcements is faster. In 
addition they find that investors use trading halts periods to adjust their portfolios and that 
both volatility and trading volume increased subsequent to trading halts.  
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The literature on price limits is much diversified including many policy implications 
topics, i.e. leverage and stock market stability under price limits (Chowdahry and Nanda, 
1998), market quotes and spread components between cross listed shares, (Kryzanowski 
and Nemiroff, (2001), describing the behaviour of asset pricing under price limits (Chou, 
1999), the impact on the lead-lag portfolio returns (Chiao et al. (2004), trading strategies 
during circuit breakers Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004). 
 
5.3.3 Price limits in Futures Markets 
Due to the unique characteristics of futures markets the empirical results of the literature 
on price limits in equity markets cannot be generalised to futures markets. I present in this 
section the main findings of the effect of imposing price limits in futures market. 
 
Ma et al. (1989) find that price limits decrease stock price volatility immediately after limit 
moves in the Treasury Bond futures market. They use Treasury Bond futures prices to test 
both the overreaction and the information hypotheses over the period 1980-1983 in the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). Ma et al. (1989) also examine the effect of imposing 
price limits on the behaviour of the commodities futures market. They find evidence of 
price reversal one day following limits hit associated with high trading volume. In addition 
they find that price limits lower volatility and do not disrupt the price discovery 
mechanism.   
 
Arak and Cook (1997) investigate the effect of imposing daily price limits on the Treasury 
Bonds in the US stock market. The main objective is to investigate whether or not price 
limits destabilise price behaviour or act as a magnet in the U.S. Treasury Bond futures 
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market. Daily price data are collected for the US Treasury Bonds over the period from 
1980 to April 29 1987. In order to include a day into the dataset, the absolute value of the 
overnight price change should be twice as the standard deviation. Two empirical models 
are used to examine the effect of the price limits or news on the change in price. They find 
that price limits lead to little price reversal behaviour; this supports that the role of price 
limits as a stabiliser in the US futures market.    
 
Ackert et al. (1997) investigate the impact of the changes in price limits regulations on 
investors’ expectations. Using the of S&P 500 futures contracts, they find that circuit 
breakers fail to minimise both futures market volatility and investors expectations.  
 
Chen (1998) investigates the overreaction hypothesis and the effect of price resolution in 
futures markets. The dataset consists of daily prices for 19 futures contracts. The main 
results of the paper relatively support the efficiency of futures market in the US with 
regard to information dissemination. In addition, he finds little evidence of the overreaction 
hypothesis in the US futures markets.  
 
Chou et al. (2005) also investigate the relationship between price limits and default risk 
and whether or not price limits can reduce the effective margin requirements and to 
minimise default risk in the Taiwanese futures market. They find evidence that price limits 
can actually reduce the cost of contracts and the margin requirements only for low risk 
aversion investors. They also find that price limit is not an efficient tool to cool down the 
futures price volatility for risk averse investors.  
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Ackert et al. (2001) investigate the relationship between circuit breakers and both trading 
volume and price dynamics in the NYSE futures markets. They use experimental methods 
on nine different markets to analyse and compare the behaviour of prices under three 
regulatory policies, namely, temporary halt, no limit effects and market closure. They find 
that circuit breakers significantly affect trading volume as trading activities tend to be 
higher when prices are closer to limits hit. They also find no impact of temporary trading 
halts on trading behaviour.   
 
Similarly, Holder et al. (2002) collect data of Treasury Bond futures prices from the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) over the period 1980-1988. They conclude that price 
limit moves can be predicted three hours prior to the first limit move as they argue that the 
true futures prices deviate from the actual prices. In addition they find evidence that the 
overreaction hypothesis may offer a better explanation to the behaviour of stock prices 
around limits than the information hypothesis in the US futures market.  
 
There is a growing body of literature investigating the effect of price limits in futures 
markets, mainly the returns predictability under circuit breakers, price discovery 
mechanism and volatility of futures contracts, see for example, Kao and Ma (1992), 
Kuserk and Locke (1996), Berkman and Steenbeek (1998), Broussard (2001), Hall and 
Kofman (2001), Martens and Steenbeek (2001), Chen (2002), and Egelkraut et al. (2007), 
 
To conclude, the effect of the different types of circuit breakers has been excessively 
investigated in both developed and emerging markets in addition to futures markets. The 
main finding of the empirical literature is that price limits increase volatility in the short 
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run rather than cool the market down as was intended. However, there is no clear effect or 
evidence of price limits and/or circuit breakers in the longer-term due to the time-varying 
price volatility.  
 
Kim and Yang (2004) argue that the time-varying price volatility makes it difficult to 
investigate the effect of regulatory policies on stock price movements. In this chapter I 
investigate the effect of both short and long-term effects of regulatory policies (price limits 
and/or circuit breakers) on stock price movements; this is one of the main contributions of 
this chapter
25
.  
 
On the other hand, the main findings of the empirical literature support the argument that 
imposing price limits results in delaying the price discovery mechanism and the so called 
magnet effect. The literature survey concludes also that the effects of price limits on price 
overreaction are mixed, Kim and Yang (2004). Moreover, the results of the empirical 
literature on trading halts are consistent for both developed and emerging markets as 
volatility and trading volume are found to be higher around trading halts. Trading halts 
support the process of information dissemination during the halt period as intended. 
Finally, the main conclusion of the empirical studies is that price limits have no value 
added to the stock markets; on the contrary these policies should have been reconsidered 
by the regulators, Kim and Yang (2004). Table 5.17 presents a summary of main findings 
of the literature on price limits and circuit breakers in equity markets. 
 
                                                          
25
 This result has been published in Farag and Cressy (2011) based on the earlier version of this chapter. 
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5.4 The data 
The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) has become one of the biggest and most promising 
emerging markets in Middle East and North Africa region, having grown substantially 
since the beginning of the Egyptian economic reform and privatisation program in mid-
1990s.  
 
The Egyptian stock exchange (EGX) has unique history of price limit regimes; this makes 
studying the EGX - amongst few other stock exchanges i.e. Korean stock exchange - 
interesting. Since 1996 EGX trading regulations have imposed strict (+-5%) price limits 
(SPL) for all the listed shares. The limit is activated for a particular stock only when stock 
returns hit the Upper or Lower limit, then the trading on these shares is suspended to the 
end of the trading session. The SPL is only removed in case of any corporate action. The 
SPL was first launched by the regulator to cool down the market and to avoid excess 
volatility. 
 
In 2002 the regulator commenced a new price ceiling system, namely, circuit breakers 
(CB) in which the price limits have winded to (+-20%) for the most actively traded shares 
in the EGX. Within the new CB regime, trading is halted for 30 minutes when stock return 
for a particular stock hits (+-10%).    
 
During the 30-minute trading halt, brokers should inform their clients about the temporary 
suspension of the trading session. In addition they are allowed to cancel or adjust traders’ 
orders to adjust their portfolio positions. When the trading session is resumed and if stock 
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return for a given share hits the Upper or Lower limit (20%), trading is suspended until the 
end of trading session.  
 
The dataset consists of daily open, high, low and closing prices for all listed shares in the 
Egyptian stock exchange over the period 1999-2009, in addition to trading volumes as a 
proxy for trading activity and market capitalisation as a proxy for size.  I use the EGX30 - 
a free-float market capitalisation-weighted index - as a benchmark.  
 
5.5 Econometrics Modeling and empirical results 
In this section, I present the econometric modeling used in this chapter to investigate the 
effect of the changes in regulatory policies on the overreaction hypothesis, volatility 
spillover hypothesis, delayed price discovery hypothesis, the trading interference 
hypotheses and the volume volatility relationship. In addition, I present the empirical 
results and the main findings. 
 
The econometric modeling of this chapter depends on the methodologies of both Huang 
(1998), Kim and Rhee (1997) and Farag and Cressy (2011). The main difference between 
the methodology of this chapter compared to the papers of Huang (1998) and Kim and 
Rhee (1997) is that it is – to the best of my knowledge – the first to examine and compare 
the  effect of regime switch (from Strict Price Limits to circuit breakers) on the 
overreaction, volatility spillover, the delayed price discovery and the trading interference 
hypotheses. 
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5.5.1 Overreaction hypothesis 
To investigate the overreaction hypothesis under price limits and/or circuit breakers, I 
adopt the event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1980) and Huang (1998). I start 
in section 5.5.1.1 defining the returns measures I shall use.  
 
5.5.1.1 Daily Returns  
The return variable tR is defined as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the 
closing price over two consecutive trading days:  
 
    1 ttt pLogpLogR                     
  (1) 
where tp  is the adjusted (dividends, stock split and stock dividends) closing price of the 
stock in day (t). 
 
5.5.1.2 Stock Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
I estimate the market model parameters i and i  over estimation window 125 days (-
140,-16) as in equation 2. Stocks’ Abnormal Returns in the test period are defined as 
follows:  
 
    
TtRR mtiiit .....,2,1,0,                                                              (2)
 
I define the event (t=0) as when stock prices hit the Upper or the Lower limit in both 
regimes (SPL +/-5%) and (CB +-10%). The Egyptian stock market is regarded as a thinly 
trading market so that and in order to avoid the infrequent trading bias, and following 
Huang (1998), I exclude those shares that are not traded at least 80% of trading days 
during the estimation window. Following Huang (1998), the event window is (-15, +15) 
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and the security abnormal return in the post-event period has been estimated as in equation 
3: 
 TtRRAR mtiiitit .....,2,1,0,             (3) 
where T = 31days around event (-15, +15), i  and i  are the parameters of the market 
model for each company over the estimation window using the OLS. In addition to the 
OLS, I use the GARCH and TARCH models to estimate security abnormal returns and 
obtained similar results as the OLS. itR and mtR  
are the returns on company (i) and the 
value weighted market index EGX30 respectively. 
 
To further develop the analysis, I examine the effect of firm size on the overreaction 
hypothesis in the style of Huang (1998). Market capitalisation (as a proxy for size) is 
calculated for each share based on the average daily market capitalisation in the previous 
month (t-1). Firms included in the sample are ranked in an ascending order and grouped 
into five quintiles based on market capitalisation of the previous month. This process is 
updated according to the monthly market capitalisation rankings of the firms included in a 
sample. Therefore, daily average abnormal returns have been calculated for two groups, 
namely, Small-Big based on the first and fifth quintile.      
 
5.5.1.3 Average and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
The daily average abnormal return (AAR) for a given day for (n) events and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns for the event window (-15, +15) are calculated as in equations 4 
and 5. 
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The test statistic for a given day within event window is 
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5.5.1.4 Event definition 
I define the Event in our analysis as when a stock hits its Upper or Lower limit within the 
two regimes (SPL and CB). The total number of events is 4221 over the period 1999-2009. 
1655 and 771 events are associated with +5% and +10% Upper limit hits respectively; 
1174 and 621 events are associated with -5% and -10% Lower limit hits respectively. 
Table 5.3 and figure 5.1 summarise the total number of events over the period 1999-2009. 
Table 5.3: Summary statistics for the total number of events 
year 
Upper limit 
 Hits 
Lower limit  
Hits 
Total 
no. of 
events +5% +10% -5% -10% 
Total no. of events 5555 775 5574 525 4225 
1999 553 0 85 0 244 
2000 570 0 44 0 254 
2001 574 0 555 0 240 
2002 587 25 527 58 353 
2003 544 34 534 25 388 
2004 208 44 143 32 427 
2005 283 52 223 43 505 
2006 182 127 167 133 504 
2007 38 146 35 106 325 
2008 35 558 24 524 352 
2009 24 574 25 544 358 
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Figure  5-1: Total number of events over the period 1999-2009 
 
 
Table 5.3 shows that the total number of events associated with Upper limit hits (2426) is 
greater than those associated with Lower limits hits (1795) for the two regimes. The total 
number of the Upper limit hits is greater than those of the Lower limit hits by 41% and 
24% for the (SPL) Strict Price Limits and CB regimes respectively. This suggests that 
either price limits or circuit breakers are more likely to prevent stock price increases rather 
than price decreases.  
 
Table 5.4 presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal 
returns for the Strict Price Limits (SPL) Upper and Lower limit hits (+-5%). Table 5.4 
shows that the average abnormal returns for the Upper limit hits on event day is positive 
(3.95%) and highly significant, meanwhile the average abnormal returns for the Lower 
limit hits on event day is negative (4.45%) and highly significant as well. Price reversals 
occur in the third day subsequent to Upper limit hits and on the second day for the Lower 
limit hits.  
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Table 5.4: Average abnormal returns for upper and lower limit hits within the Strict 
Price Limits regime 
 Upper limit hits Lower limit hits 
Days +5% -5% 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 -0.1337 -0.1337 -0.7053 -0.7053 -0.1466 -0.1466 -0.7416 -0.7416 
-14 0.4708 0.3371 2.3759** 1.1345 0.0436 -0.1030 0.2238 -0.3215 
-13 -0.0091 0.3280 -0.0476 0.9721 0.0247 -0.0783 0.1620 -0.2275 
-12 -0.0403 0.2877 -0.2522 0.6879 0.1019 0.0236 0.5391 0.0626 
-11 -0.2779 0.0098 -1.5355 0.0199 0.1778 0.2014 1.0985 0.4825 
-10 0.4274 0.4371 2.0443** 0.7266 0.2186 0.4200 1.1556 0.8003 
-9 0.3331 0.7702 2.0270** 1.1084 0.1235 0.5435 0.6470 0.9827 
-8 -0.1745 0.5957 -1.0198 0.7933 0.4712 1.0147 2.5957*** 1.5929 
-7 0.2254 0.8212 0.9448 1.0718 0.1224 1.1371 0.7364 1.6877* 
-6 0.1820 1.0031 0.8574 1.1912 0.1869 1.3240 0.9184 1.7804 
-5 0.1699 1.1730 0.6652 1.2834 0.3655 1.6895 1.6938* 2.0334** 
-4 0.1105 1.2835 0.5700 1.3923 0.4626 2.1521 2.0669** 2.4037** 
-3 0.1105 1.3941 0.5700 1.2337 0.4626 2.6147 2.0669** 2.4243** 
-2 -0.1225 1.2716 -0.4642 0.9835 0.5427 3.1574 2.3646** 2.6531*** 
-1 0.2801 1.5517 1.8423* 1.7903* 0.1087 3.2661 2.4301** 2.4896** 
0 3.9534 5.5051 16.0287*** 4.2220*** -4.4529 -1.1868 -26.737*** -2.7332*** 
1 0.1362 5.6413 0.3454 4.052*** -0.3606 -1.5474 -0.5246 -0.7338 
2 0.6337 6.275 1.7307* 3.3583*** 0.1696 -1.3778 0.6839 -0.8564 
3 -0.2785 5.9965 -0.9321 3.4481*** 0.5106 -0.8672 0.7667 -0.5402 
4 0.4493 6.4458 1.3325 3.6264*** 0.8104 -0.0568 1.7195 -0.0612 
5 0.4683 6.9141 1.7822* 3.718*** -0.4758 -0.5326 -2.0772 -0.2555 
6 0.0938 7.0079 0.315 3.619*** -0.014 -0.5466 -0.0754 -0.2593 
7 -0.2552 6.7527 -0.9973 3.326*** 0.7228 0.1762 1.1274 0.1783 
8 0.1858 6.9385 0.7209 3.3392*** -0.1532 0.023 -0.8588 0.0934 
9 0.1855 7.124 0.7789 3.3875*** -0.2755 -0.2525 -1.252 -0.0574 
10 0.1091 7.2331 0.318 3.2987*** -0.4219 -0.6744 -2.0937** -0.2886 
11 0.0062 7.2393 0.0217 3.2778*** 0.1079 -0.5665 0.5671 -0.2285 
12 0.4204 7.6597 1.7641* 3.4827*** -0.0441 -0.6106 -0.2445 -0.2573 
13 0.2426 7.9023 0.8959 3.5581 -0.2921 -0.9027 -1.3307 -0.4106 
14 0.3764 8.2787 1.4538 3.5337*** 0.0475 -0.8552 0.2305 -0.3778 
15 0.551 8.8297 2.5838*** 3.6886*** -0.2898 -1.145 -1.3161 -0.5264 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The number of observations varies across time. It 
ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 4221 events. 
  
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is the Delayed Price Discovery hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis Strict Price Limits delay or prevent stock prices from 
reaching their equilibrium levels for a few days after the event as trading is suspended until 
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the end of trading session when prices hit the limits. Therefore the effect of limit hit 
continues in the following day(s) subsequent to up and down limit activation.  
 
In addition, we notice the leakage of information effect one day pre the Upper event (AR= 
+ 0.28% and marginally significant). This suggests that Upper limit hits might be 
predictable one day pre the event. As for the Lower limit hits, table 5.5 reports highly 
significant and positive abnormal returns five days pre the event. This suggests that the 
Lower limit hits may not be predictable under the strict (-+5%) price limit regime. The 
positive and significant abnormal returns five days pre vent may imply investor optimism 
towards stock prices and herding bahaviour
26
.  
 
Table 5.5 presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal 
returns for the +-10% Upper and Lower limit hits.  
 
Table 5.5 shows that the average Abnormal Returns for the Upper and Lower limit hits on 
event day are (+11.32%) and (-8.63%) respectively and both are highly significant. Price 
reversal occurs on day one following the Upper and Lower limit hits; however, the latter is 
highly significant.  
 
We notice the leakage of information effect for the Upper limit hits, as the abnormal 
returns on day one pre-event are highly significant, (although positive abnormal returns are 
found four days pre-event). This suggests that Upper limit hits might be predictable one 
day pre the event within the circuit breakers (CB) regime. 
                                                          
26
 If there is a leakage of information effect we would expect negative and significant abnormal returns pre 
event. 
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As for the Lower limit hits, table 5.5 reports positive abnormal returns six days pre the 
event, which suggests that the Lower limit might not be predictable under the CB regime. 
 
 
Table 5.5: ARs and CARS for Upper and Lower limit hits within the CB regime 
 
 Upper limit hits Lower limit hits 
Days 
+10% -10% 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 -0.0352 -0.0352 -0.1146 -0.1146 0.7467 0.7467 1.9948** 1.9948** 
-14 -0.1875 -0.2227 -0.7146 -0.8474 1.2343 1.9810 3.8296*** 4.2844*** 
-13 -0.7487 -0.9714 -2.4672** -1.3135 0.2616 2.2426 0.6871 3.3353*** 
-12 -0.0655 -1.0369 -0.2752 -1.2489 0.0250 2.2676 0.0923 3.2370*** 
-11 -0.5312 -1.5681 -1.7723* -1.5640 0.6578 2.9254 1.5807 2.7832*** 
-10 -0.3646 -1.9327 -1.1692 -1.6915* 0.5777 3.5031 1.3842 2.3340*** 
-9 0.4298 -1.5029 1.5179 -1.0597 0.4586 3.9617 1.2985 2.6023*** 
-8 0.0697 -1.4332 0.3258 -1.1228 -0.0195 3.9422 -0.0672 2.4284** 
-7 0.3477 -1.0855 1.0907 -0.6605 -0.4015 3.5407 -1.3467 2.0850** 
-6 -0.1090 -1.1945 -0.4382 -0.4560 0.0780 3.6187 0.2473 2.0273** 
-5 -0.1169 -1.3114 -0.3555 -0.3608 0.7022 4.3209 2.0623 1.9820** 
-4 0.3177 -0.9937 0.9916 0.2769 0.4225 4.7434 1.1711 2.0687** 
-3 0.3177 -0.676 0.9916 0.5384 0.4225 5.1659 1.1711 2.2486** 
-2 0.0627 -0.6133 0.1490 0.9301 0.1050 5.2709 0.2430 2.5619** 
-1 0.6043 -0.009 1.9668** 1.1639 0.3731 5.644 1.0595 2.6258*** 
0 11.3280 11.319 30.6179*** 7.3844*** -8.6362 -2.9922 -21.384*** -2.9432*** 
1 -0.5768 10.7422 -0.9159 7.0178*** 1.6122 -1.38 2.9928*** -1.9197* 
2 -0.1945 10.5477 -0.3465 6.2229*** -0.6983 -2.0783 -1.9257* -1.0556 
3 0.6262 11.1739 1.4070 6.0432*** -0.0692 -2.1475 -0.1643 -1.1549 
4 -0.0290 11.1449 -0.0701 5.7334*** -0.9047 -3.0522 -1.3984 -1.4125 
5 0.0026 11.1475 0.0053 5.1626*** 0.6204 -2.4318 1.0971 -0.6703 
6 -0.1624 10.9851 -0.3823 5.0544*** 0.0002 -2.4316 0.0007 -0.4215 
7 0.2800 11.2651 0.5203 4.6873*** -0.5460 -2.9776 -1.7603* -0.7332 
8 0.2905 11.5556 0.6901 4.6616*** -1.3613 -4.3389 -1.7523* -1.1866 
9 1.0686 12.6242 1.9663** 4.5480*** -0.4132 -4.7521 -0.6104 -1.2211 
10 -0.2191 12.4051 -0.5495 4.3324*** 0.0724 -4.6797 0.1247 -1.3032 
11 -0.1317 12.2734 -0.3226 4.1756*** -0.0407 -4.7204 -0.0837 -1.3312 
12 0.1090 12.3824 0.2530 4.7106*** -0.2387 -4.9591 -0.5701 -1.1091 
13 0.2646 12.647 0.6042 4.9524*** -0.2259 -5.685 -0.5191 -1.2902 
14 -0.2947 12.3523 -0.7927 4.7403*** -0.4727 -6.1577 -1.3298 -1.3675 
15 0.0048 12.3571 0.0135 4.7940*** -0.0682 -6.2259 -0.1595 -1.3481 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The number of observations varies across time. It 
ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 4221 events. 
 
Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show the cumulative average abnormal returns for the Upper and 
Lower price limit hits over the event window for the two regimes. 
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Figure  5-2: Cumulative average abnormal returns for the upper limit hit for the two 
regimes 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5-3: Cumulative average abnormal returns for the lower limit hit for the two 
regimes 
 
 
 
-0.04 
-0.02 
0 
0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
0.08 
0.1 
0.12 
0.14 
-1
5
 
-1
3
 
-1
1
 
-9
 
-7
 
-5
 
-3
 
-1
 
1
 
3
 
5
 
7
 
9
 
1
1
 
1
3
 
1
5
 
C
A
R
s 
Event window 
CARs ( +5%) 
 CARs (+10%) 
-0.08 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.02 
0 
0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
-15 -13 -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 
C
A
R
s 
Event window 
 CAR (-5%) 
 CAR (-10%) 
236 
 
Figure  5-4: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the upper and lower 
price limit hits over the event window for the two regimes 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that there are no significant price reversal patterns either for the Strict 
Price Limits or for  the more relaxed Circuit Breaker regimes in the case of the Upper limit 
hits (although we notice negative and insignificant abnormal returns one and three days 
subsequent circuit breakers and strict price limits regimes respectively). This suggests that 
price continuation patterns are expected post-Upper limit hits. The jump in the cumulative 
average abnormal returns on Event date within circuit breakers regime is wider – as 
expected – post-event compared with those of pre-events.   
 
On the other hand, for the Lower limit hits, figure 5.3 shows that there is a significant price 
reversal pattern for the CB regime on day one following limit hits. However, there is an 
insignificant price reversal pattern for the SPL regime. The event day drop in the CAARs 
between the two regimes is again wider for the CB regime. 
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To sum up, the above figures show that there is price reversal pattern for the Lower limit 
hits (bad news) within the two regimes. In addition, there is price continuation pattern 
(momentum behavior) for the Upper limit hits (good news) within the two regimes.  
In conclusion, these results support the overreaction hypothesis in the case of bad news 
(Lower limit hits) and suggest the presence of a leverage effect in the Egyptian stock 
market within the two regimes. 
 
5.5.1.5 Overreaction hypothesis: the size effect 
To investigate the effect of firm size
27
 on the overreaction hypothesis under different 
regulatory policies, Table 5.6 presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns for the strict (+5%) Upper limit hits (good news) for Small and 
Big portfolios.  
The results presented in table 5.6 (Upper limit hits) show that there is price continuation 
behaviour for small portfolios for two days following event day (limit hit). Price reversals 
occur on day three following the event. These results are consistent with Huang (1998) as 
we are interested in the sign (direction) rather than the significance of the abnormal 
returns; however we notice positive and marginally significant abnormal returns one day 
following the event.  
 
Table 5.6 also reports that price reversal for big portfolios occurs on the second day 
following the event for the Upper limit hit. The leakage of information is clear for big 
portfolios in cases of Upper limit hits (good news) as highly significant and positive 
cumulative abnormal returns are detected for two days pre limit hits. A possible 
                                                          
27
 Following the literature of  the overreaction hypothesis and price limits, I use market capitalisation as a 
proxy for firm size as all the firms included in the sample are listed in the EGX. None of the literature used 
other measures i.e. total assets due to the drawback of accounting measures.  
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interpretation of this result is the vast majority of investors are actively involved in 
analysing the news of big firms.   
  
Table 5.6: Average abnormal returns for the upper limit hits for Big and Small 
portfolios within SPL regime 
 
Upper limit hits  +5% 
Days 
Small portfolio Big portfolio 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 -0.3628 -0.3628 -0.9109 -0.9109 0.1285 0.1285 0.4165 0.4165 
-14 1.1477 0.7849 2.6569*** 1.5510 0.3629 0.4914 1.4986 1.8737* 
-13 -0.7191 0.0658 -1.6397* 0.1611 0.2636 0.755 1.4876 2.3366** 
-12 0.5414 0.6072 1.9375* 1.1319 -0.2198 0.5352 -1.0585 1.2286 
-11 -0.7107 -0.1035 -1.4020 -0.1628 0.0365 0.5717 0.1285 1.0401 
-10 0.8820 0.7785 1.9968** 0.9402 0.3271 0.8988 1.0941 1.4539 
-9 0.6619 1.4404 1.7361* 1.3823 0.2668 1.1656 1.0184 1.5516 
-8 -0.2919 1.1485 -0.8285 1.0858 0.1483 1.3139 0.8344 1.5656 
-7 0.2745 1.423 0.4719 1.2900 0.4210 1.7349 1.5200 1.3301 
-6 -0.7047 0.7183 -1.9739** 0.6218 0.0268 1.7617 0.1200 1.3558 
-5 0.1271 0.8454 0.1583 0.4836 0.0858 1.8475 0.2709 2.3573** 
-4 0.2510 1.0964 0.6533 0.5566 -0.1743 1.6732 -0.9536 1.9856** 
-3 0.2510 1.3474 0.6533 0.4151 -0.1743 1.4989 -0.9536 2.2870** 
-2 -0.3751 0.9723 -0.5475 0.2103 0.2724 1.7713 1.9596** 2.0891** 
-1 0.0678 1.0401 0.0978 0.1977 0.3615 2.1328 1.9604** 2.2447** 
0 3.8801 4.9202 6.1000*** 2.9372*** 3.7326 5.8654 13.3678*** 5.3084*** 
1 0.0778 4.998 0.0583* 1.2906 0.1048 5.9702 0.1755 4.434*** 
2 0.7752 5.7732 0.7695 1.0854 -1.2117 4.7585 -2.4622** 3.2049*** 
3 -0.3761 5.3971 -0.4428 1.1963 0.4813 5.2398 0.894 3.7437*** 
4 0.3922 5.7893 0.4325 1.3891 0.2277 5.4675 0.4061 3.3547*** 
5 1.0838 6.8731 1.9944** 1.5849 -0.0854 5.3821 -0.1715 3.1556*** 
6 1.4037 8.2768 2.0287** 1.8153* -0.4670 4.9151 -1.1205 2.7652*** 
7 -0.4326 7.8442 -0.7240 1.6311 -0.5090 4.4061 -1.3056 2.5228** 
8 -0.6800 7.1642 -0.8938 1.5577 -0.2555 4.1506 -0.7500 2.4402** 
9 0.1946 7.3588 0.2943 1.6454* 0.9579 5.1085 2.8107*** 2.7367*** 
10 0.6032 7.962 0.9669 1.8512* 0.3398 5.4483 0.6603 3.0451*** 
11 0.8317 8.7937 1.0101 1.8084* -0.1059 5.3424 -0.2685 3.3089*** 
12 -0.2078 8.5859 -0.3158 1.6886* 0.6081 5.9505 1.7028 3.6141*** 
13 0.9613 9.5472 1.5074 1.8712* -0.0209 5.9296 -0.0863 3.6537*** 
14 0.8263 10.3735 1.5167 1.8924* -0.0017 5.9279 -0.005 3.9516*** 
15 0.6163 10.9898 1.2618 1.9369* 0.3798 6.3077 0.8430 4.2100*** 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The number of observations varies across time. 
It ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 4221 events. 
 
Table 5.7 presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal 
returns for the strict (-5%) Lower limit hits (bad news) for Small and Big portfolios. 
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Table 5.7 reports that price reversal for small portfolios occurs on the third day following 
the event (Lower limit hits). We notice positive and highly significant abnormal returns for 
small portfolios on days three and four following the event. However, price reversal for big 
portfolios occurs on the second day following the event. The leakage of information is not 
clear for both Small and Big portfolios.  
Table 5.7: Average abnormal returns for the lower limit hits for Big and Small 
portfolios within SPL regime 
Lower linit hits  -5% 
Days 
Small portfolio Big portfolio 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 0.3520 0.3520 0.6964 0.6964 -0.2510 -0.2510 -0.6794 -0.6794 
-14 -0.0243 0.3278 -0.0600 0.4210 0.1595 -0.0915 0.4657 -0.1547 
-13 0.1485 0.4763 0.5712 0.6308 -0.3701 -0.4616 -1.1573 -0.8320 
-12 -0.1330 0.3432 -0.4052 0.3833 -0.0729 -0.5345 -0.1947 -0.6543 
-11 0.1058 0.4491 0.5046 0.4441 0.1909 -0.3436 1.0285 -0.3812 
-10 0.9216 1.3706 2.1811** 1.0331 -0.0899 -0.4335 -0.2389 -0.4252 
-9 -0.2312 1.1394 -0.4048 0.7610 0.2933 -0.1402 1.0392 -0.1205 
-8 0.6140 1.7533 1.1886 0.9167 0.2425 0.1023 0.6663 0.0870 
-7 0.2348 1.9882 0.7034 1.0167 0.0601 0.1624 0.1439 0.1110 
-6 0.1290 2.1172 0.2511 0.9107 -0.1922 -0.0298 -0.5011 -0.0234 
-5 -0.0703 2.0469 -0.1680 0.8068 0.1234 0.0936 0.2269 0.0754 
-4 0.1268 2.1737 0.2704 0.8246 0.4688 0.5624 1.0389 0.4067 
-3 0.1268 2.5031 0.2704 0.8908 0.4688 0.0379 1.0389 0.0257 
-2 0.9282 3.4314 2.0186** 1.0771 0.2310 0.2690 0.3852 0.1848 
-1 0.4986 3.9300 0.9355 1.1235 -0.1157 0.1533 -0.2225 0.0933 
0 -4.3080 -0.3780 -10.2560*** -0.1036 -4.9465 -4.7932 -22.048*** -2.7439*** 
1 -0.7945 -1.1725 -1.6235* -0.3095 -0.7171 -5.5103 1.1773 -2.2732** 
2 -0.9835 -2.1560 -2.2162** -0.5835 0.0376 -5.4727 -0.0614 -2.4389** 
3 2.6901 0.5341 1.9817** 0.2217 -0.5376 -6.0103 -1.3276 -2.8949*** 
4 2.8364 3.3705 1.9825** 0.9592 -0.2411 -6.2514 -0.8844 -2.8865*** 
5 -0.9755 2.3951 -1.9136* 0.7427 0.4912 -5.7602 1.1370 -2.6105*** 
6 0.2461 2.6412 0.6696 0.8276 -0.0559 -5.8161 -0.1248 -2.4556** 
7 2.1338 4.7750 0.8127 0.9084 0.0070 -5.8091 0.0193 -2.5287 
8 -0.2399 4.5351 -0.5887 0.8640 0.1656 -5.6435 0.4210 -2.4596** 
9 -0.8771 3.6580 -1.5489 0.7450 0.0178 -5.6257 0.0500 -2.4672** 
10 -0.4041 3.2539 -0.9203 0.6715 -0.2660 -5.8917 -0.6671 -2.7143*** 
11 0.1545 3.4084 0.4715 0.7001 -0.8966 -6.7883 -2.6559*** -3.5623*** 
12 0.0002 3.4087 0.0005 0.7375 0.3842 -6.4041 0.9133 -2.7968*** 
13 0.3077 3.7164 0.7227 0.7928 -0.0889 -6.493 -0.1721 -2.3969** 
14 0.2926 4.0090 0.5418 0.8557 0.0313 -6.4617 0.0614 -2.4342** 
15 -0.8617 3.1473 -2.5813*** 0.6938 -0.4662 -6.9279 -1.4975 -2.7522*** 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The number of observations varies across time. It 
ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 4221 events. 
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The results presented in tables 5.6 and 5.7 support the effect of firm size on the 
overreaction hypothesis for the Lower limit hits for small firms in particular. This can be 
explained in the light of the literature as volatility is more likely to be higher for small 
firms (Huang (1998). 
 Figure 5.5 plots the cumulative averages abnormal returns for Big and Small portfolios 
within the Strict Price Limits +-5% Upper and Lower limit hits. It is clear from figure 5.5 
that price reversals are prevailing for small firms in case of strict (-5%) price limit.   
 
Figure  5-5: Cumulative averages abnormal returns for Big and Small portfolios for 
the upper and lower limit hits within SPL regime 
 
  
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 present the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average 
abnormal returns for Small and Big portfolios within the CB Upper and downward (10%) 
limit hits respectively. It is clear from the tables that within the Upper and Lower 10% 
limit hits, price reversals occur one day following the event (limit hits day) for both Big 
and Small portfolios. However, these reversals are highly significant for small firms for the 
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Upper limit hits and big firms for the Lower limit hits. Furthermore, the leakage of 
information is clear for small firms as a highly significant abnormal return is reported one 
day pre-event for the Upper limit hits. 
 
 
Table 5.8: Average abnormal returns for the upper limit hits for Big and Small 
portfolios within CB regime 
 
Upper limit hits  +10% 
Days 
Small portfolio Big portfolio 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 0.0230 0.0002 0.0189 0.0189 0.2203 0.2203 0.4366 0.4366 
-14 0.3370 0.0036 0.6734 0.2334 -0.8836 -0.6633 -2.5796*** -0.9326 
-13 -1.6317 -0.0127 -3.9772*** -0.9564 0.3462 -0.3172 0.7803 -0.3943 
-12 0.7860 -0.0049 1.7593* -0.4379 -0.3317 -0.6488 -0.6099 -0.6411 
-11 -1.0335 -0.0152 -2.0605** -1.2686 -0.2290 -0.8779 -0.4606 -0.6437 
-10 0.2641 -0.0126 0.3938 -0.7754 -0.0334 -0.9113 -0.0673 -0.5798 
-9 0.8586 -0.0040 1.9247* -0.2375 0.5631 -0.3482 1.2414 -0.1923 
-8 0.3144 -0.0008 0.6263 -0.0449 0.8693 0.5211 2.4041** 0.2675 
-7 -0.0042 -0.0009 -0.0105 -0.0465 0.1585 0.6796 0.3907 0.3476 
-6 -0.2591 -0.0035 -0.5209 -0.1649 0.3124 0.9920 0.6129 0.4647 
-5 -0.2184 -0.0056 -0.5331 -0.2681 -0.7859 0.2061 -1.1043 0.1105 
-4 -0.8265 -0.0139 -1.2501 -0.5995 1.3715 1.5776 2.2880** 0.7740 
-3 -0.8265 -0.0136 -1.2501 -0.5277 1.3715 2.1136 2.2880** 0.9423 
-2 -0.2851 -0.0164 -0.2861 -0.5202 0.8154 2.9290 1.0346 1.0771 
-1 2.0326 0.0039 2.1044** 0.1159 -1.3659 1.5631 -1.0650 0.4591 
0 11.9821 0.1237 21.1858*** 3.6754*** 10.1940 11.7571 11.2760*** 3.6214*** 
1 -3.9895 0.0838 -4.8058*** 2.3055** -0.9499 10.8072 -0.8447 3.3666*** 
2 0.9464 0.0933 0.6173 2.3764** -0.1755 10.6317 -0.1717 3.0765*** 
3 -0.0105 0.0932 -0.0158 2.4136** -0.3207 10.3111 -0.5933 2.8026*** 
4 0.9056 0.1022 0.7328 2.6762*** -0.2861 10.0250 -0.4533 2.8377*** 
5 3.2954 0.1352 1.8201 2.9140*** 0.1720 10.1969 0.2277 2.7993*** 
6 -1.5100 0.1201 -1.2351 2.4623** 0.4639 10.6608 0.5073 2.6286*** 
7 2.2880 0.1430 0.9667 2.3354** 0.6128 11.2736 0.7652 2.8261*** 
8 -0.3055 0.1399 -0.4681 2.4765** -0.5101 10.7635 -0.7909 2.6929*** 
9 2.8493 0.1684 1.5158 2.3437** -1.1072 9.6564 -1.5432 2.3683** 
10 1.2279 0.1807 1.0446 2.2890** 0.1206 9.7770 0.1915 2.5123** 
11 0.3237 0.1839 0.4907 2.3531** -1.6492 8.1278 -1.8445 1.9064* 
12 -2.2213 0.1617 -1.6006 2.4211** 0.5156 8.6434 0.5108 2.3353** 
13 -0.2452 0.1593 -0.3736 2.2961** -0.1473 8.4960 -0.2412 2.2837** 
14 -0.9861 0.1494 -1.4756 2.2416** -0.8235 7.6725 -1.3231 1.8705* 
15 -0.3968 0.1454 -0.4544 2.3859** -0.3389 7.3336 -0.4192 1.8312* 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The number of observations varies across time. 
It ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 4221 events. 
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Table 5.9: Average abnormal returns for the upper and lower limit hits for Big and 
Small portfolios within CB regime 
 
Lower limit hits  -10% 
Days 
Small sized portfolio Big sized portfolio 
AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) AR(%) CAR(%) t(AR) t(CAR) 
-15 2.3637 2.3637 1.3984 1.3984 0.4387 0.4387 0.8998 0.8998 
-14 0.2721 2.6357 0.4462 1.3198 0.1276 0.5663 0.3126 1.0189 
-13 -0.3024 2.3334 -0.4000 1.3910 0.2504 0.8166 0.3876 0.7924 
-12 -1.0080 1.3254 -1.4911 0.6828 0.8922 1.7089 1.9430* 1.4483 
-11 -0.8538 0.4717 -1.0516 0.2010 0.9058 2.6147 1.8833* 2.1399** 
-10 0.7254 1.1971 0.4910 0.3944 -0.4132 2.2015 -1.5097 1.9101* 
-9 -0.0102 1.1868 -0.0085 0.3256 -0.0339 2.1676 -0.0804 1.9666** 
-8 0.8040 1.9909 0.9015 0.5127 -0.4043 1.7633 -1.5907 1.4895 
-7 0.0789 2.0697 0.0674 0.5385 0.1785 1.9418 0.4517 1.4396 
-6 -0.7880 1.2817 -0.6720 0.3260 -0.6130 1.3288 -1.0243 0.8624 
-5 -0.0874 1.1943 -0.1089 0.2878 -0.4531 0.8757 -1.0928 0.5774 
-4 -0.2045 0.9898 -0.2792 0.2227 -0.0153 0.8604 -0.0280 0.5701 
-3 -0.2045 1.5429 -0.2792 0.3253 -0.0153 0.2956 -0.0280 0.1797 
-2 -1.0182 0.5247 -0.9959 0.1102 -0.9721 -0.6765 -1.4695 -0.3702 
-1 0.5944 1.1191 0.3527 0.2299 1.6311 0.9547 2.7069*** 0.4790 
0 -11.2329 -10.1138 -8.9462*** -2.1427** -7.6231 -6.6684 -6.3750*** -2.8245*** 
1 0.2354 -9.8785 0.2371 -1.8729* 4.4624 -2.2060 3.8610*** -0.7539 
2 1.3024 -8.5761 0.8968 -1.6109 -1.3305 -3.5365 -1.7616* -1.3486 
3 -1.0993 -9.6754 -1.2649 -1.9779** -1.0512 -4.5877 -1.3126 -1.7083* 
4 -1.9053 -11.5808 -1.5797 -2.1336** 0.8758 -3.7119 1.4234 -1.4249 
5 1.0256 -10.5552 1.0104 -2.0436** 1.8371 -1.8748 2.9406*** -0.6304 
6 0.2712 -10.2840 0.3895 -2.1216** -0.1722 -2.0471 -0.4245 -0.7125 
7 0.2394 -10.0446 0.4581 -2.0873** -1.0398 -3.0868 -1.9040* -1.0431 
8 -2.1925 -12.2371 -1.2813 -2.1864** -0.6933 -3.7801 -0.7307 -1.2956 
9 -0.8417 -13.0787 -0.9092 -2.2535** -1.1947 -4.9748 -1.9592** -1.7038* 
10 -1.6071 -14.6859 -1.8575* -2.5001** 0.8214 -4.1534 1.0468 -1.2910 
11 -1.4261 -16.1120 -1.8654* -2.8093*** 0.9363 -3.2171 1.1676 -0.9404 
12 -1.3349 -17.4468 -1.1400 -3.0846*** 1.0451 -2.1720 1.5368 -0.6068 
13 0.6416 -16.8053 0.4889 -2.8946*** 1.0910 -1.0810 1.4690 -0.2913 
14 0.9747 -15.8305 1.2816 -2.6729*** 0.0852 -0.9958 0.1975 -0.2620 
15 -1.0714 -16.9019 -1.2455 -2.7000*** -1.2359 -2.2317 -1.3426 -0.6072 
***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The number of observations varies across time. It 
ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 4221 events. 
 
 
 
Results presented in tables 5.8 and 5.9 do not support the effect of firm size on the 
overreaction hypothesis within the circuit breakers regime as price reversals occur one day 
following the event. Therefore there is no evidence of the volatility spillover hypothesis 
within circuit breakers regime; this result is consistent with Kim and Rhee (1997) .  
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Figure 5.6 plots the cumulative averages abnormal returns over the event window for the 
Big and Small portfolios within the CB (10%) Upper and Lower limit hits. 
Figure  5-6: cumulative averages abnormal returns over the event window for the Big 
and Small portfolios within the CB regime 
 
 
5.5.2 Volatility Spillover hypothesis 
To investigate the Volatility Spillover (VS) hypothesis, for each event (price hits the Upper 
or the Lower limit), I identify days (events) where the high price during the trading session 
matches its previous day's closing price plus the symmetric price limit (-/+5%) or (-/+ 
10%) (Kim and Rhee 1997). 
For Upper limits I assume:  
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  where: 
    tH is day's high price. 
   tL is day's low price. 
   1tC is previous day's closing price. 
           t
SPL is the symmetric price limit for day (t) (+/-5% or +/-10%) according to the 
regime in  operation (SPL or CB). 
 
To test the volatility spillover hypothesis and following Kim and Rhee (1997), I examine 
volatility during 21 days (-10, +10) around event day. The event for a particular stock 
occurs when its price hits its Upper or lower price limit (+/-5% or +/-10%) in a particular 
day. In event time, this day is t=0.     
I define daily price volatility in the fashion of Kim and Rhee (1997) as in equation 10: 
 
                
2
tjtj RV                                                      (10)
 
 
where: 
tjV  is the volatility of stock (j)  on day (t). 
             tjR is the close-to-close return for stock j on day t, measured by  the log of the 
firm’s price ratio i.e.       
                1/ln  ttt PPR   where tP  is the closing price of the stock on day (t). 
 
In order to examine the volatility spillover hypothesis in post limit days for each regime 
(SPL +/-5% or CB +/-10%) within the two categories (upward and downward movements), 
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I calculate the daily price volatility 
2
tjR  
for each stock in the four categories (upward and 
downward +/-5% or +/-10%) and then take the daily averages.  
                 
To overcome potential bias in volatility estimation I include only non-overlapping event 
windows; the inclusion of consecutive events would bias the post-event window. To 
compare volatility levels for upward and downward price movements, I use the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed–rank test (Kim and Rhee, 1997). I assume that the sample 
distribution of the difference between the matched pairs is symmetric. The null hypothesis 
is ''The distribution is centered on zero difference''. 
 
To investigate the volatility spillover hypothesis, table 5.10 presents stock returns volatility 
around the event (limit hit day) for the Upper and Lower limit hits within the two regimes. 
I exclude from the analysis the multiple overlapping events to minimise the pre-limit day 
volatility bias arising from the inclusion of the consecutive events as independent events 
(Kim and Rhee 1997). This reduces the sample size for the stocks that hits their limits by 
19.20% (from 4221 to 3542). 
 
It is clear from the table 5.10 that the highest volatility is reported on event day for both 
Upper and lower price movements for the two regimes. For the Upper limit hits for 
instance, we notice a large drop in volatility on day one from 2.5 to 5.57 for the strict (+ 
5%) price limit regime and from 10 to 0.81 for the (+ 10%) circuit breakers regime.  
However, for the lower price limits we also notice a large drop in volatility on event day 
from 2.5 to 1.28 and from 10 to 0.89 within Strict Price Limits (SPL) and circuit breakers 
(CB) regimes respectively. Ma et al. (1989) explain this as the cooling effect of price 
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limits, however Kim and Rhee (1997) and Lee et al. (1994) conclude that volatility 
measures will naturally decline when stocks hit their limits. To support this result, I re-
estimated the volatility spillover hypothesis for other categories of stocks that nearly hit 
their limit 90% and 80% of Upper and Lower limit, and found similar results. 
 
Table 5.10: Volatility Spillover Hypothesis 
 
Days 
Upper price movements Lower price movements 
+5%  +10% -5%  -10% 
-10 0.1768  0.1291 0.2200  0.2241 
-9 0.1653  0.2984 0.2190  0.2216 
-8 0.0827  0.2414 0.2813  0.2450 
-7 0.1095  0.2422 0.1933  0.2936 
-6 0.0957  0.2490 0.2071  0.3542 
-5 0.1349  0.2239 0.2373  0.2214 
-4 0.1110  0.2568 0.2398  0.2440 
-3 0.1333 < 0.2644 0.2430  0.3259 
-2 0.2667  0.3379 0.2541 < 0.4071 
-1 0.4072  0.5560 0.3674 << 0.6695 
0 2.5000 << 10.0000 2.5000 << 10.0000 
1 1.5723 >> 0.8088 1.2797 >> 0.8947 
2 1.2739 >> 0.7680 0.3649 < 0.4448 
3 0.2427 << 0.3895 0.2962 << 0.4770 
4 0.1107 < 0.2857 0.1309  0.2409 
5 0.1277  0.2572 0.1727  0.2115 
6 0.1586  0.2876 0.2138  0.2883 
7 0.1432  0.3813 0.1735  0.4051 
8 0.1745  0.3598 0.1752  0.2809 
9 0.1326  0.3249 0.1400  0.3169 
10 0.1343  0.2779 0.2005  0.2590 
>> and > implies that the left hand figure is significantly greater than the right hand figure at 0.01 and 0.05 
significance levels respectively using Wilcoxon signed-ranked test.  
Volatility is measured by squared stock returns multiplied by 1000. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number 
of events is 4221 events. 
 
By comparing the volatility within the two regimes, we notice that for the Upper and 
Lower events, the volatility within the CB regime is greater than those of the SPL regime 
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over the entire event window except for the first two days subsequent to the Upper limit 
hits and for the first day post-event for the Lower limit hits. 
 
 Volatility of the Upper (+ 5%) SPL for the first two days post-event (limit hits) is greater 
than those of CB by 93%, and 65% respectively. However, volatility of the Lower SPL (- 
5%) is greater than those of the CB regime by 43.82% only during the first day post-event. 
This suggests that within the SPL regime, stocks that hit their Upper and Lower limit 
continue to experience greater volatility during the first 1-2 days post-event compared with 
the CB regime. 
 
These results are consistent with the volatility spillover hypothesis as price discovery 
mechanism is disrupted when stocks experience greater volatility for a few days post limit 
hits, therefore stock prices are prevented from reaching their equilibrium levels for the 
following few days post-event. These deviations from the true prices are expected to 
prevail within the SPL (+-5%) regime as trading session is suspended until the following 
day (trading session) when the prices hit their Upper or lower limits. However, within 
wider bands of limits (- +10%) followed by trading halts investors have chance to adjust 
their portfolio positions within the same trading session. Therefore, the volatility spillover 
is expected to be higher within the SPL regime.  
 
To support the analysis I compare between volatility levels pre and post each regime. We 
notice that within the Upper and Lower price limit regimes, volatility post limits is greater 
than those of pre limits for two and three days for Lower and Upper price limits 
respectively, for example, within +5% SPL, post limit volatility is greater than those of pre 
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limit volatility for the first three days post limits by 286%, 377% and 82%. Similarly, 
within +10% CB regime, post limit volatility for the first three days is greater than those of 
pre-limit hit by 45%, 127% and 47%. This result supports the volatility spillover 
hypothesis. Finally, the Wilcoxon signed–rank test shows that the differences between the 
two regimes are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels on event day 
and over the three days post-event. 
 
To conclude, results show that price limits do not decrease volatility as intended in both 
regimes (SPL and CB). However, volatility is found to be higher within the CB regime. On 
the other hand, within the SPL regime, volatility is spread out over the following two days 
subsequent to limit hit day. These results support the volatility spillover hypothesis in the 
Egyptian stock exchange consistent with findings of Kim and Rhee, (1997) and Lee et al 
(1994). Figures 5.7 and 5.8 present the daily price volatility around event day. 
 
Figure  5-7: Daily price volatility for the Upper limit hits for the two regimes around 
event day 
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Figure  5-8: Daily price volatility for the Lower limit hits for the two regimes around 
event day 
 
 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 present the cumulative average volayility (CAV) for the Upper and 
Lower limit hits for the two regimes.  
Figure  5-9: Cumulative average volatility (CAV) for the Upper limits hits for the two 
regimes 
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Figure  5-10: Cumulative average volatility (CAV) for the Lower limits hits for the 
two regimes 
 
 
 
5.5.3 The delayed price discovery hypothesis 
According to the Delayed Price Discovery (DPD) hypothesis there will be positive 
overnight returns for stocks which hit their Upper limits and negative overnight returns for 
stocks which hit their Lower limits (Kim and Rhee 1997).  
 
To investigate these claims I estimate the following two returns series: open-to-close 
returns on the limit day, namely )/ln()( 0000 OCCOR   and close-to-open returns between 
the event day and the following day, namely )/ln()( 0110 COOCR  , where 0C is the 
closing price on day (t) and 1O  is the opening price on day (t+1). As stock returns can be 
positive, negative or zero, we have nine return series (+, +), (+, 0), (0, +), (0, -), (0. 0), (+, -
), (-, +), (-, -) and (-, 0) as shown in table 5.11 below. 
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The first return symbol represents the open-to-close returns on the limit day 
)/ln()( 0000 OCCOR   and the second return symbol represents the close (in event day)-to-
open (in event day +1) )/ln()( 0110 COOCR  . 
 
Stocks often experience either price continuation or price reversal based on overnight 
returns. I compare the price behaviour of the two regimes (SPL and CB) so that if price 
continuation behaviour within SPL is greater than those of the CB regime then, we can 
infer that the efficient price discovery mechanism is much delayed within the strict price 
limit regime and the opposite is correct. 
 
In other words, I argue that price continuation behaviour prevents stock price from 
reaching their equilibrium levels (Kim and Rhee, 1997), since otherwise we should observe 
price reversals or overreactive behaviour (Roll, 1983). I examine the immediate stock price 
movement subsequent to price-limit hit on event day for both regimes (SPL and CB) by 
estimating the frequencies of price continuation, price reversal and no changes, as in the 
following table 5.11. 
Table 5.11 Frequencies of price continuation and price reversal for the two regimes 
 
 Upper limit  Lower limit  
Price continuation (+, +) and (0, +) (-, -) and (0, -) 
Price reversal (+, -), (0, -), (-, +), (-, 0) and (-, -) (-, +), (0, +), (+, -), (+, 0) and (+, +) 
No change (+,0) and (0,0) (-, 0) and (0, 0) 
Note:  The first return symbol represents the open-to-close returns on the limit day )/ln()( 0000 OCCOR   and the 
second return symbol represents the close-to-open )/ln()( 0110 COOCR   
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 
4221 events. 
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Following Kim and Rhee (1997) and Bildik, and Gulay (2006), consecutive event days are 
not excluded from the analysis as they will underestimate the frequencies of price 
continuation and price reversals. As can be seen from Table 5.11 I classify both (+, +) and 
(0, +) categories as price continuation for the Upper Limit hits. The (0, +) category is 
classified as price continuation because these stocks experience an overnight price increase 
(stocks open at the Upper limit and remain unchanged over the event day). The same 
concept applies to the lower limits as I classify (-, -) and (0, -) categories as price 
continuation for the Lower limit, Kim and Rhee (1997) and Bildik, and Gulay (2006). 
 
On the other hand, I classify – following Kim and Rhee (1997) (+, -), (0, -), (-, +), (-, 0) 
and (- , -) as price reversal for the Upper limits. I include (-, +), (-, 0) and (-, -) categories 
as price reversal as the first negative sign (open-to-close returns) implies price reversal 
before the end of trading session in event day (Kim and Rhee (1997) and Bildik, and Gulay 
(2006)). The same concept applies on the lower limits as I classify (-, +), (0, +), (+, -), (+, 
0) and (+, +) categories as price reversals for the Lower limit. Finally, I consider (+, 0) and 
(0, 0) as no-change categories for the Upper limit hits and the (-, 0) and (0, 0) as no-change 
categories for the Lower limit hits (Kim and Rhee (1997) and Bildik, and Gulay (2006)). 
 
I use the following standard nonparametric binomial Z-test to examine for significant 
differences between the two regimes with respect to price continuations and price reversals 
(Kim and Rhee (1997) and Bildik, and Gulay (2006)). 
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     where: 
hitsSPLx : Number of price continuations or price reversals events that stocks   
experience within SPL regime. 
hitCBpx : Percentage of price continuations or price reversals events that stocks 
experience within CB regime hitCBhitCB Nx / . 
hitN : sample size for stocks hit the limit within the SPL and CB regimes.  
 
As the sample is large the Z-statistic is normally distributed (Olkin, Gleser, and Dermam, 
1980 pp. 244-253). 
 
I now discuss the empirical results of the delayed price discovery hypothesis. Table 5.12 
presents the frequencies of price continuations, price reversals and no change events for 
stocks that hit their Upper and/or lower price limits for the two regimes over the period 
1999-2009.  
 
For the Upper price limit hits, table 5.12 shows that price continuation occurs 74.7% and 
51.04% immediately following the event (limit hit day) for SPL and CB regimes 
respectively. However, price reversals occur 24.88% and 47.15% immediately following 
the event for SPL and CB regimes respectively over the same period. The no change events 
occurs 0.42% and 0.81% immediately following the event for SPL and CB regimes 
respectively. For the Lower price limit hits, price continuation occurs 69.15% and 47.58% 
immediately following the event for SPL and CB regimes respectively.  
However, price reversals occur 30.15% and 52.40% immediately following the event for 
the SPL and CB regimes respectively. 
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We notice that price continuation occurs more frequently within the SPL regime; however, 
price reversals occur more frequently within the CB regime immediately following the 
event. This result is consistent with the delayed price discovery hypothesis as price limits 
prevents stock prices from reaching their equilibrium levels, in particular within a strict 
price limit regime. The nonparametric binomial Z test show that there are significant 
differences between the two regimes regarding price continuations and price reversals.  
Table 5.12: Delayed price discovery: price continuation and reversal 
 
Price Behaviour 
Upper price movements Lower price movements 
SPL (%) CB (%) SPL-CB 
(z- stat) 
SPL (%) CB (%) SPL-CB 
(z-stat) 
Price Continuation 74.70 51.04 5.7737*** 69.15 47.58 7.9097*** 
Price Reversal 24.88 47.15 -8.9936*** 30.15 52.40 -5.3111*** 
No. change 0.42 0.81 -1.2568 0.70 0.02 1.5987 
The table presents the limit hit frequencies for the two regimes. The number of observations varies across time. 
It ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 4221 events. 
 
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 illustrate the frequencies for price continuation and price reversal 
within the two regimes. 
Figure  5-11: Frequencies for price continuation and price reversal for the 
Upper limit hits within both regimes. 
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Figure  5-12: Frequencies for price continuation and price reversal for the Lower limit 
hits within both regimes. 
 
 
To summarise, price continuation behaviour occurs more frequently within the SPL regime 
immediately following the event (limit hit day). This implies that price discovery 
mechanism is delayed by the Strict Price Limits. This result supports the delayed price 
discovery hypothesis. Price reversal behaviour seems to occur more frequently within the 
CB regime compared to the SPL regime immediately following the event. This implies that 
Strict Price Limits delay or prevent - to some extent - the overreactive behaviour, 
compared to the circuit breakers regime.  
 
5.5.4 The Trading Interference hypothesis. 
The Trading Interference (TI) hypothesis claims that trading volume (as a proxy for trading 
activity) will be higher for stocks that hit their Upper or Lower limits for a few days post-
event (Bildik, and Gulay (2006)). As we expect that price limits will prevent rational 
trading on the event day, therefore trading volume is expected to continue increasing over 
the post-event days (Kim and Rhee (1997).  
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To investigate the trading interference TI hypothesis around limit-days, following Kim and 
Rhee, (1997) and Cressy and Farag (2011), I calculate  the percentage change in the 
turnover ratio as a proxy for trading activity in the window (-10 to +10 days): as follows: 
 
                  
)/ln(% 1 jtjtjt TATATA                                                          (12)
 
                 
sharesofNoVolTA tjt ./                                                        (13)
 
where: 
          
jtTA is the turnover ratio as a proxy for trading activity of stock (j) at time (t). 
          
jtVol  is a daily trading volume for stock (j) at time (t). 
I calculate the percentage change in the turnover ratio for each stock in the two regimes (± 
5% SPL) and (± 10% CB) and then take averages for each day for each window (-10, +10); 
I exclude the consecutive events during the limit window (-10, +10) to be consistent with 
volatility spillover (VS) hypothesis analysis (Kim and Rhee, (1997). We are interested in 
the daily percentage change in turnover ratio because liquidity (trading) interference 
hypothesis is mainly concerned with the daily change in trading activity (Bildik, and Gulay 
(2006)). 
Table 5.12 presents daily percentage change in turnover ratio as a proxy for trading activity 
over a 25-day window (-10 to +10) around the event (limits hit ± 5% and ± 10%) for both 
SPL and CB regimes.  
 
It is clear from the table that there is sharp increase in trading activity on event day (limit 
hit day) for both the SPL and CB regime. For the upward price movement, table 5.13 
reports that the percentage increases in trading activity on event day are 51.26% and 
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77.03% for SPL and CB respectively. In addition, the trading activity on event day (limit 
hit day) is significantly greater than those within the first 8 days of trading window. 
 
The increase in trading activity lasts for two days (45.15% and 36.69%) subsequent to the 
event within the SPL and lasts only for one day (40.50%) following the event within the 
CB regime. Trading activity within the CB regime is higher than those of the SPL four 
days pre-event. 
 
For the Lower price movements, the highest trading activity – as expected – is reported on 
event day; 42.84% and 67.15% for the SPL and CB respectively. We also notice that the 
increase in trading activity lasts only for one day (24.89%) following the event within the 
SPL regime. In addition, we find a significant decrease in trading activity one day 
following the event within CB regime. Trading activity within the CB regime – on average 
– is higher than those of the SPL for four days pre-event. 
 
I interpret these results as follows: within the SPL regime, traders are unable to obtain their 
desired positions on event day. In addition, traders are unable to adjust their portfolios’ 
positions – when prices hit the limit – and are forced to wait until the following day. 
Therefore Strict Price Limits interfere with trading activity. 
 
On the other hand, within circuit breakers regime, trading activity on average is 
significantly higher than those of Strict Price Limits as price limits are widened to ± 10%. 
Investors within the CB regime have the chance to adjust their portfolios positions during 
the same trading session. However, not all investors are informed about the suspension of 
258 
 
trading due to the lack of informational efficiency in the emerging markets. Therefore, 
only one day following the event (in case of Lower limit hits) may be required to adjust 
portfolios’ position.  
 
Table 5.13: Trading interference hypothesis: Turnover ratio 
 
Days 
Upper price movements Lower price movements  
+5%  +10% -5%  -10%  
-10 -0.0498  0.0227 -0.0380  0.0012 
-9 -0.0462  0.0249 -0.0354  -0.1074 
-8 -0.0716  -0.1658 0.2126 > 0.1201 
-7 0.1791 > 0.0855 0.0274  -0.0336 
-6 -0.0151  0.1044 -0.1268  0.1127 
-5 -0.1385  -0.1485 0.1669  -0.0172 
-4 0.0569  0.1480 -0.0857  -0.0704 
-3 0.0511  0.1052 -0.0368  0.0583 
-2 -0.0475  0.0958 0.1470 < 0.1701 
-1 0.2578 < 0.4053 -0.1330  -0.0453 
0 0.5126 << 0.7703 0.4284 << 0.6715 
1 0.4515 >> 0.4050 0.2489 >> -0.3751 
2 0.3669 >> -0.2302 -0.1296  0.0618 
3 -0.1578  0.1976 0.0929  0.1522 
4 -0.0168  -0.0079 0.0722 << 0.1550 
5 -0.1162  -0.0345 -0.0526  -0.0355 
6 -0.1133  -0.0236 -0.0563 << 0.1122 
7 -0.0534 >> -0.1374 0.0607  0.0935 
8 -0.1176  0.0078 -0.0568  -0.0183 
9 -0.0256 << 0.1283 0.1099  -0.0457 
10 0.0179  0.0686 -0.1377 << -0.0461 
>> and > implies that the left hand figure is greater than the right hand figure at 0.01 and 0.05 significance 
respectively using Wilcoxon signed-ranked test. The number of observations varies across time. It 
ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 4221 events. 
 
 This result suggests that price limits interfere with trading activity and negatively affect 
the investors’ liquidity positions within the two regimes. Moreover, these results are 
consistent with Lehmann, (1989) and Kim and Rhee (1997). Figures 5.13 and 5.14 present 
the trading activity ratio (TAR) for the Upper and Lower limit hits respectively. 
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Figure  5-13: Trading activity ratio (TAR) for the Upper limit hits 
 
 
Figure  5-14: Trading activity ratio (TAR) for the Lower limit hits 
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trading volume and stock price volatility which is often explained by the Mixture of 
Distributions Hypothesis of Clark (1973) subsequently developed by Epps and Epps 
(1976) and Tauchen and Pitts (1983).  An alternative explanation is provided by the 
Sequential of Information Arrival hypothesis (SIAH) of Copeland (1976Farag and Cressy 
(2011).  
 
To explore further the Trading Interference hypothesis, I run a regression (following Kim 
and Rhee, 1997) for the 21-day window for both the Upper and Lower limits within the 
two limit regimes as in equation 14. I exclude the consecutive events for the sake of 
consistency with the volatility spillover analysis. 
 
               jjjj
CBTAV   21 )(                                              (14) 
where: 
          
jV : Squared stock returns as a measure of price volatility. 
         
jTA : The percentage change of turnover ratio as a proxy of trading activity. 
jCB : A dummy variable that equals 1 for stocks that reach Upper or Lower limit 
within CB regime, and equals 0 within SPL regime. 
 
I use the turnover ratio as a proxy for trading activity instead of trading volume per se as 
Farag and Cressy (2011) found that there is an endogeneity problem between trading 
volume and stock price volatility (each determines the other). I estimate the above equation 
for each day of the 21-day window for both Upper and Lower limit hits. 
 
261 
 
According to the literature, I expect a positive relationship between trading activity and 
stock price volatility during the 21-day window. However, in day 0, I do not expect this 
relationship to continue, as price limits interfere with trading activity according to the 
trading interference (TI) hypothesis. The sign of the CB – dummy is expected to be 
positive and significant around event day. This implies an increase in stock price volatility 
due to regime switch from Strict Price Limits to circuit breakers. 
 
To investigate the relationship between regulatory policies and the volume volatility 
relationship, tables 5.14 and 5.15 report the results of the OLS regressions for the Upper 
and Lower price movements as in equation 14. The two models are well specified as the F 
stat is highly significant and the adjusted R squared is reasonably high on event day.  
 
As expected, tables 5.14 and 5.15 report a positive relationship between turnover ratio (as a 
proxy for trading activity) and stock price volatility over the 21-day window for the Upper 
and Lower price movements. This suggests a positive relationship between trading volume 
and stock price volatility. However, this volume–volatility relationship is much stronger 
and highly significant around event day for the Lower and Upper price movements 
respectively
28
.  
 
Interestingly, I find an insignificant volume–volatility relationship on event day (limit hits 
day) and on the first day subsequent to the event or both Upper and Lower limit hits. This 
suggests that regulatory policies (Strict Price Limits and circuit breakers) disrupt trading 
activity according to the trading interference hypothesis.   
                                                          
28
 Although the adjusted R squared is quite low in table 5.14, however, this is consistent with Kim and Rhee 
(1997) as we are interested in the direction (sign) of the volume-volatility relationships not in the explanatory 
power of the model. However we notice that F-statistics are highly significant. 
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Table 5.14: Volume volatility relationship for the Upper limit hits 
 
Day Intercept CB TR Adj R
2
 F.value 
-10 
0.0013
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0004
**
 
(0.0002) 
0.00004 
(0.0001) 
0.0074 2.6455
*
 
-9 
0.0014
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0007
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0002
*
 
(0.0001) 
0.0208 5.7050
***
 
-8 
0.0015
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0010
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0003
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0773 19.544
***
 
-7 
0.0012
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0006
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0002
**
 
(0.0001) 
0.0341 8.8236
***
 
-6 
0.0017
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0011
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0560 14.146
***
 
-5 
0.0013
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0006
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0004
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0239 6.4277
***
 
-4 
0.0014
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0008
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0003
**
 
(0.0003) 
0.0379 9.7202
***
 
-3 
0.0140 
(0.0843) 
0.0834 
(0.1092) 
0.1182
***
 
(0.0417) 
0.0150 4.3669
**
 
-2 
0.0012
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0006
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0004
**
 
(0.0004) 
0.0403 10.290
***
 
-1 
0.0030
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0025
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0006
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.1669 45.363
***
 
0 0.0177
***
 
(0.0004) 
0.0152
***
 
(0.0005) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.6544 78.36
***
 
1 
0.0037
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0024
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.1531 41.030
***
 
2 
0.0014
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0006
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0003
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0163 4.6628
***
 
3 
0.0012
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0004
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0002
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0279 7.3632
***
 
4 
0.0016
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0008
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0002
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0369 9.4785
***
 
5 
0.0014
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0005
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0002
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0323 8.3821
***
 
6 
0.0018
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0010
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0002
**
 
(0.0001) 
0.0377 9.6817
***
 
7 
0.0011
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0004
**
 
(0.0002) 
0.0001
*
 
(0.0001) 
0.0153 4.4516
**
 
8 
0.0017
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0011
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.00002 
(0.0001) 
0.0324 8.4281
***
 
9 
0.0014
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0008
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0003
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0640 16.153
***
 
10 
0.0012
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0004
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0001
*
 
(0.0001) 
0.0213 5.8159
***
 
The table presents the results of equation 14 for the Upper limit hits.  
               
jjjj CBTAV   21 )(                                               
where, 
jV : Squared stock returns as a measure of price volatility,   jTA : The 
percentage change of turnover ratio as a proxy of trading activity, 
jCB : dummy 
variable equals 1 for stocks that reach Upper or Lower limit within CB regime, and 0 
within SPL regime. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
The number of observations varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies 
and the total number of events is 4221 events. 
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        Table 5.15: Volume volatility relationship for the Lower limit hits  
Day Intercept CB TR Adj R
2
 F.value 
-10 
0.0010
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0003
*
 
(0.0001) 
0.00003 
(0.0001) 
0.0045 1.7904  
-9 
0.0012
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0005
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.00001 
(0.0001) 
0.0140 3.4804
**
 
-8 
0.0010
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0003
**
 
(0.0001) 
0.0001
*
 
(0.0001) 
0.0229 5.1069
***
 
-7 
0.0017
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0010
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0003
*
 
(0.0001) 
0.0327 6.9245
***
 
-6 
0.0019
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0013
***
 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0283 6.0977
***
 
-5 
0.0014
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0008
**
 
(0.0003) 
0.00003 
(0.0001) 
0.0109 2.9250
*
 
-4 
0.0011
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0006
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0291 6.2441
***
 
-3 
0.0038
***
 
(0.0008) 
0.0032
***
 
(0.0011) 
0.00004
**
 
(0.0002) 
0.0174 4.1070
**
 
-2 
0.0020
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0012
***
 
(0.0004) 
0.0005
**
 
(0.0002) 
0.0289 6.2000
***
 
-1 
0.0054
***
 
(0.0008) 
0.0046
***
 
(0.0011) 
0.0004
**
 
(0.0002) 
0.0410 8.4796
***
 
0 
0.0180
***
 
(0.0005) 
0.0151
***
 
(0.0007) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.5732 36.00
***
 
1 
0.0021
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0010
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0411 8.5066
***
 
2 
0.0023
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0016
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0002
**
 
(0.0001) 
0.0717 14.519
***
 
3 
0.0018
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0010
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.000
**
 
(0.0001) 
0.0417 8.6144
***
 
4 
0.0013
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0006
***
 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001
*
 
(0.0001) 
0.0425 8.7626
***
 
5 
0.0012
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0005
**
 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0137 3.4380
**
 
6 
0.0018
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0010
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0275 5.9499
***
 
7 
0.0015
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0009
***
 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0175 4.1251
**
 
8 
0.0008
***
 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0016 0.7234 
9 
0.0012
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0004
**
 
(0.0002) 
0.0002
*
 
(0.0001) 
0.0134 3.3710
**
 
10 
0.0013
***
 
(0.0002) 
0.0006
*
 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.01165 3.0476
**
 
The table presents the results of equation 14 for the Lower limit hits.  
               
jjjj CBTAV   21 )(                                               
where, 
jV : Squared stock returns as a measure of price volatility,  jTA : The 
percentage change of turnover ratio as a proxy of trading activity, 
jCB : dummy 
variable equals 1 for stocks that reach Upper or Lower limit within CB regime, and 0 
within SPL regime. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. ***, 
**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The number of observations 
varies across time. It ranges from 180-251 companies and the total number of events is 
4221 events. 
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On the other hand, I also find a positive and significant relationship between the dummy 
variable (CB) and stock price volatility within the Upper and Lower limit hits. This 
suggests that switching from Strict Price Limits to circuit breakers does increase short-term 
stock price volatility rather than cooling down the market as was intended by the regulator. 
These findings are consistent with the volatility spillover hypothesis as regulatory policies 
(not trading activity) cause volatility to spread out few days subsequent to limits hit. 
 
5.5.6 Long term volatility and regime switch 
To further investigate the long-term effect of regime switch on stock price volatility, I 
estimate the Exponential Asymmetry GARCH model (EGARCH of Nelson (1991)) for the 
EGX30 market index over the period 1999-2009 (5 years within SPL regime and 5 years 
within CB regime) and augment it by adding a price limit dummy variable as in equation 
15. The EGARCH model has many advantages over the symmetric GARCH as the 
estimation has no negative parameters ( )(log 2t  
is positive), and so, no non-negativity 
constraints need be imposed on the model parameters as in TARCH-GJR model. The 
EGARCH formula is presented in equation 15 below. 
Leverage effect (the effect of positive and negative shocks on the future conditional 
volatility) is allowed and the parameter   is expected to be negative in sign if the 
relationship between return and volatility is negative. The leverage effect in the EGARCH 
model is exponential rather than quadratic and can be tested by the hypothesis that 0 . 
The impact is asymmetric if 0 . The volatility persistence is measured by  to examine 
whether big (small) shocks are followed by bigger (smaller) shocks.  
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conditional volatility. 
                
2
1
1


t
t


  is the effect of positive and negative shocks on conditional volatility 
(leverage effect).  
tCB  is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CB regime is in operation on 
day t; and zero if the SPL regime is in operation.  
Importantly for our empirical analysis, the sign of   will be positive or negative as 
switching regimes increase or decrease volatility.  Nelson (1991) assumed that the error 
term follows the Generalized Error Distribution (GED). This is defined by 
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where )))/3(ln())2/1()/1(ln()2/1()2ln()/1exp(( vvv  , and v  is a tail thickness 
parameter. When v = 2, tu  
has a Standard ormal distribution. Finally, I use the Berndt- 
Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) technique to maximize the log likelihood function of the 
GED. 
266 
 
To investigate the effect of long-term volatility on regulatory policies, table 5.16 presents 
the results of the augmented EGARCH model. The model is well specified as the log 
likelihood estimation is big compared to the symmetric GARCH model. This suggests that 
the EGARH model fits the daily returns time series of the EGX30 and the temporal 
dependence of return volatility can be captured by the model.  
 
The volatility persistence coefficients  and   are highly significant, however  is 
greater in magnitude than ; this implies that the bigger the market shocks the relatively 
smaller revision expected volatility.  
 
Table 5.16: Augmented EGARCH Estimation 
 
           
EGX30 -0.4949
***
 
(0.0704) 
0.9686
***
 
(0.0068) 
-0.0281
*
 
(0.0167) 
0.0371
***
 
(0.0135) 
0.0296
**
 
(0.0142) 
Log likelihood  5680     
Ljung-Box Q(20) 35.831     
Ljung-Box Q2(20) 18.634     
LMARCH 1.1435     
The table presents the results of the augmented Exponential Generalized autoregressive GARCH 
model as in equation 15. ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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The number of observations varies based on the number of trading days in the EGX across years. 
 
The leverage effect is negative as expected; this suggests that negative shocks have greater 
effect on conditional volatility in the EGX. Most importantly, the CB coefficient is positive 
in sign and highly significant; this suggests that the switch from SPL to CB increases 
future volatility. This result is consistent with the previous analysis. Furthermore, we can 
reject the null that the residuals are serially uncorrelated and homoskedastic. The results of 
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the Ljung-Box Q(20) and Ljung-Box Q
2
(20) for serial correlation and the LMARCH for 
heteroskedastisity are insignificant.    
  
The results of the volatility spillover and delayed price discovery hypotheses in addition to 
the asymmetry EGARCH models show that switching from the SPL to the CB did increase 
stock price volatility in the Egyptian stock market. A potential interpretation to this result 
is as follows: based on the volatility spillover hypothesis, price limits prevent speculative 
traders from responding to the new information and to adjust their portfolios. This implies 
a remarkable delay in price discovery mechanism as current prices are away from their 
equilibrium levels (Farag and Cressy (2011).  
I claim that the price discovery mechanism in the Egyptian stock market varies between 
SPL and CB. Within the SPL as prices hit the limit, trading is suspended until the end of 
the trading session, therefore volatility is expected to spread out over the following day(s), 
Meanwhile, investors have more time (until the following day) to analyse  and to react to 
the new information and then adjust their portfolios accordingly. On the other hand, within 
the CB regime, when prices hit the limit, trading is suspended for 30 minutes. During this 
relatively short time investors have to adjust their portfolios based on the new information 
arriving in the market (Farag and Cressy (2011).  
 
I argue that since herding behaviour and noise trading are dominant behaviours in 
emerging markets, intense trading activity is continued by some speculative traders when a 
trading session is resumed. In addition, the media coverage plays an important role in 
affecting investors’ belies within a trading halt period (Lee et al. 1994) and (Farag and 
Cressy (2011). 
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However, due to the lack of informational efficiency in the Egyptian stock market not all 
investors are being informed with the new information. Therefore investors are unable to 
reveal their demand during the halt period. This suggests that stock prices are expected to 
be much noisier post halt period and significantly different from their equilibrium levels. 
As a result, higher volume and volatility are expected when trading is resumed (Lee et al. 
(1994) and Farag and Cressy (2011)
29
.  
 
5.6 Summary and conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the effect of regulatory policies (price 
limits, circuit breakers) on four main hypotheses, namely, the overreaction hypothesis, 
volatility spillover hypothesis, the delayed price discovery hypothesis and the trading 
interference hypothesis in the Egyptian stock market. In addition, the chapter examines the 
effect of the regime switch (from Strict Price Limits to circuit breakers) on the long-term 
volatility. Moreover, the chapter introduces a comprehensive literature review of price 
limits as well as the theoretical background about the evolution of the different types of 
regulatory policies.  
 
The dataset consists of daily open, high, low and closing prices for all listed shares in the 
Egyptian stock exchange during the period 1999-2009, in addition to trading volumes as a 
proxy for trading activity and market capitalisation as a proxy for size.  Moreover, I use the 
EGX30 - a free-float market capitalisation-weighted index - as a benchmark.  
 
                                                          
29
 These results have been published in the European Journal of Finance (forthcoming) based on my earlier 
work in this chapter. 
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The Egyptian stock exchange (EGX) has unique price limit regimes; this makes studying 
the EGX - amongst a few other stock exchanges i.e. Korean stock exchange - interesting. 
The regulator in the EGX has imposed strict (+-5%) price limits (SPL) for all the listed 
shares since 1996. The limit is activated for a particular stock only when stock return hits 
the Upper or Lower limit, then the trading on this share is suspended to the end of the 
trading session. In 2002 the regulator commenced a new price ceiling system, namely, 
circuit breakers (CB) in which the price limits have winded to (+-20%) for the most 
actively traded shares in the EGX. Within the new CB regime, trading is halted for 30 
minutes when stock return for a particular stock hits (+-10%).    
The results of the overreaction hypothesis show that there is price reversal pattern for the 
Lower limit hits (bad news) one and two days following the event within the two regimes 
SPL and CB respectively. In addition, there is a price continuation pattern for the Upper 
limit hits (good news) within the SPL regime over the event window. This result supports 
the overreaction hypothesis in case of bad news (Lower limit hits) while also suggesting 
the leverage effect in the Egyptian stock market within the two regimes. 
 
Moreover, the results support the effect of firm size on the overreaction hypothesis for the 
Lower limit hits for small firms in particular. This can be explained in the light of the 
literature as volatility is more likely to be higher for small firms (Huang (1997 and (1998)). 
The results do not support the effect of firm size on the overreaction hypothesis within the 
circuit breakers regimes.  
 
The findings of the volatility spillover hypothesis conclude that price limits do not 
decrease volatility as intended in both regimes (SPL and CB). However, volatility is found 
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to be higher within the CB regime whereas, within the SPL regime, volatility is spread out 
over the following two days subsequent to limit hit day.   
These results are consistent with the volatility spillover hypothesis as the price discovery 
mechanism is disrupted when stocks experience greater volatility for a few days post limit 
hits, therefore stock prices are prevented from reaching their equilibrium levels for the 
following few days post-event. These deviations from the true prices are expected to 
prevail within the SPL (+-5%) regime as a trading session is suspended until the following 
day (trading session) when the prices hit their Upper or lower limits. However, within 
wider bands of limits (- +10%) followed by trading halts, investors have chance to adjust 
their portfolios position within the same trading session. Therefore the delay in the price 
discovery process is expected to be higher within the SPL regime. These results are 
consistent with Kim and Rhee, (1997) and Lee et al (1994). 
 
The results of the delayed price discovery hypothesis show that price continuations 
behaviour occurs more frequently within the SPL regime immediately following the event 
(limit hit day). This implies that the price discovery mechanism is delayed by the Strict 
Price Limits. This result is consistent with the delayed price discovery hypothesis. Price 
reversal behaviour seems to occur more frequently within the CB regime compared to the 
SPL regime immediately following the event, thus implying that Strict Price Limits delay 
or prevent the overreactive behaviour, compared to the circuit breakers regime.  
 
The results of the trading interference hypothesis show that there is a sharp increase in 
trading activity on event day (limit hit day) for both SPL and CB regimes for the Upper 
and Lower price movement. In addition, the trading activity on event day (limit hit day) is 
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significantly greater than those within the rest of trading window. This increase in trading 
activity lasts for 1-2 days subsequent to the event.  
 
I interpret these results as follows: within the SPL regime, traders are unable to obtain their 
desired positions on event day. In addition, traders are unable to adjust their portfolios’ 
positions - when prices hit the limit - and are forced to wait until the following day. 
Therefore Strict Price Limits interfere with trading activity. 
 
 On the other hand, within circuit breakers regime, trading activity on average is 
significantly higher than those of Strict Price Limits. Investors within the CB regime have 
the chance to adjust their portfolio positions during the same trading session. However, not 
all investors are informed about the suspension of trading due to the lack of informational 
efficiency in emerging markets. Therefore only one day following the event may be 
required to adjust their portfolios’ position. This result suggests that price limits interfere 
with trading activity and negatively affect the investors’ liquidity positions within the two 
regimes. Moreover, these results are consistent with Lehmann, (1989) and Kim and Rhee 
(1997).  
 
The results of the volume volatility relationship show that there is a positive relationship 
between turnover ratio (as a proxy for trading activity) and stock price volatility over the 
21-day window for the Upper and Lower price movements. However, this positive 
volume–volatility relationship is much stronger and highly significant around event day for 
the Lower and Upper price movements respectively.  
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Interestingly, I find insignificant volume–volatility relationship on event day (limit hits 
day) and on the first day subsequent to the event for both Upper and Lower limit hits. This 
suggests that regulatory policies (Strict Price Limits and circuit breakers) disrupt trading 
activity according to the trading interference hypothesis.   
 
On the other hand, I also find a positive and significant relationship between the dummy 
variable (CB) and stock price volatility within the Upper and Lower limit hits in the short 
run. In addition, I investigate the effect of regulatory policies on the long-term conditional 
volatility, using the augmented EGARCH model. I find that the CB coefficient (dummy 
variable in the conditional variance of the EGARCH model) is positive in sign and highly 
significant, thus suggesting that the switch from SPL to CB increases future volatility.  
 
To conclude, the above results of the volatility spillover and delayed price discovery 
hypotheses in addition to the asymmetric EGARCH model show that switching from the 
SPL to the CB did increase stock price volatility in the Egyptian stock market. A potential 
interpretation to this result is as follows: based on the volatility spillover hypothesis, price 
limits prevent speculative traders from responding to the new information and to adjust 
their portfolios. This implies a remarkable delay in price discovery mechanism as current 
prices are away from their equilibrium levels (Farag and Cressy (2011).  
 
I claim that the price discovery mechanism in the Egyptian stock market varies between 
SPL and CB. Within the SPL as prices hit the limit, trading is suspended until the end of 
the trading session, therefore volatility is expected to spread out over the following day(s). 
Meanwhile, investors have more time (until the following day) to analyse and to react to 
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the new information and then adjust their portfolios accordingly. Within the CB regime, 
when prices hit the limit, trading is suspended for 30 minutes. During this relatively short 
time investors have to adjust their portfolios based on the new information arriving in the 
market (Farag and Cressy (2011).  
 
I argue that since herding behaviour and noise trading are dominant behaviours in 
emerging markets, intense trading activity is continued by some speculative traders when 
trading session is resumed. In addition, the media coverage plays an important role in 
affecting investors’ belies within trading halt period (Lee et al. 1994) and (Farag and 
Cressy (2011). 
 
Due to the lack of informational efficiency in the Egyptian stock market not all investors 
are being informed with the new information. Therefore investors are unable to reveal their 
demand during the halt period. This suggests that stock prices are expected to be much 
noisier post halt period and significantly different from their equilibrium levels; as a result 
higher volume and volatility are expected when trading is resumed (Lee et al. (1994) and 
Farag and Cressy (2011). 
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Table 5.17: Summary of the literature on price limits and circuit breakers 
Authors, date and title Study objective(s) 
Sample description, study period 
and methodology 
Summary of empirical finding 
and conclusion 
Gerety, M. & Mulherin, 
J. (1992) Trading Halts 
and Market Activity: An 
Analysis of Volume at 
the Open and the Close. 
Investigate the performance of the 
daily trading volume under trading 
halts at the open and the close of 
the trading day.  
They used hourly trading volume data 
of three market indices - the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 1933-
1988, the Down Jones (DJ) 30 
industrial index from 1933-1940 and 
the Dow Jones 65 Composite Index 
over the period 1941- 1988.  They 
estimated of expected and unexpected 
volatility following Brock and Kleidon 
(1992), and Davidian and Carroll 
(1987).  
They found that circuit breaker 
leads to an overreaction 
phenomenon rather than cooling the 
market down as was intended. In 
addition they found that the trading 
volume at a closing hour is highly 
related to the previous day’s trading 
volume at the opening hour.   
Santoni, G. & Liu, T. 
(1993) Circuit Breakers 
and Stock Market 
Volatility. 
Looked at the volatility of the 
NYSE under circuit breakers and 
whether or not price limits reduced 
stock price volatility.  
Daily data were collected for the S&P 
500 over the period July 1962 - May 
1991 and using the ARCH model.  
They found that imposing circuit 
breakers did not reduce the stock 
price volatility in the US.  
Lauterbach, B and   Ben-
Zion (1993) Stock 
Market Crashes and the 
Performance of Circuit 
Breakers: Empirical 
Evidence. 
To analyze the behaviour of stock 
prices for small firms after the 
imposition of circuit breakers for a 
selected number of stocks during 
the stock market crash of 1987.   
They used a short window (form 13
th
 
to 28
th
 October) of daily stock prices, 
firm characteristic and order 
imbalances data around the stock 
market crash (1987) from the Tel Aviv 
Stock Exchange (TASE). They regress 
the order imbalances on firm specific 
characteristics. 
 
They found no evidence that circuit 
breakers affected the magnitude of 
the decline but concluded that they 
might have smoothed fluctuations 
in prices, i.e. reduced volatility. In 
addition, they found that during the 
crash (1987) the selling pressure 
were concentrated on both higher 
beta and larger companies. 
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Lee, C, Ready, M, and 
Seguin, P. (1994) 
Volume, Volatility, and 
New York Stock 
Exchange Trading Halts.  
To investigate the effect of trading 
halts on stock price volatility and 
trading volume.  
 
 
They used a sample of 852 trading 
halts of 449 firms on NYSE during 
1988 and followed the price-matched 
case control methodology to isolate the 
volume volatility effects of the price 
impact. In addition, they controlled for 
firm-specific time-of-day effects, the 
amount of information released and the 
relationship between media coverage 
and posthalt activity.  
They found that trading halts 
increase both trading volume and 
stock price volatility by 230% 
higher than following nonhalt 
control.  In addition they found 
little evidence that the flow of 
information is not facilitated by the 
trading halts. Finally they argued 
that media coverage played an 
important role in explaining the 
posthalt price behavior due to the 
increase heterogeneity of investors’ 
beliefs. 
Subrahmanyam, A. 
(1994) Circuit Breakers 
and Market Volatility: A 
Theoretical Perspective. 
Examined the effect of circuit 
breakers (price limit + trading halts) 
on stock return volatility in New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
Daily date of New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA). 
Linear equilibrium and optimization in 
addition to market models.  
Imposing circuit breakers increases 
stock return volatility rather than 
cooling the volatility as intended. In 
addition these regulatory policies 
are not consistent with maximising 
market liquidity objectives.  
George, T. & Hwang, C.-
Y. (1995) Transitory 
Price Changes and Price-
Limit Rules: Evidence 
from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. 
Investigated the stock returns 
volatility during 24 hours for the 
most actively traded against the 
least traded shares listed in Tokyo 
stock exchange (TSE).  
 
Open and close price data were 
collected over the period from January 
1975 to December 1989. They used the 
Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM).  
They found the price limits prevent 
share prices from reaching to the 
equilibrium level when changes in 
share value is associated with order 
imbalance. Therefore, the most 
actively traded shares are exhibited 
price continuation with high trading 
volumes.    
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Lee, S. & Chung, J. 
(1996) Price limits and 
stock market efficiency. 
Investigated the effect of price limit 
on the market efficiency in the 
Korean Stock Exchange KSE.  
They used a sample of thirty active 
individual stocks over the period from 
January 1990 to December 1993, and 
the conditional heteroscedasticity to 
test the efficient market hypotheses.  
The main findings of this paper is 
that the KSE seems to be inefficient 
due to the price limit regime as 
opening prices reflects all the 
information that was not fully 
reflected during the previous 
session due to the limits. 
Kim, K. & Rhee, S. 
(1997) Price Limit 
Performance: Evidence 
from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. 
To examine the price limit 
mechanism and to investigate three 
main hypotheses namely volatility 
spillover, delayed price discovery, 
and trading Interference 
hypotheses.  
 
Daily stock prices date from Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE) over the period 
1989-1992. They used the squared 
stock returns as a measure of volatility 
for all the listed shares in the TSE for a 
21-day window for three different 
events namely; stock hitting the limit, 
stocks hitting 0.90 and 0.80 of the 
limits.  
The main finding of this paper is 
that imposing price limits leads to 
volatility spillover, as price limits 
prevent larger price changes. 
Therefore price limits do not cool 
off volatility but just spread the 
volatility over the subsequent days. 
In addition they found evidence for 
the price continuation hypothesis as 
well as trading inference 
hypothesis.   
Lee, S. & Kim, D. (1997) 
Price Limits and Beta. 
Investigated the effect of price 
limits on the parameters of the 
market model particularly on beta 
in the Koran stock exchange.  
 
They used the methodology of 
restricted regression analysis together 
with the two-pass regression analysis 
(suggested by Cohen et al. 1983) to 
investigate whether the estimation of 
bets is bias or not. The data set consists 
of all listed shares in the Korean Stock 
Exchange over the period 1990-1993.  
The found that the stochastic 
process of the returns and the 
parameters of market models are 
significantly affected by the price 
limits. In addition, they found that 
the estimation of beta is biased and 
unstable over the time. 
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Arak, M. & Cook, R. 
(1997) Do Daily Price 
Limits Act as Magnets? 
The Case of 
Treasury Bond Futures. 
The main objective is to investigate 
whether price limits destabilise 
price behaviour or act as a magnet 
in the U.S. Treasury bond futures 
market.  
Daily price data were collected for the 
US treasury Bonds over the period 
from 1980 to April 29 1987. In order 
to include a day into the data set, the 
absolute value of the overnight price 
change should be twice as the standard 
deviation. Two empirical models were 
used to examine the effect of the price 
limits or news on the change in price.  
They found that price limits lead to 
small price reversal behaviour; this 
suggests the role of price limits as a 
stabilizer in the US futures market.    
Kryzanowski, L. & 
Nemiroff, H. (1998) 
Price Discovery around 
Trading halts on the 
Montreal Exchange using 
trade –by- trade data. 
To examine whether the 
relationship between price 
discovery and the regulatory 
polices (trading halts) are stable 
over time.  
Using 823 trading halts from the 
Montreal stock exchange over three- 
six month sub periods arbitrarily 
chosen over the period 1988-1989. 
They used the mean –adjusted 
generating model to measure the 
Abnormal Returns for stocks that 
experienced trading halts.  
They found that both volatility and 
trading volume tend to increase 
significantly around trading halts 
over the two days subsequent to 
trading halts.    
 
Shen, C.-H. & Wang, L.-
R. (1998) Daily serial 
correlation, trading 
volume and price limits: 
Evidence from the 
Taiwan stock market. 
To examine the effect of price 
limits on the stock return 
autocorrelation, and trading 
volume.  
Daily date from Taiwan stock 
exchange over the period from 
November 1988 to December 1995, 
and using generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) and the (GMM). 
They found evidence of the impact 
of price limits on stock 
autocorrelation; however the 
UpperUpper limit has positive and 
stronger impact than o Lower limit.   
Chen, H. (1998) Price 
Limits, Overreaction, and 
Price Resolution in 
Investigated the overreaction 
hypothesis and the effect of price 
resolution in the futures markets.  
The data set consists of daily prices for 
19 futures contracts. They used the 
event study methodology following 
Ma et al. (1989, 1990) and Gay et al. 
The main results of this paper 
relatively support the futures 
market efficiency with regard the 
information dissemination. In 
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Futures Markets. (1994). addition, little evidence of 
overreaction hypothesis is found in 
the US futures markets.  
Huang (1998), Stock 
Price Reaction to Daily 
Limit moves: Evidence 
from the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange. 
Investigated the overreaction 
hypothesis following up and down 
limit moves.  
The data set consists of all listed shares 
in the Taiwan stock exchange over the 
period 1971-1993. They used the 
market model in the context of the 
event study methodology. 
They found highly significant price 
reversals following up and down 
limit moves; in addition, these 
reversals are not due to size effects. 
Therefore the overreaction 
hypothesis is dominated in the 
Taiwan Stock Market under the 
price limit regime.  
Phylaktis, K., 
Kavussanos, M. & 
Manalis, G. (1999) 
Price limits and stock 
market volatility in the 
Athens Stock Exchange. 
Investigated effect of price limits of 
stock price volatility in the Athens 
Stock Exchange (ASE). In addition 
the paper examined the information 
and overreaction hypotheses. 
The dataset consists of daily and 
monthly closing prices for the most 
active 10 stocks in the ASE over the 
period from January 1990 to June 
1996. They used the serial correlation 
of the daily returns and the time 
varying models (GARCH). 
They found that no effects of price 
limits on stock price volatility, in 
addition their results supported the 
information and the overreaction 
hypotheses in the ASE.   
Kim, K. & 
Limpaphayom, P. (2000) 
Characteristics of stocks 
that frequently hit price 
limits: Empirical 
evidence from Taiwan 
and Thailand.  
Looked at the characteristics of 
shares that frequently hit the limit 
in Taiwan and Thailand stock 
exchanges.  
 
 
The data set consists of daily and 
monthly returns over four years 1990-
1993. They used the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) following 
Gallant (1987) and Ogaki (1993). 
They found that it is highly likely 
for the share to hit the limits if it 
has small market capitalisation 
(small firm effect), high volatility, 
and high trading volume. 
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Corwin, S. & Lipson, M. 
(2000) 
Order Flow and Liquidity 
around NYSE Trading 
Halts.  
Looked at the trading behaviour, 
stock price volatility and shares 
liquidity around halts in the NYSE.  
The data set consists of 469 intraday 
trading halts for the listed shares over 
the period 1995-1996. They compared 
the normal trading activity (non halts 
sessions) with those of trading halts for 
10 days before and after the halt.
  
 
They found consistent results with 
Lee et al. (1994) as volatility tends 
to be higher following trading halts 
as liquidity is decreased around 
trading halts. In addition they found 
higher volume of order submission 
and cancellation around trading 
halts; this suggests that investors 
are trying to adjust their portfolios 
during the halt period. 
Ackert, L., Church, B. & 
Jayaraman, N. (2001) An 
experimental study of 
circuit breakers: The 
effects of mandated 
market closures and 
temporary halts on 
market behaviour. 
Investigated the relationship 
between circuit breakers and both 
trading volume and price dynamics 
in the NYSE futures markets.  
They used experimental methods on 
nine different markets to analyse and 
compare the behaviour of prices under 
three regulatory policies namely; 
temporary halt, no limit effects and 
market closure. 
The main finding of this paper is 
that circuit breakers significantly 
affect trading volume as trading 
activities tend to be higher the 
closer the limit hits. In addition 
they found no impact of temporary 
trading halts on trading profits.   
 
Huang, Y., Fu, T.-W. & 
Ke, M.-C. (2001) Daily 
price limits and Stock 
price behaviour: 
evidence from the 
Taiwan stock exchange. 
To investigate the information and 
overreaction hypothesis in the 
Taiwan stock market. 
The data set consists of all Upper and 
downward limits for consecutive three 
days for all listed shares in the Taiwan 
stock exchange over the period 1990-
1996. In addition the study extended 
the analysis to further investigate the 
intraday limit moves and near-limit 
cases. They used the market model in 
the context of the event study 
The main findings of the paper 
supported both the information and 
the overreaction hypotheses as 
continuation pattern is found in the 
overnight period following the limit 
moves and price reversal behavior 
is reported in the subsequent 
trading days due to noise trading.    
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methodology to examine the overnight 
and trading time Abnormal Returns.  
Holder, M, Ma, C. 
and Mallet, J. (2002) 
Future price limits moves 
as option.  
 
To investigate the information and 
the overreaction Treasury bond 
future prices in the US futures 
market.  
Simulation models were used on the    
Treasury bond futures prices data were 
collected from the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) over the period 1980-
1988.  
They concluded that the price limit 
moves can be predicted three hours 
prior to the first limit move as the 
true futures prices deviate from the 
actual prices In addition they found 
evidence that the overreaction 
hypothesis better explain stock 
prices around price limits than the 
information hypothesis in the US 
future market. 
Christie, W., Corwin, S. 
& Harris, J. (2002) 
Nasdaq Trading Halts: 
The Impact of Market 
Mechanisms on Prices, 
Trading Activity, and 
Execution Costs. 
The main objective of the paper is 
to examine the effect of two 
different reopening mechanisms on 
stock prices, transaction costs, and 
trading activity. 
 
Data set consists of a sample of 714 
news –related halts in Nasdaq over the 
period 1997- 1998 and using a 
matched sample of trading halts and 
non trading halts days. 
They found that the market 
liquidity can be enhanced during 
market closure as trading halts 
allows the dissemination of 
information. They also found 
highly significant increase in the 
trading volume and stock price 
volatility during the 90 minutes 
following halts reopened in the 
following morning.  
Cho, D., Russell, J., 
Tiao, G. & Tsay, R. 
(2003) The magnet effect 
of price limits: evidence 
Investigated the ‘magnet’ effect of 
imposing price limits in Taiwan 
stock exchange. 
Intraday data from Taiwan stock 
exchange (5-min return series on all 
the listed companies from January 3, 
1998 to March 20, 1999). They tackle 
They found evidence of ceiling 
magnet effect but only a weak 
evidence of floor magnet effect. 
They argue that magnet effect is 
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from high-frequency data 
on Taiwan Stock 
Exchange. 
the deterministic volatility pattern by 
standardising the 5-min returns by its 
standard deviations. 
strong evidence against 
overreaction hypothesis so that 
price limits fail as a tool for the 
control of price overreaction.  
McDonald, C & 
Michayluk, D. (2003), 
Suspicious trading halts 
 
To Examine the type of trading 
halts that stimulates investors to 
take advantage due to Paris Bourse 
imperfection.  
The data set consists of daily 
transactions, quotes and orders of all 
continuously traded shares listed on 
the Paris Bourse during 1997-1998. 
They used Wilcoxon rank sums test 
and ANOVA F-test.  
They found that closing price in the 
Paris Bourse can be manipulated by 
some noise traders using trading 
halt mechanism and this leads to 
dramatic decrease in the market 
liquidity for the rest of the trading 
session. 
Chen, A, Chiou, S and 
Wu, C (2004),  
Efficient learning under 
price limits: evidence 
from IPOs in Taiwan 
Investigated the learning behaviour 
by rational investors and the role of 
past information within price limits 
regime (7%) in Taiwan.  
 Daily data of 362 IPOs were collected 
over the period 1991-1998. They 
adopted the methodology of Bossaerts 
and Hillion (2001) and using Fama and 
French 3 factor model to estimate the 
IPO’s benchmark return. 
They found significant and positive 
abnormal return four months after 
IPO. This suggests underreaction 
behaviour due to the delayed 
information hypothesis under price 
limits. 
Naughton, T. & 
Veeraraghavan, M. 
(2004) Stock Exchange 
Are Price Limits Priced? 
Evidence from the 
Taiwan. 
Investigated whether or not price 
limits are priced in the Taiwan 
stock exchange (TSE).  
The data set consists of monthly stock 
returns over the period 1975-1996 and 
using the Fama and French three-factor 
model and augmented it by the price 
limit factor.  
They found that size and price 
limits factors significantly explain 
cross section of stock returns in 
Taiwan. In addition, they found that 
shares that hit the limit less 
frequently have significant returns 
and risk premium as well. 
Chung, J. & Gan, L. 
(2005) Estimating the 
Investigated the relationship 
between price limits and the 
The sample consists of 69 
continuously traded stocks over the 
They found evidence that imposing 
price limits leads to cooling effect 
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effect of price limits on 
limit-hitting days. 
underlying equilibrium prices on 
limit-hitting days. In addition the 
paper examined the two main 
effects namely; Ceiling and 
Cooling off (Heating up) effects.  
period 1987-1997. They used the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the 
effect of price limits on five randomly 
selected shares as well as for all listed 
shares in the Taiwan stock exchange. 
In addition to the mixture normal 
density and the Mixture of 
Distributions Hypothesis (MDH).  
on average stock returns. In 
addition they found significant 
effect of price limits on stock return 
volatility assuming that stock 
returns follow simple normal 
density function. However these 
effects disappear if the mixture 
normal density function is used.                   
Chan, S, Kim, K and 
Rhee, J. (2005). Price 
limit performance: 
evidence from 
transactions data and the 
limit order book 
Investigated the effect of imposing 
wider price limits on price 
discovery mechanism, information 
asymmetry and order imbalance in 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) of Malaysia.  
They used order flow data and real-
time transaction data over the period 
from Jan. 1995 to Dec.1996. Using the 
methodology of Madhavan and Smidt 
(1991) and Choi and Subrahmanyam 
(1994), they identified two main 
groups namely limit-hit group and 
non-hit group and comparing the pre- 
and post-hit periods. 
They found no evidence that price 
limit enhance information 
asymmetry, in addition they found 
that price limits delay the 
information flow and lead to order 
imbalance. 
 
Chen, G.-M., Kim, K. & 
Rui, O. (2005) A note on 
price limit performance: 
The case of illiquid 
stocks. 
To investigate whether illiquid 
stocks are highly affected by price 
limits and more vulnerable to 
hitting the limit more frequently 
than liquid shares. 
Daily data of 83 firms (A-shares and 
B-shares) over the period from July 
1999 to December 2002 from the 
Chinese stock exchange. 
Following the methodology of Kim 
and Limpaphayom (2000), they run a 
regression to examine the relationship 
between the wider bid-ask spread and 
the frequency of limit hitting for liquid 
and illiquid stocks.   
They found that B-shares are less 
liquid and have wider bid-ask 
spread than those of A-shares this 
may lead to hitting the price limit 
more frequently than those of A-
shares. They also found positive 
and systematic relationship between 
bid-ask spread and tendency to hit 
the limits.   
283 
 
Chou, P.-H., Lin, M.-C. 
& Yu, M.-T. (2005) Risk 
aversion and price limits 
in futures markets. 
Investigated the relationship 
between price limits and default 
risk and whether price limits can 
reduce the effective margin 
requirements and to minimise 
default risk in the Taiwan futures 
market.  
Using optimization problem and the 
extended Brennan (1986) model on a 
numerical example from Taiwan stock 
exchange.  
They found evidence that price 
limits can actually reduce the cost 
of contracts and the margin 
requirements only for low risk 
aversion investors. In addition they 
found that price limit is not an 
efficient tool to cool down the 
futures market price volatility for 
risk averse investors.  
Chou, P.-H., Li, W.-S. 
Lin, J.-B. &Wang, J.-S. 
(2006) Estimating the 
VaR of a portfolio 
subject to price limits 
and non-synchronous 
trading.  
To investigate the potential bias at 
the VaR estimation due to the 
infrequent trading and price limits.  
Using daily stock returns of all listed 
shares in the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
(TSE) together with the Over the 
counter market over the period 1998-
2003 they estimated the Value at Risk 
(VaR) using the two-limit type Tobit 
model and following the methodology 
of Scholes and Williams (1977). 
They found that the simulation 
models were reasonably well 
specified in TSE except for the 
OLS even in case of higher 
volatility when prices hit the limits. 
Madura, J., Richie, N. & 
Tucker, A. (2006) 
Trading Halts and Price 
Discovery. 
Investigated the consequences of 
the trading halts and investors’ 
reaction pre, during and post 
trading halts in NASDAQ.  
 
Data of 656 trading halts were 
collected in NASDAQ in 1998. They 
compared the price behaviour pre, 
during and post trading halts in order 
to examine investors’ reaction to the 
halts.  
They found significant Abnormal 
Returns pre and during the halts 
period in NASDAQ, in addition 
they found no significant Abnormal 
Returns post trading halts. 
Bildik, R. & Gulay, G. 
(2006) Are Price Limits 
Effective? Evidence from 
the Istanbul Stock 
Iinvestigated the effects of price 
limits on the volatility spillover, 
delayed price discovery, and 
The data were collected from Istanbul 
stock market over the period 1998 – 
2002. They used the methodology of 
They found that volume weighted 
average prices (VWAP) provide 
stronger evidence for the volatility 
spillover, delayed price discovery, 
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Exchange. trading interference hypotheses.  Kim and Rhee (1997). 
 
and trading interference hypotheses 
compared with limit moves.    
Abad, D & Pascual, R. 
(2007) 
On the Magnet Effect of 
Price Limits. 
Investigated the magnet effect of 
the price limits in the Spanish stock 
exchange (SSE).  
Data were collected for 114 listed 
shares over the period from 2001-
2003. They compared trading sessions 
with limits hit with other normal 
trading sessions (no limit hits).  
Using FGLS they found that regime 
switch does not create magnet 
effect of price limits in the Spanish 
stock exchange.  
Kim, H, Yague, J. & 
Yang, J. (2008). 
Relative performance of 
trading halts and price 
limits: Evidence from the 
Spanish Stock Exchange. 
 Looked at the trading activity, 
liquidity, stock price volatility in 
addition to price discovery 
mechanism in the Spanish stock 
exchange around trading halts and 
price limit hits.  
The dataset consists of daily returns, 
trading volume for the listed shares in 
the Spanish Stock Exchange over the 
period January 1, 1998, and April 30, 
2001. They analysed the Abnormal 
Returns over 10 days around trading 
halts. 
They found that both trading 
volume and volatility increases 
immediately after trading halts. 
However, liquidity tends to be 
higher within trading halts.  
 
Kim, Y. & Yang, J. 
(2008) The effect of 
price limits on intraday 
volatility and information 
asymmetry. 
Investigated the relationship 
between price limits and both 
information asymmetry and 
intraday price volatility by 
investigating the information and 
the overreaction hypotheses in the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE).  
They used transaction data for all listed 
shares in the TWSE during 2000 to 
calculate stock returns and variances 
during 5-minute in either 30 or 15 min 
before and after the limit hits.  
They found that there is a dramatic 
decrease in price volatility 
following consecutive limit hits; in 
addition they found that price limits 
are unable to reduce information 
asymmetry in the TWSE. 
Wong, W., Liu, B. & 
Zeng, Y. (2009) Can 
price limits help when 
the price is falling? 
Investigated the intraday dynamics 
of magnet effect (ceiling and floor) 
of the price limits in the Shanghai 
Intraday (5-min price returns half an 
hour prior to the limit hits) data were 
collected over the period January 2002 
to December 2002. They used the 
They found evidence of trading 
activity acceleration and higher 
volatility when prices approach to 
limit hit, in addition they found 
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Evidence from 
transactions data on the 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. 
Stock Exchange (SHSE).  methodology of Du et al. (2005). asymmetric price limit effect 
between ceiling and floor limit hits 
as trading volume tends to be lower 
when stock prices approach the 
floor limits. 
Hsieh, P.-H. & Yang, J. 
(2009) A censored 
stochastic volatility 
approach to the 
estimation of price limit 
moves. 
They examined stock returns under 
price limits as equilibrium prices 
are unobservable when share prices 
hit the limit.  
Data were collected form a sample of 
two actively traded shares in the 
Taiwan stock exchange TSE in 
addition to two futures contracts in the 
Chicago Board of Trade CBOT. They 
used the censored stochastic volatility 
model. 
They suggested that portfolio 
managers may use the CSV model 
to model return time series under 
price limits to obtain better 
estimates for risk.  
 
Jiang, C, Mclnish, T. & 
Upson, J. (2009). 
The information content 
of trading halts. 
Investigated the effect of trading 
halts on the informationally related 
shares in the NYSE.  
 
The dataset consists of daily stock 
returns for the halted shares in the 
NYSE over the period 2003-2005.  
They used the methodology of Spiegel 
and Subrahmanyam (2000). 
They found direct impact of 
liquidity and high correlation 
between halted and reference 
stocks. In addition the effect of the 
liquidity is found to be more 
significant for small firms. 
Hsieh, P. & Kim, J. & 
Yang, J. (2009). 
The magnet effect of 
price limits: A logit 
approach. 
 
Investigated the magnet effect 
using new approach, namely, the 
logit approach to control for the 
macroeconomic variables in the 
Taiwan stock market.  
Transactional data are collected for all 
listed shares in the Taiwan stock 
exchange TWSE. They used the logit 
model to control for the microstructure 
variables and stock price behaviour.  
The main findings of this paper 
supported the magnet effect in the 
Taiwan stock exchange as they 
found significant increase of the 
conditional probability of stock 
prices when the prices reach their 
Upper limits and the opposite is 
correct when prices approach the 
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lower limits. 
Kim, K. & Park, J. 
(2010) Why Do Price 
Limits Exist in Stock 
Markets? A 
Manipulation-Based 
Explanation. 
Investigated the relationship 
between the levels of corruption 
together with the quality of public 
enforcement of the likelihood of 
adopting price limits regime. 
Corruption data were collected as a 
proxy of market manipulation a sample 
of stock exchange all over the world. 
They found high direct relationship 
between the level of corruption 
together with low-quality public 
enforcement and the likelihood of 
adopting price limits. In addition 
they found no significant 
relationship between the 
information asymmetry and price 
limits regime. 
Farag, H. and Cressy, R.  
(2011) Stock Market 
Regulation and News 
Dissemination: Evidence 
from an Emerging 
Market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigated the relationship 
between the changes in regulatory 
policies namely the switch from 
Strict Price Limits to circuit 
breakers on stock price volatility. In 
addition, they investigate the 
relationship between regulatory 
policies and the information arrival 
modes using two competing 
hypotheses, namely, the Mixture of 
Distributions Hypothesis (MDH) 
and the Sequential of Information 
Arrival Hypothesis (SIAH). 
Data for the market index EGX30 and 
trading volumes were collected from 
the Egyptian stock exchange over the 
period 1999-2009. 
They found that the mixture of 
distributions hypothesis is 
prevailing within the Strict Price 
Limits; however the sequential of 
information arrival hypothesis is 
prevailing within the circuit 
breakers regime. In addition, the 
switch from the SPL to CB leads to 
an increase in volatility due to the 
information inefficiency and noise 
trading in the Egyptian stock 
market. 
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Chapter 6 : Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter includes summary and main conclusions of the study. In addition, I present 
the main policy implications of the findings as well as suggestions for future research. 
This study investigates both short and long-term overreaction phenomenon. Moreover, the 
study examines the role and the effect of regulatory policies (price limits/circuit breakers) 
on the overreaction hypothesis in the Egyptian stock market. The Egyptian Stock market is 
considered one of the leading emerging markets in the Middle East and North Africa 
region (MENA) according to the statistics of the WFE (World Federation of Exchanges). 
 
The literature survey revealed that the overreaction phenomenon is regarded one of the 
newly added stock market anomalies. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) are the first to 
empirically examine the overreaction hypothesis in the finance literature. De Bondt and 
Thaler argue that price reversals can be predicted using only past return data. Therefore 
stock returns are predictable and this implies a clear violation of the weak-form market 
efficiency. Therefore the overreaction hypothesis is “Loser portfolios constructed using 
past information (stock returns) outperform those of Winners”.  
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue that large stock price movements will be followed by 
price reversals in the opposite direction. This suggests that stock returns exhibit negative 
serial correlation over longer horizon, therefore investors may earn abnormal return by 
exploiting this long-term mispricing.  
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Chapter two of this thesis presents a comprehensive literature survey of the overreaction 
phenomenon in both developed and emerging stock markets. The literature survey shows 
that the overreaction hypothesis has been extensively investigated in developed markets. 
However, few studies have been carried out on emerging markets. Emerging stock markets 
are regarded as less efficient, and therefore there is a possibility to achieve abnormal 
returns by exploiting market imperfection. 
 
Chapter three investigates the short-term overreaction using a novel methodology, namely, 
the dynamic panel data model using system GMM. Moreover, the chapter introduces a 
comparison between the traditional size portfolios and the so called fixed effects portfolios. 
In addition, chapter three investigates the unobservable factors which cause the company 
heterogeneity.  
 
Chapter four on the other hand, investigates the long-term overreaction phenomenon for all 
listed shares in the Egyptian Stock exchange. I present in chapter four the theoretical 
arguments of the abnormal returns measurements in addition to the alternative explanations 
of the long-term overreaction phenomenon. Moreover, chapter four investigates the 
relationship between regulatory policies and long-term overreaction. I augment the 
traditional Fama and French three-factor model by including the contrarian factor and the 
unobservable (fixed effect) factor based on the company heterogeneity.   
 
Chapter five introduces a comprehensive literature review of the different types of 
regulatory policies (price limits and circuit breakers) as well as the theoretical background 
about the evolution of the different types of regulatory policies. The chapter also examines 
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the effect of regime switch (from Strict Price Limits to circuit breakers) on the four main 
hypotheses, namely, overreaction, volatility spillover, the delayed price discovery and the 
trading interference hypotheses in the Egyptian stock market. The chapter also investigates 
the impact of regulatory policies on the dynamic relationship between volume volatility 
relationships. Finally, the chapter examines the effect of the regime switch on the long-
term conditional volatility.  
 
6.2 Summary of the main findings 
Chapter two of the thesis includes a comprehensive literature survey of the overreaction 
phenomenon. I present the literature on the short- and long-term overreaction in both 
developed and emerging markets. Moreover, I analyse the possible interpretation to the 
overreaction phenomenon, namely, the variation of risk (beta), seasonally and size effects, 
bid-ask spread and the tax hypothesis. In addition, I analyse the overreaction to specific 
events such as the overreaction to corporate actions (merger, acquisition and earnings and 
dividends announcements), overreaction to rumors and overreaction to the international 
sport championships results. Finally, I critically discuss the main arguments of the 
opponents of the overreaction phenomenon.  
 
I find that both short- and long-term overreaction phenomenon have been extensively 
investigated in developed markets in the 1980s and 1990s using both cumulative average 
abnormal return (arithmetic and rebalancing method) and the buy and hold method. 
However, a new strand of literature has recently investigated the overreaction phenomenon 
in emerging markets. The literature survey shows that there is a debate about the existence 
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of the overreaction phenomenon itself and whether or not the change in risk factor (beta), 
firm size, seasonality, and bid-ask spread are the main sources of contrarian profits.   
The existing body of the literature has investigated the overreaction phenomenon using 
either cross section or time series dimension. However, none of the existing studies has 
combined the two dimensions using panel data model cross section time series (CSTS). 
Ignoring time dimension may lay the estimation open to bias (Cressy and Farag (2011). 
Moreover, none of the existing studies has investigated the overreaction phenomenon using 
the dynamic panel data model and system GMM in particular. 
 
Regulatory policies (price limits and circuit breakers) play an important role in cooling 
down stock market volatility in both developed (trading halts) and emerging markets. 
However, none of the existing body of the literature on the overreaction has investigated 
the link between regulatory policies and overreaction hypothesis. The above mentioned 
gaps in the literature are the main motivation for this thesis. 
 
Chapter three empirically investigates the short-term overreaction hypothesis using a novel 
methodology, namely, dynamic panel data.  In this chapter I compare the traditional and 
dynamic panel data models to investigate the short-term overreaction and price reversal 
phenomena in the Egyptian stock market. Using daily price data from the Egyptian stock 
market on a sample of 100 companies which experienced dramatic one-day price change as 
the result of main four events over the period 2003 to 2009, I find negative and significant 
abnormal returns as the result of terrorist attacks for the subsequent three days post-event. 
However, the Lebanon war as a proxy for the tension in the Middle East region has no 
effect on the average abnormal returns in the Egyptian stock exchange. 
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There is no significant average abnormal return as the result of the announcement of the 
constitutional change and the formation of the new government. In addition, I find that past 
Losers significantly outperform past Winners over 120 days post-events. Therefore 
investors can beat the market and exploit market imperfection to achieve abnormal return. 
The traditional fixed and random effects models show that the sign of lnmcap (our proxy 
for firm size) is positive for both Losers and Winners. This suggests the underlying 
company heterogeneity in the data and a biased estimation of the OLS regressions.  
 
The system GMM results are consistent with the estimation of the two-way fixed effects 
model and in contrast with the cross-sectional regressions; this confirms the concealed 
company heterogeneity and the biased estimation of the OLS. I find also evidence of the 
leverage effect as size coefficients are highly significant for Losers (negative shocks) but 
insignificant for the Winners (positive shocks). Moreover, I find evidence of insider 
information and market inefficiency as the leakage of information variable is found 
positive in sign and highly significant for all the events.  
 
Most importantly, I find that low fixed effects portfolios outperform high fixed effects 
portfolios as the dummy variable DumQ (our proxy of company heterogeneity) is found 
negative for all events and highly significant for the Losers. 
 
One of the main contributions of this chapter is to construct the so called fixed effects 
(unobservable) portfolios. I find that low fixed effects portfolios for Losers not only 
outperform those of high fixed effects, but also outperform small and big size portfolios. In 
addition, the arbitrage portfolio LMH )fixed effects) outperforms the SMB portfolios on 
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average. High fixed effects Winners outperform low fixed effects portfolios on average, 
however small size portfolios outperform those of big size on average. This result is new to 
the literature as I argue that the portfolio formation based on fixed effects may be used as a 
new profitable construction strategy to achieve higher abnormal return than the traditional 
size portfolios. 
 
To identify the potential unobservable factors, I found a positive and significant 
relationship between the political connections of the board members and the company 
heterogeneity in addition and, interestingly, I found an inverse relationship between both 
management quality and corporate governance compliance with the company 
heterogeneity. This suggests that the better the management quality the lower the company 
heterogeneity and the more efficient the share price. 
 
To conclude, investors can exploit the Egyptian market imperfection and achieve abnormal 
returns as a result of major events. Past Losers significantly outperform past Winners post-
events over the event window. The panel data approach adds a new dimension to the 
existing models and offers interesting insights and reveals the importance role of 
unobservable firm-specific factors in addition to the observable size in the analysis of the 
overreaction phenomenon. Finally, constructing portfolios based on some unobserved 
factors i.e. management quality, corporate governance and political connections of board 
members significantly outperform traditional portfolios based on size.  
 
Chapter four investigates the long-term overreaction for all listed shares in the Egyptian 
Stock exchange and whether or not the overreaction phenomenon can be attributed to size, 
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length of formation period, time varying risk and seasonality effects. Based on the results 
of chapter three that the fixed effects portfolios outperform traditional size portfolios, I 
investigate whether the contrarian and the unobservable (fixed effect) factors are priced or 
not by using the augmented Fama and French  three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model. 
 
The chapter also investigates the academic debate regarding the measures of the long-term 
performance (CARs vs BAH) in addition to the different types of biases and measurement 
errors in contrarian strategies i.e. bid-ask spread, Survivorship bias, data- snooping bias, 
data mining bias, look-ahead bias, rebalancing bias and the non-synchronous trading bias.   
Following Fama (1998) I adopted the rebalancing RB CARs approach as it implies fewer 
theoretical and statistical problems than long-term Buy and Hold. In addition, Roll (1983) 
argues that using monthly returns is less likely to be affected by the choice of CARs or BH. 
Dissanake (1994) argues that the BH approach may lead to less benefit from diversification 
in the longer term. Moreover, Loughran and Ritter (1996) claim that there is a little 
difference between BH and CARs in test period returns calculations, and they argue that 
the results of Conrad and Kaul (1993) are affected by the survivorship bias.     
 
I find evidence of genuine long-term overreaction in the Egyptian stock market and this 
phenomenon is not attributed to size effect. Past Losers outperform past Winners for Big 
and Small firms. Therefore investors can earn significant abnormal returns by buying 
Losers and selling Winners. In addition, the findings suggest that the overreaction 
phenomenon in the Egyptian stock market is not sensitive to the length of the formation 
period. 
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One of the main contributions of this chapter is the first to link the overreaction 
phenomenon with regulatory policies. Results show that within the strict price limit 
regime, there is no significant market-adjusted abnormal return by adopting the contrarian 
strategy (for the two non-overlapping portfolios) as Losers continue to be Losers and 
Winners continue to be Winners and thus there is no positive abnormal return for the 
arbitrage portfolio.  
 
On the other hand, the overreaction phenomenon is clear during the circuit breaker regime 
for both short (two years) and longer (four years) test periods. Results show positive and 
highly significant market-adjusted abnormal returns for the arbitrage portfolio. The main 
interpretation for this is the delayed price discovery hypothesis as imposing price limits 
prevent stock prices from reaching their equilibrium levels (Kim and Rhee, 1997).  
 
The stability of beta results shows that beta for Loser portfolios – in the aggregate test 
period- are highly significant and outperform those in the rank period. This suggests that 
Losers are more risky during the test period. On the other hand, betas of the Winner 
portfolios in the rank periods significantly exceed those of test periods. The change in beta 
from rank to test period is negative and highly significant. We also notice that betas of the 
Losers are greater than those of Winners in the aggregate test period. This suggests that 
beta is not constant over time throughout the rank and the test periods. These results are 
consistent with Chan (1988) and Gaunt (2000).  
 
I also find evidence of the January effect in the arbitrage portfolio, as we notice positive 
and highly significant abnormal return in January and negative and highly significant 
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abnormal returns in December. This result is consistent with the literature on the calendar 
effect and the tax–loss hypothesis as investors tend to sell Losers by the end of December 
to increase the capital losses and to reduce the tax burden at the end of the financial year 
followed by buying Winners in January. I also find significant and positive abnormal 
return in June and July as the vast majority (84%) of the listed companies in the Egyptian 
stock exchange have June as the end of their financial year. This suggests that the 
significant abnormal return resulting from the overreaction phenomenon in the Egyptian 
stock market is not mainly due to the seasonality effect.  
 
The results of the augmented Fama and French and the Carhart (1997) models show that 
the HML loadings are positive in sign for the Losers and negative for the Winners. This 
suggests that value stocks (high book-to-market ratio) outperform growth stocks (low 
book- to-market ratio) for the Losers and the opposite is correct for the Winners.  In 
addition, the contrarian factor LMW is positive for the Losers and negative for the 
Winners. This implies that Losers outperform Winners. Interestingly, HMLFE (High 
minus Low fixed effects) is negative in sign for both Winners and Losers; this suggests 
that lower fixed effects portfolios are positively correlated with portfolios return. This 
result is consistent with main findings of the system GMM of chapter three. Finally, size 
effect has a minor role in explaining portfolio returns in the Egyptian stock exchange. 
 
To conclude, results show evidence of genuine long-term overreaction phenomenon in the 
Egyptian stock market. The contrarian profits of the arbitrage portfolio cannot be attributed 
to the small firm effect, formation period length, or seasonality effect. In addition, the 
study highlighted the strong relationship between regulatory policies and the long-term 
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contrarian profits. Results show no evidence of contrarian profits within the Strict Price 
Limits, however there are clear contrarian profits within circuit breakers regime. I find that 
the contrarian factor LMW is positive for the Losers and negative for the Winners. This 
suggests that Losers outperform Winners. Moreover, HMLFE is negative for both Winners 
and Losers and this suggests that lower fixed effects portfolios outperform higher fixed 
effect portfolios and are positively correlated with the portfolios return.  
 
Chapter five investigates the effect of the regime switch (from Strict Price Limits to circuit 
breakers) on the overreaction, volatility spillover, the delayed price discovery and the 
trading interference hypotheses in the Egyptian stock market. The chapter also examines 
the effect of the regime switch on the long-term conditional volatility.  
 
The results of the overreaction hypothesis show that there is price reversal pattern for the 
Lower limit hits (bad news) one and two days following the event within SPL and CB 
regimes respectively. However, there is a price continuation pattern for the Upper limit hits 
(good news) within the SPL regime over the event window. This result supports the 
overreaction hypothesis in cases of bad news (Lower limit hits). Moreover, the results 
support the effect of firm size on the overreaction hypothesis for the Lower limit hits for 
small firms in particular. This can be explained in the light of the literature as volatility is 
more likely to be higher for small firms (Huang (1998). However, results do not support 
the effect of firm size on the overreaction hypothesis within the circuit breakers regimes.  
 
The results of the volatility spillover hypothesis show that price limits do not decrease 
volatility as was intended in both regimes. However, volatility is found to be higher within 
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the CB regime. Within the SPL regime, volatility is spread out over the following two days 
subsequent to limit hit day.  These results are consistent with the volatility spillover 
hypothesis as price discovery mechanism is disrupted when stocks experience greater 
volatility few days post limit hits, therefore stock prices are prevented from reaching their 
equilibrium levels for the following few days post-event.  
 
These deviations from the true prices are expected to prevail within SPL (+-5%) regime as 
the trading session is suspended until the following day (trading session) when the prices 
hit their upper or lower limits. However, within wider bands of limits (- +10%) followed 
by trading halts investors have chance to adjust their portfolios position within the same 
trading session. Therefore the delay in price discovery process is expected to be higher 
within the SPL regime. These results are consistent with Kim and Rhee, (1997) and Lee et 
al (1994). 
The results of the delayed price discovery hypothesis show that price continuations 
behaviour occurs more frequently within the SPL regime. This implies that price discovery 
mechanism is delayed by the Strict Price Limits. This result is consistent with the delayed 
price discovery hypothesis. Price reversal behaviour seems to occur more frequently within 
the CB regime compared to the SPL regime, which suggests that strict price limit delays or 
prevents the overreactive behaviour, compared to the circuit breakers regime.  
 
The results of the trading interference hypothesis show that there is sharp increase in 
trading activity on event day (limit hit day) for both the SPL and CB regimes for the Upper 
and Lower price movement. In addition, the trading activity on event day (limit hit day) is 
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significantly greater than those within the rest of trading window. This increase in trading 
activity lasts for one-two days subsequent to the event.  
 
I interpret these results as follows: within the SPL regime, traders are unable to obtain their 
desired positions on event day. In addition, traders are unable to adjust their portfolios’ 
positions - when prices hit the limit - and are forced to wait until the following day. 
Therefore Strict Price Limits interfere with trading activity. 
 
On the other hand, within the circuit breakers regime, trading activity on average is 
significantly higher than those of Strict Price Limits. Investors within the CB regime have 
the chance to adjust their portfolio positions during the same trading session. However, not 
all investors are informed about the suspension of trading due to the lack of informational 
efficiency in emerging markets. Therefore only one day following the event may be 
required to adjust portfolios’ position. This result suggests that price limits interfere with 
trading activity and negatively affect the investors’ liquidity positions within the two 
regimes. Moreover these results are consistent with Lehmann, (1989) and Kim and Rhee 
(1997).  
 
The results of the volume volatility relationship show that there is positive relationship 
between turnover ratio (as a proxy for trading activity) and stock price volatility over the 
21- day window for the Upper and Lower price movements. However, this positive volume 
volatility relationship is much stronger and highly significant around event day for the 
Lower and Upper price movements respectively. Interestingly, I find an insignificant 
volume–volatility relationship on event day (limit hits day) and on the first day subsequent 
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to the event for both Upper and Lower limit hits. This suggests that regulatory policies 
disrupt trading activity according to the trading interference hypothesis.   
 
On the other hand, I find a positive and significant relationship between the dummy 
variable (CB) and stock price volatility within the Upper and Lower limit hits in the short 
term. This suggests that volatility is found to be higher within the CB regime. In addition, I 
investigate the effect of regulatory policies on the long-term conditional volatility, using 
the augmented EGARCH model. I find that CB coefficient (dummy variable in the 
conditional variance of the EGARCH model) is positive in sign and highly significant, thus 
suggesting that the switch from SPL to CB increases conditional volatility.  
 
To conclude, the above results of the volatility spillover and delayed price discovery 
hypotheses in addition to the asymmetric EGARCH model show that switching from the 
SPL to the CB did increase stock price volatility in the Egyptian stock market. A potential 
interpretation to this result is as follows: based on the volatility spillover hypothesis, price 
limits prevent speculative traders from responding to the new information and to adjust 
their portfolios. This implies a remarkable delay in price discovery mechanism as current 
prices are away from their equilibrium levels (Farag and Cressy (2011).  
 
I claim that the price discovery mechanism in the Egyptian stock market varies between 
SPL and CB. Within the SPL as prices hit the limit, trading is suspended until the end of 
the trading session, therefore volatility is expected to spread out over the following day(s), 
Meanwhile investors have more time (until the following day) to analyse  and to react to 
the new information and then adjust their portfolios accordingly. Within the CB regime, 
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when prices hit the limit, trading is suspended for 30 minutes. During this relatively short 
time investors have to adjust their portfolios based on the new information arriving in the 
market (Farag and Cressy (2011).  
 
I argue that since herding behaviour and noise trading are dominant behaviour in emerging 
markets, intense trading activity is continued by some speculative traders when trading 
session is resumed. In addition, the media coverage plays an important role in affecting 
investors’ beliefs within the trading halt period (Lee et al. 1994) and (Farag and Cressy 
(2011). 
 
However, due to the lack of informational efficiency in the Egyptian stock market not all 
investors being informed with the new information. Therefore investors are unable to 
reveal their demand during the halt period. This suggests that stock prices are expected to 
be much noisier post halt period and significantly different from their equilibrium levels 
and as a result higher volume and volatility are expected when trading is resumed (Lee et 
al. (1994) and Farag and Cressy (2011). 
6.3 Contribution of the study 
The study contains many methodological contributions. The main contribution of chapter 
three is the use of the dynamic panel data model in investigating the overreaction 
phenomenon. Panel data approach adds a new dimension to the existing models and offers 
interesting insights and reveals the importance role of unobservable firm-specific factors in 
addition to the observable size in the analysis of the overreaction phenomenon (Cressy and 
Farag 2011). I use the unobservable factors (fixed effects) as a new methodology to 
construct portfolios compared with the traditional size portfolios. The chapter investigates 
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the potential unobservable factors and concludes that management quality, corporate 
governance and political connections of the board of directors are the main unobservable 
factors which may add new insight to the existing panel data models.  This chapter is the 
first in the literature to investigate the relationship between firms’ corporate governance 
compliance as well as the political connections of the board of directors and the 
overreaction phenomenon. 
 
The main contribution of chapter four is that it is the first to link the long-term overreaction 
phenomenon with the change in regulatory policies, namely, the switch from Strict Price 
Limits to circuit breakers.  In addition, this study is the first to augment the Fama and 
French three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model by including the 
contrarian factor and the unobservable factor based on the company heterogeneity. 
The main contribution of chapter five is that it is the first to investigate the effect of regime 
switch (from Strict Price Limits to circuit breakers) on the overreaction, volatility spillover, 
the delayed price discovery and the trading interference hypotheses.  
 
Finally, this study is the first to empirically investigate both the short- and long-term 
overreaction phenomenon and the relationship between regulatory policies and the 
volatility spillover, the delayed price discovery and the trading interference hypotheses in 
the Egyptian stock market as one of the leading market in the Middle East and North 
Africa region (MENA). 
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6.4 Research limitations 
The vast majority of the well-documented and most influential studies of the overreaction 
phenomenon are focused in developed markets (US and UK). This is due to the availability 
and the reliability of the data from different sources and data bases. Emerging markets are 
considered less informationally efficient and transparent. This feature makes conducting 
research on emerging markets rather difficult. The sources of the data in this thesis are 
from a range of sources, namely the Egyptian stock exchange, Egypt for Information 
Dissemination Company (EGID) and the Capital Market Authority in addition to the 
companies’ annual reports. There is no published intraday (hourly) trading data available 
to the researcher; this kind of data would have enabled one to investigate intraday volatility 
and its relationship with regulatory policies. In addition, there is no published data on both 
bid and ask prices in addition to margin buying data. Finally, the Egyptian stock market is 
considered a thinly traded market and less liquid compared with developed markets, and 
this limits valid comparison of results to other markets. 
 
6.5 Policy implication of the findings 
The thesis has clear policy implications; firstly, from the viewpoint of investors, it provides 
clear evidence of stock market imperfection, namely, stock market overreaction. Investors 
and fund managers in particular are trying to explore a potential violation of efficient 
market hypothesis and to exploit emerging market imperfection to achieve abnormal 
returns on their portfolios. The opportunities are limited in well developed markets. 
Therefore, emerging markets are essential for the international portfolio investments. The 
long- and short-term overreaction phenomenon in the Egyptian stock markets encourages 
both local and international investors and fund managers to well diversify their portfolio 
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risk and to achieve abnormal returns. The Egyptian stock market provides a suitable 
investment environment to investors all over the world as there is no tax on either 
dividends or capital gains, in addition to the strong legal and regulatory institutional 
settings compared with other emerging markets.   
 
Since the short selling strategy, which is not widely used in the Egyptian stock market, 
investors may adopt one of the following two trading strategies base on the overreaction 
hypothesis. Firstly, at the end of each trading day, investors may buy shares that 
experience a particular event and to sell it at the end of the following trading session, 
Brown et al. (1988) and Lob and Rieks, (2011). Secondly, investors may buy Losers based 
on stocks past performance or unobservable factors and sell Winners at the end of 
particular investment holding period. 
 
From the perspective of regulators, exploring market imperfections and a potential market 
anomaly works as an early warning system to the regulator. Emerging stock markets are 
known to be more volatile and less efficient than well established markets. In particular, 
thinly trading markets are likely to be more risky and therefore the effect of shocks is 
greater than in larger, established markets.  
 
The regulatory authorities in all markets are trying their best to raise the level of market 
efficiency and to make sure that stock prices do not depart from their true economic values. 
The vast majority of emerging markets are thinly traded markets; therefore raising the level 
of market efficiency encourages share buying and increases the market liquidity. Most 
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importantly, market efficiency facilitates the process of resource allocation in the 
economy, and it gives a message to the current management (Fama, 1976).   
 
On the other hand, due to the greater volatility of emerging markets, the regulator adopts 
price limits and circuit breakers to cool markets down during times of panic and to reduce 
excessive price volatility. However, despite the potential benefits of price limits and circuit 
breakers, much recent empirical research in this area finds that they are not fit for purpose: 
they do not reduce volatility. This is found to be true for both developed and developing 
markets. See for example, Santoni, and Liu (1993), Subrahmanyam (1994), Kim and Rhee 
(1997), Phylaktis et al. (1999), Lee and Chung (1996), Ryoo and Smith (2002) and Kohers 
et al. (2004). 
 
Following Lee and Chung (1996) and Ryoo and Smith (2002) I argue that the Weak Form 
market efficiency hypothesis is violated in the Egyptian stock exchange due to the effect of 
price limits. The thesis finds consistent results with Lee and Chung (1996) as closing 
prices do not fully reflect all the information arriving in the market when prices hit the 
limits. Therefore price limits prevent prices from reaching their equilibrium levels. There is 
an obvious policy implication beyond this as we can firstly, identify the right band of price 
limits. Secondly and most importantly, the regulator should consider the potential tradeoff 
between market efficiency and the excessive volatility. 
6.6 Suggestions for future research 
 
Several suggestions for future research can be identified. Firstly, examine empirically the 
profitability of different trading strategies such as selling Winners short and buying Losers 
(the disposition effect). This could be done by collecting data on the short selling 
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transactions on the Egyptian stock exchange. Secondly, more attention could be given to 
comparing the profitability of both contrarian and momentum strategies. Momentum 
strategy – by contrast of overreaction hypothesis- assumes that Losers continue to be 
Losers and Winners continue to be Winners and thus the disposition effect does not exist.  
 
Thirdly, to investigate the generalisability of the results of the dynamic panel data model 
by using data from other emerging and developed markets; in particular those emerging 
markets which have similar characteristics of regulatory policies i.e. the Korean stock 
exchange.  
 
Fourthly, the potential definitions of the unobservable factors (management quality, 
corporate governance compliance and political connections of the board members) might 
be taken into consideration when estimating the GMM model. Controlling for these factors 
may lead to better explanation to the overreaction phenomenon and to overcome the 
potential omitted variables problem.  
 
Fifthly, as there are few stock markets that have the regime switch features, i.e. Korean 
stock market, future research might compare the effect of regime switch on the volatility 
spillover, delayed price reaction and the trading interference hypotheses. Furthermore, 
more attention should be given to those stock markets which operate from Sunday-
Thursday while the vast majority of the well developed markets are closed. This creates the 
notion of the 24/7 trading phenomenon. Finally, investigating the relationship between 
regulatory policies and the intraday volatility is another future research suggestion.  
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